

School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA)

Haiti: A Future beyond Peacekeeping*

Under the Academic Leadership of
Professor Elisabeth Lindenmayer
Director of the United Nations Studies Program
(UNSP)

Sean Blaschke, Andrew Lucas Cramer, Marcy Hersh, Carina Lakovits, Leila Makarechi,
Alejandro Gomez Palma

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The willingness of the United Nations (UN) and the international community to seek a lasting and effective strategy towards Haiti has been underscored by high-level visits to the country by the Secretary General and members of the Security Council, the recent donor conference of April 2009 and the June 15, 2009 appointment of former president William J. Clinton as the United Nations Special Envoy to Haiti. However, as the global economic crisis continues to unfold and security threats and humanitarian emergencies in the Middle East and Africa persist, keeping international attention focused on Haiti will be a challenge. And yet, there are compelling reasons why Haiti should continue to matter. This research report examines the engagement of the UN in Haiti, particularly focusing on the seventh mission, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The report addresses the link between security and development in fragile states, a link acknowledged in ongoing discussions within the UN Security Council and among bilateral donors and other international bodies regarding the importance and limitations of peacekeeping. The case of Haiti highlights the challenges faced by the international community when dealing with weak or fragile states. As a number of destabilizing events in 2008, including the international food crisis and natural disasters, have demonstrated, political and security gains are not enough to bring lasting peace to the country. But despite widespread recognition that establishing a link between security and development is a priority in Haiti, a common strategy to establish this link has proven elusive.

Moving beyond the security development debate. A major challenge facing the UN Security Council and the international community is that security continues to be perceived as separate from development. Certainly, a definition of security as strictly limited to security sector reform and policing is not sustainable. The single largest threat to stability and lasting peace is the lack of livelihood opportunities for Haiti's poor, either through formal employment or agricultural activities. As long as the Security Council chooses to define peace as the absence of war or conflict, and to deal primarily with only "hard security" issues, the sources of instability and fragility in Haiti will not be adequately addressed. The history of UN engagement in Haiti and the current conditions facing the majority of Haitians require an approach that acknowledges that both security and development efforts are needed simultaneously. An integrated recovery and development strategy that can quickly deliver results in employment and livelihood opportunities is needed to ensure that security gains already achieved by MINUSTAH are not lost. At the same time, a quick-impact strategy for economic security will not be sustainable unless there is a concomitant effort to build the legitimacy, capacity and credibility of the Haitian state.

State-building and governance: the link between security and development. The Haitian state continues to lack the capacity and authority (legal, financial, institutional, and technical) to provide basic services, or to regulate and coordinate the non-state providers of those services (NGOs, faith-based organizations and development agencies). The limited presence of the government, especially in the rural areas beyond Port-au-Prince, contrasts sharply with the scale and visibility of the peacekeeping mission. The credibility of the government depends on a visible, concerted and

legitimate effort on its part to increase the welfare of average Haitians. The Haitian government, with the assistance of the international community, must pursue an explicit strategy to assert its role in the regulation and supervision of basic services by others (e.g. security, social protection, livelihood opportunities, education, health, and private sector development). At the same time, it must strengthen its capacity to provide those services it considers strategic for the functioning of the Haitian state (e.g. civil registry, fiscal reform, land-tenure reform, and education). This will create a basis to construct a social contract between Haitians and the state. Although it may take many years to consolidate, a social contract is one of the most important factors needed for an inclusive and transparent political process to emerge. The crossroads facing the Haitian people, and indeed the international community, may not be the choice between security or violence, or poverty or development, but rather one between chronic fragility and the consolidation of functioning, democratic state institutions.

A question of political will and leadership. Without sufficient political will and leadership on the part of the international community, little seems possible. The appointment of former US President William J. Clinton as the United Nations Special Envoy for Haiti presents an opportunity to exert this leadership and bring numerous international actors together behind a clearly defined strategy. A focused and united international community is a prerequisite for establishing a meaningful and lasting compact with the Haitian government. Firstly, a united proposal is necessary to enable the international community to establish transparent mechanisms of accountability with both the executive and parliamentary branches of the government. Furthermore, because there is no structural authority that formally has jurisdiction over the many actors and partners involved (bilateral donors, international financial institutions, NGOs, development agencies and the UN family), *political* leadership is needed to provide that coordination and *de facto* authority for a concerted and strategic engagement with Haiti. Finally, experience has shown that state-building is necessary in implementing any sustainable security or development initiative. Even for a quick-impact economic security strategy, for example, the need to build the authority, legitimacy and credibility of the Haitian state cannot be neglected. To date, there exists no formal institution within the international community with the necessary political leverage and capacity to lead an integrated and clearly defined state-building strategy. Haiti's neighbors in the region such as the US, Canada, Brazil and other Latin American countries, are faced with the opportunity for effective leadership.

Haiti is fragile, but not failed. In the last fifty years, Haitians have endured dictatorships, political repression, military coups, and, at times, the absence of law and order. However, despite the violence of its recent past, Haiti is not a failed state. Although Haiti did not experience a civil war and therefore does not present the typical profile of a post-conflict country as some African countries with which it is often grouped (including Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone), it faces a number of similar challenges. Weak state institutions, a taxing electoral calendar and a fledgling democratic process based on the 1987 Constitution burden Haiti. Conflicts between Parliament and the executive branch of government are common, as are potential overlaps in authority between the offices of the president and the prime minister. Moreover, the economic elite are highly influential and have the potential to act as security spoilers to seek, keep, or maximize power, income, authority, or position. However, for all of its shortcomings, lack of cohesiveness and

institutional frailty, the current government of President René Garcia Prével and Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-Louis has electoral legitimacy and is attempting to communicate with political actors and the international community, albeit with limited success. It is important to note that many of the things for which the Haitian government is often criticized (corruption, lack of priority-setting, lack of institutional and technical capacity, lack of leadership), are not unique to Haiti. However, as long as the political process in the country continues to be conflict-prone and vulnerable, efforts by the international community to assist Haiti will require the participation and agreement of different sectors of Haitian society, as well as unified political leadership from the president and the prime minister.

What makes Haiti a fragile state? A number of elements contribute to the fragility of the Haitian state, beginning with the extreme poverty that directly affects approximately eighty percent of individuals and households, particularly women and youth; the limited capacity of the government to provide basic public services, such as security, social protection and livelihood opportunities; and the conflicting interests and strategies among political actors and the economic elite. At the core of Haiti's fragility is the near absence of a social contract between the Haitian state and its citizens. Abstract notions of state authority and legitimacy become very concrete to the average Haitian when faced with the incapacity of the state to respond to his or her basic needs and expectations. The lack of a social contract magnifies the ability of private interest groups – often the economic and political elite to influence the political process and create conflict, further compromising the ability of the Haitian state to carry out basic functions. The result has been a vicious cycle of political conflict, social unrest and the threat of widespread violence.

Repeated efforts and multiple missions of the UN in Haiti. As the most recent mission authorized by the UN Security Council, MINUSTAH was established in 2004 in response to deteriorating security conditions in Haiti. After more than a decade of UN peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, the Security Council and the broader international community recognized that peacekeeping alone would not be able to address the underlying factors contributing to instability in Haiti. Perhaps the single most important lesson to be gleaned from repeated missions to Haiti are that a broader state-building strategy is needed, not *instead of* but *in addition to* peacekeeping. This recognition is reflected in the particular mandate given to MINUSTAH: Resolution 1524 established it as a multidimensional integrated mission that seeks to combine the efforts of the political, security, humanitarian and development arms of the UN. The Security Council also mandated the mission to undertake important institution-building activities in the areas of political process, police reform and the rule of law. As an integrated mission, MINUSTAH formally includes all of the UN family of agencies. However, these can only account for approximately twenty percent of international development assistance to Haiti. MINUSTAH itself does not have a development mandate, therefore, it cannot address one of the underlying causes of Haiti's fragility. Other actors must play this role based on a coordinated strategy and common vision. Security and development cannot be sequential. Progress on security and socio-economic developments are inextricably intertwined; the one has an immediate bearing on the other.

The recent crises are a looking glass for Haiti's continued fragility. Although MINUSTAH was able to achieve important gains, particularly in the area of security sector reform and elections, the UN's

broader goal of creating lasting security and establishing sustainable and democratic state institutions in the country has proven elusive. The April 2008 ouster of Haitian Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis in the wake of the international food crisis and the oil price increases of 2007 and 2008 underscored the continued volatility and precariousness of the political process in the country. The devastation caused by tropical storms and hurricanes in August and September of 2008 also highlighted the extreme environmental vulnerability of the country and the still limited capacity of the government to adequately address the issues of food insecurity and emergency preparedness and response. The latent threat to stability stemming from the Parliament, as well as other political actors, is also exemplified by the recent controversy surrounding June's parliamentary elections, as well as the unrest regarding minimum wage.

Security and political gains are not enough. The progress made by MINUSTAH and the Haitian government in the areas of security and political process in recent years has not translated into improvements in the socioeconomic conditions faced by the majority of Haitians, particularly women and unemployed youth. For four out of five Haitians – those who live on less than \$2 US a day – there is an expectation that the very visible presence of the UN and the international community should translate into concrete improvements in their living conditions. MINUSTAH, *by definition*, will not meet these expectations, as it cannot be the agent of development in Haiti. It can only create the security conditions that will allow development actors to act. A clear and unifying development strategy that is comparable in scale and visibility to the deployment of more than 7,000 peacekeepers does not exist. Instead, we observe a wide array of development actors, each with an individual mission, strategy and focus.

Threats facing Haiti are also potential threats for the region. The importance of the regional context for Haiti cannot be overstated. As the region's poorest and most fragile country, Haiti is fertile ground for drug trafficking and organized crime, which in turn poses a threat to the security of the region as whole. The proximity of Haiti to the US and increasing interest from Latin American countries have resulted in the commitment of regional powers to invest in Haiti's development and growth. The increase in the numbers of Haitian refugees (to the US, Canada and Dominican Republic), during times of political and social upheaval, along with the increasing importance of the Haitian Diaspora and support from members of the US Congress, all serve to augment the importance of renewed and more effective engagement with Haiti. Haiti's neighbors will continue to have a vested interest in not seeing conditions in the country deteriorate.

Is a renewed compact possible between Haiti and the international community? An impasse between the international community and the Haitian government has existed for years. The causes of this impasse include the following:

- a) Haitian history is a source of pride, but also ambivalence towards the international community. The occupation by the US between 1915 and 1934 established a clear precedent of foreign intervention, one that has lasted to the present. After decades of aid and peacekeeping, the presence of the international community, including the UN, has become an important factor in Haiti's political processes. Sources of funds, power, authority and legitimacy in the country have been linked repeatedly to foreign powers. As a result, the

relationship between Haiti and the international community is often marked by mutual blame and distrust.

- b) From the perspective of the Haitian government, the international community has not always fulfilled its commitments of assistance. Because it is so heavily dependent on foreign assistance, the Haitian government is keenly aware of instances in which assistance has been delayed, modified, or conditioned, or when pledges have failed to materialize into actual assistance.
- c) Among bilateral donors and development agencies, the most often cited criticisms of the government include its lack of clear priorities, a lack of effective leadership, institutional incapacity, insufficient absorptive capacity, lack of transparency and widespread corruption. As a result, some donors are unwilling to channel funds through the government, preferring instead direct assistance to NGOs, which in turn undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the state. It would seem that the April donor conference might have been an important milestone in assessing whether the impasse has been resolved. However, the \$324 million pledged by the international community at the Washington conference has yet to be disbursed.

A new window of opportunity. The research findings suggest that, despite recent setbacks, including the crises faced in 2008, there is a unique window of opportunity for renewed engagement with Haiti. The challenge for the international community is to go beyond a piecemeal and perfunctory development effort and move towards a coordinated and sustained strategy that will allow Haiti, as a sovereign but fledgling democracy, to break out of the conflict-poverty trap. The Haitian government, for its part, has produced a general vision for poverty reduction, “Vers un nouveau paradigme de cooperation.” There is also a consolidated *Post-Disaster Needs Assessment* that was produced in response to the 2008 crises. Moreover, certain conditions for economic development are favorable in light of the renewed interests and commitments of the US, the enactment of the 2008 HOPE II Act, which expands trade preferences to Haiti’s textile industry, and the engagement of the world’s foremost experts, including Jeffrey Sachs and recently, Paul Collier, in designing a strategy for economic recovery in Haiti. Based on their proposals, the government of Haiti has laid out a clear plan, including the creation of 150,000 jobs in the next two years through the reconstruction of infrastructure, the expansion of export zones for the garment industry and the enhancement of agricultural productivity. This will require a new partnership between the Government of Haiti, the private sector and all other international partners. If successful, it will send clear signals to potential spoilers and those that have benefited from the status quo that a new way forward for Haiti is emerging. With renewed hope in the future, the people of Haiti will have the opportunity to work together to fulfill the promise of prosperity that has eluded their country for so long.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	2
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	7
List of Acronyms	8
1 Introduction	9
2 The History of Haiti.....	11
2.1 A Difficult Beginning.....	11
2.2 From Isolation to Intervention.....	11
2.3 Haiti and the International Community: Ambivalence and Distrust.....	12
3 Recent International Engagement and MINUSTAH.....	12
3.1 Multiple Missions before 2004.....	12
3.2 Minustah: the Security Council Responds.....	14
3.3 Mandate: Intent, Interpretation and Evolution.....	14
3.4 Significant Achievements.....	15
4 The Fragility of the Haitian State	14
4.1 Elements Contributing to Haiti’s Fragility.....	20
4.2 Socio-Economic Trends Localized: Demographics, Poverty, Inequality, Livelihoods and Unemployment.....	21
5 Persistent Challenges and the Potential for Instability	24
5.1 <i>Lavichè</i> : The April Food Riots.....	25
5.2 Food Insecurity in Haiti.....	26
5.3 The Impact of the 2008 Hurricane Season.....	27
5.4 Livelihoods	28
6 Human Security Threats	30
6.1 Security for All: Women, Men, Adolescents and Children	31
7 Beyond the Security-Development Debate.....	33
7.1 The Importance of Building State Capacity	35
7.2 State Authority and Government Credibility	36
7.3 The Challenges of Effective Public Administration	37
8 Haiti in a Regional Context.....	38
8.1 Challenges and Opportunities	38
8.2 Strategic Interests: Is Stability Possible without Development?	40
8.3 The Haitian Diaspora: An Untapped Resource	41
9 Haiti: A Future beyond Peacekeeping?.....	42
9.1 Past Challenges and Deadlock.....	42
9.2 The Importance of the State.....	43
9.3 The Importance of Political Will and Leadership.....	44
9.4 Epilogue – A Change of Paradigm in 2009?.....	44
APPENDICES.....	46

List of Acronyms

CARICOM	Caribbean Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Plan
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GIA	Governor's Island Agreement
GOH	Government of Haiti
HDI	Human Development Index
HNP	Haitian National Police
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ILAS	Institute of Latin American Studies
MICAH	Civilian Support Mission in Haiti
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission
MNF	Multi-National Force
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSP	Non-State Providers
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
QIP	Quick Impact Project
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNPOL	United Nations Police
VSN	Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1 Introduction

This research project was conceived in the early months of 2008, shortly before Haiti underwent its latest series of dramatic events. Over the course of the academic year, six graduate students at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, under the academic leadership of Professor Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Director of the UN Studies Program, conducted in-depth research on the nature of UN peacekeeping, the problems of fragile states and the challenges of consolidating peace and stability in Haiti. The team completed numerous interviews in New York and traveled to Haiti in January 2009, where the UN peacekeeping mission was their generous host.

Over the course of previous years, Haiti had experienced a period of sustained growth and held great signs of promise. The election of President Rene Prével in February 2006 was widely considered to be a success and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was able to contribute to a more secure and stable environment. However, events in 2008 rapidly set the country back, severely undermining the recent progress. Violent riots in the wake of the global food crisis led to the ouster of the Prime Minister in April 2008 and the country was left without a functioning government for nearly five months. Shortly after, in September and October 2008, four consecutive hurricanes and tropical storms struck the country and wiped out fifteen percent of the country's GDP within a period of three weeks.²

Haiti demonstrates the difficulties that the international community faces when dealing with weak states mired in endemic political instability, destitution, hunger and disease. After twenty years of UN involvement and more than US\$5 billion in foreign assistance, the country still suffers from extreme poverty, severe environmental degradation, unpredictable bursts of violence and the near absence of government at all levels of society. The latest in a long list of UN Peacekeeping Missions, MINUSTAH was established in 2004 to secure a peaceful and stable environment, but the country remains vulnerable to external shocks and internal political manipulation and instability.

As the research team traveled throughout Haiti in January 2009, the limitations of the UN peacekeeping instrument came into sharp relief. Since the end of 2006, when UN troops disrupted gang activities in Cite Soleil and other urban slums, security has improved, but the majority of the people continue to face the same desperate living conditions. Jobs remain elusive, basic commodities, including food, water and shelter, are difficult to obtain, access to health care and education remains a luxury, and violence against women and girls is widespread. In this context, the potential to mobilize the masses of disaffected, unemployed, destitute youth remains high and Haitian security continues to rest in fragile balance.

Haiti is the only country in the world formed after a successful slave revolt. The significance of the Haitian revolution should not be minimized: while the transatlantic slave trade was still thriving, Haitian slaves rose up against their French masters and in 1804 founded the only black republic in

² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Haiti Flash Appeal 2008 – Revision," (19 December 2008)

the Americas. The extraordinary circumstances of the country's independence remain a symbol of hope to Haitians. They give substance to the belief that, despite its recent history of lowered expectations and shattered optimism, the country will eventually be able to lift itself out of chronic poverty and political instability. As Prime Minister Michelle Pierre-Louis told the team of researchers, belief in hope is the only option: "We have to be able to [achieve an] 'Obama effect'. It's like the Haitian revolution. No matter what happens, [it] is an epiphany. This is what I expect from my Haitian citizens."

This research would not have been possible without the generous support of several important donors and collaborators. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) at Columbia University together supported the travel to Haiti and the conference that took place at Columbia University on April 7, 2009 where the team was able to present their findings. The team is particularly grateful for the invaluable support of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Hedi Annabi, and all of MINUSTAH, who were so generous with their time and consideration during the numerous interviews that took place in country. Finally, the team would like to express its appreciation to Professor Elisabeth Lindenmayer for her leadership, inspiration and dedication throughout the project.

2 The History of Haiti

2.1 A Difficult Beginning

The history of Haiti has been one of constant struggle between conflicting interests and deeply antagonistic race relations. The legacy of its violent birth and the subsequent periods of international isolation and intervention strongly influenced the development of the country's societal structure and its institutions. Governance in Haiti has carried with it a consistent theme of autocracy, where consent to rule has often been obtained through force, and violent upheavals, rather than democratic process, bring about political change.

The French slave colony of Saint-Domingue was the most prosperous in the world.³ At different points in its history, it was the world's foremost producer of coffee, rum, indigo and cotton. By 1789, it was responsible for seventy-five percent of the world's sugar production.⁴ Saint-Domingue was also arguably the most brutal colony. From 1784 to 1791, the average number of slaves imported annually into the colony was around 29,000.⁵ Once in the colony and enduring gross excesses of violence and cruelty, the average lifespan of the slaves was between four and seven years, requiring a consistent supply of fresh labor from Africa. As in other former colonies, Haiti's historical legacy of sharp class and racial divisions remains, 200 years later, a fundamental obstacle to achieving a unified vision for addressing the country's endemic poverty and economic insecurity.

Slavery in Haiti began with white French owners and black African slaves. Soon, a third element was added, the children of African mothers and French fathers. The mulattoes, known as the *gens de couleur*, formed a class of citizen that adopted French customs and shunned the black masses unless it was in their interest to use them for their own gain. Prior to the revolution, the land-owning and increasingly wealthy *gens de couleur* strategically separated themselves from the masses and sought to create a system of equality based on material wealth rather than race.⁶ As slave owners, it was in their interest to maintain the system of slavery intact. In 1790, when the French Assembly passed a number of decrees that gave autonomy to the colonies and extended the right to vote to free men who owned property – without specifying race – the mulatto elite began pushing for full economic and political rights.⁷ Social hierarchy in the colony was thus primarily based upon shades of skin color, an element that continues to permeate contemporary Haiti.

2.2 From Isolation to Intervention

The existence of a country founded as a result of the only successful slave revolt in the world was a direct threat to the other slave-holding nations at the time. In Haiti's young neighbor to the north, Robert Hayne, a senator from South Carolina, lamented at the time, "We never can acknowledge

³ Coupeau, Steeve, *The History of Haiti*, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), p.18

⁴ Farmer, Paul, *The Uses of Haiti* (Common Courage Press, 1994), p. 63

⁵ Ibid, p. 63

⁶ Fatton Jr., Robert, *The Roots of Haitian Despotism* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 30 July 2007), p. 47

⁷ Ibid, p. 46

Haiti's independence . . . The peace and safety of a large portion of our union forbids us even to discuss it."⁸

Diplomatic isolation, however, did not eclipse economic interest. Europe and the US competed to establish trade relations with Haiti, which, despite the destruction wrought by the liberation struggle, still commanded considerable wealth. The economic elite that emerged from the revolutionary struggle were intent on restoring the country to its former position as a dominant agricultural producer, with an export-oriented economy that relied on the continued toil of the peasantry. For decades, beginning with Toussaint L'Ouverture and Jean-Jacque Dessalines, Haitian leaders used forced labor to maintain the economic system established during the colonial era.⁹ Their efforts, however, were not successful and by the end of the nineteenth century, small landholders engaged in subsistence farming dominated the countryside. The Haitian state's financial situation was extremely weak due to loss of exports, declining terms of trade, and reparations paid to France for the losses it sustained during the revolution.¹⁰

By the early twentieth century, autocratic rule continued unabated and caused unremitting political instability. Political actors increasingly used the peasantry as a tool to dethrone incumbent leaders. In a practice that appears to have been perfected in Haiti's recent history, the peasant class was routinely recruited to serve as private militias to foment violent political change. From 1908 to 1915, seven Haitian governments were overthrown in this way.¹¹ The US, intent on consolidating its power in the hemisphere and on containing instability in the region, invaded Haiti in 1915. Under US stewardship, class divisions within Haiti were exacerbated and the centralization of political power in Port-au-Prince was institutionalized.¹² Haitians living in the countryside were subjected to forced labor to develop the infrastructure that would better enable the US to maintain control over the country. Further control was also ensured with the creation of the Haitian military, which became the institution that, more than any other, would dictate the rise and fall of subsequent presidents.¹³

2.3 Haiti and the International Community: Ambivalence and Distrust

Historically, the international community has not always fostered functioning democratic institutions within Haiti. The election of 1957 brought Dr. Francois Duvalier to power.¹⁴ In the Cold War context, Dr. Duvalier was able to exploit both his position as an anti-communist and Haiti's geographical position to maintain US military and economic assistance starting in the 1950s. Millions of dollars were pledged for major infrastructure projects, and, in exchange for the Haitian

⁸ Heintz, Robert Debs and Nancy Gordon Heintz, *Written in Blood* (University Press of America, Inc. 1996), p. 149.

⁹ Fatton (2007), p. 81

¹⁰ World Bank, "Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti: A Country Social Analysis," (27 April 2006), p. 2

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 132

¹² Maguire, Robert et al., *Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood* (Diane Pub Co., August 1996), p. 5

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6

¹⁴ Dr. Duvalier was a soft-spoken country doctor who had played a pivotal role in eradicating the yaws epidemic that had infected the Haitian countryside. Traveling the breadth of Haiti and curing hundreds of thousands of the crippling disease, he became known to Haitians as "Papa Doc." His desire to reconstitute Haitian society by emphasizing the injustices the black majority suffered at the hands of the elite deteriorated into a brutal dictatorship. Abbot, Elizabeth, *Haiti, An Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers* (Simon and Schuster, 1988), p. 55.

government's pivotal vote to impose sanctions on Cuba at the 1962 meeting of the Organization of American States, Haiti received US\$2.8 million to construct the Francois Duvalier Airport.¹⁵ Ironically, as Dr. Duvalier emphasized his anti-communist stance to the outside world, he was consolidating government control over the Haitian economy at home.¹⁶ Like past autocratic rulers, he maintained his power through violent suppression of dissent. An essential component of this strategy was the creation of the *Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale* (VSN), known throughout Haiti as the *Tontons Macoutes*.¹⁷ With this control apparatus, along with a well-established network of loyal functionaries in all branches and agencies of the government structure, and with the state as the dominant actor in the economy, the Duvalier regime became "permanent and hereditary."¹⁸

When Jean Claude Duvalier assumed power in 1971 following the death of his father, his plans to modernize Haiti gained support from Washington, international financial institutions, and foreign governments. His regime received tens of millions of dollars annually in the form of foreign assistance throughout the 1970s.¹⁹ Under the framework of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the assistance was based on the assumption that substantial economic growth could be achieved through the establishment of an assembly industry that relied on Haiti's comparative advantage of low-cost labor.²⁰ The situation for the majority of Haitians, however, did not improve. Moreover, the influx of well-funded development experts did not prevent key ministries within the Haitian State, such as agriculture, education, public works and justice, deteriorating until they posed a negligible presence outside of Port-au-Prince. This precipitated migration from rural areas to the capital, and those unable to secure jobs in the assembly industry settled to create large slums throughout the city. Instead of delivering basic services to the growing urban population, the State predated upon the people, extracting the limited resources of the Haitian peasantry through the office of taxation, the army, and the *Tontons Macoutes*.²¹

The fall of the Jean Claude Duvalier regime in 1986 created five-and-a-half years of political crisis in Haiti.²² International involvement in Haiti during this time did little to promote democratic transition, or to address the pervasive poverty in the country, as the focus of the international community was on the electoral process rather than on addressing the underlying political processes that were the cause of instability.²³

¹⁵ Maguire, p. 6-7

¹⁶ Dr. Duvalier created new state institutions, such as the National Bank of Haiti; the Development Bank; the *Régie du Tabac*, which monopolized the purchase, manufacture and sale of tobacco; along with control over various telephone, electricity, and air transport services. By 1962, the state represented eighteen percent of the GNP. Dupuy, Alex, *The Prophet and the Power: Jean Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, and Haiti* (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2007), p. 37.

¹⁷ The VSN was the main tool by which Dr. Duvalier neutralized any form of opposition, whether coming from the business community, the church, or trade unions. Perhaps most importantly, the VSN was used to pacify the national army and recruit supporters from around the country. World Bank (27 April 2006), p. 60.

¹⁸ Dupuy, p. 37

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 8

²⁰ Kumar, Chetan, "Sustainable Peace as Sustainable Democracy: The Case of Haiti," (April 1999), p. 4

²¹ Maguire, p. 8

²² This period saw the rise and fall of four military-dominated governments. On one side, the Duvalierists struggled to maintain hegemony over the state structure and its resources. On the other, a broad-based popular movement pushed for democratic governance that could address the needs of the impoverished majority. The US was considered the balance between these opposing camps. Dupuy, p. 57

²³ *Ibid*, p. 27

3 Recent International Engagement and MINUSTAH

3.1 Multiple Missions before 2004

UN political involvement in Haiti began in the early 1990s. Following the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, four violent and turbulent years marked by military rule, coups and countercoups and a series of aborted or fraudulent elections ensued. It soon became clear to international observers that any return to constitutional rule would require the assistance of the international community. The elections organized in January 1990 and supported by a joint mission between the OAS and the UN promised the onset of a new era of popular, democratic rule for Haiti: for the first time in Haiti's history, the marginalized masses – the *moun andeyo* – found a common voice and swept the radical young priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, into power.²⁴ But hope was short-lived. Seven months into his term, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed by a military coup. The traditional political and economic elite were not prepared to yield part of their power and influence in the country. Haiti relapsed into three years of military-backed rule and violent backlash against Aristide supporters.

It was not until 1993, when the Security Council imposed a worldwide fuel and arms embargo that the *de facto* regime was forced to the negotiation table. Previous attempts to impose sanctions had proven ineffective and could not prevent individual trading partners, including the US, to bypass the sanctions regime for their national economic interest. A long series of efforts led to the Governors Island Agreement (GIA) between the *de facto* regime and the exiled president in July 1993. The GIA established a roadmap for the restoration of constitutional rule in Haiti and the eventual return of Aristide. But the regime reneged on the agreement and, following Aristide's explicit request, the Security Council authorized a US-led Multi-National Force (MNF) to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership."²⁵ This was the first time in the UN's history that the Council mandated the use of force to remove an unpopular regime and restore democratic rule in a member state.²⁶ Once a "secure and stable environment" was established, the MNF would hand operations over to a UN Peacekeeping Mission. The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) deployed in October 1994 with the core aims of "sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase"; "professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force"; and assisting the Haitian authorities in the organization of free and fair elections.²⁷

In subsequent years, the Security Council authorized a total of four follow-on missions. Although the composition and civilian staff of those missions largely remained in place, their mandates and military staff components were gradually narrowed down.²⁸ Throughout the 1990s, the Security Council seemingly lacked a strategic, long-term perspective of the needs of the country and the

²⁴ Fatton, Robert Jr., *Haiti's Predatory Republic – The Unending Transition to Democracy*. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2002), p.28.

²⁵ Security Council Resolution 940 (1994).

²⁶ Malone, David, "Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?" *International Relations*, (2006), p. 153.

²⁷ Security Council Resolution 940 (1994).

²⁸ Interview, Lisbeth Cullity, MINUSTAH Chief of Human Rights Section (13 January 2009)

possible ways in which they could be addressed.²⁹ The different UN missions deployed in the 1990s were the result of political bargaining among members of the Security Council, rather than a reflection of the UN's broader objectives in the country. They were, in short, "diplomatically convenient rather than operationally sound."³⁰

The first peaceful transfer of power in Haiti's history took place in 1996 when President Aristide's term ended and his handpicked successor, Rene Préval, took office. One year later saw the beginning of the political crisis that would paralyze Haiti for the coming decade. After divisions emerged within Aristide's party, *Organisation Politique Lavalas (OPL)*, Aristide withdrew his supporters to form his own party, the *Fanmi Lavalas*. Controversy over the elections in 1997 led to a rift between the executive and Parliament and the resignation of Prime Minister Rosny Smarth. The legislative branch refused to approve Préval's appointments and the country was left without a prime minister for nearly two years. As a result of the political crisis, investment dried up and aid flows were either suspended or could not be disbursed.

The 2000 elections that reinstated Aristide as president lacked legitimacy. The opposition boycotted the elections and the OAS refused to assume a monitoring role. UN engagement in the country became particularly unproductive as Aristide's government became increasingly authoritarian and defiant vis-à-vis the international community. Political violence in the country increased again during those years, as protests and strikes were crushed by government-sponsored gangs – the *chimeres* – and clashes between police forces, pro-government groups and opposition groups escalated.

Despite concerns about rising political tensions and violence leading up to the elections scheduled for 1999, the Security Council decided to withdraw the UN Civilian Police Mission (MIPONUH) in 1999. China and Russia had already resisted an extension of the mission in 1998, and the US had now joined them in becoming increasingly disillusioned with involvement in the country. In order to consolidate the gains achieved by MIPONUH, the General Assembly established the Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH). Due to lack of funds, MICAH also had to pull out in 2001 at a time when international observers described the human rights situation in Haiti as "more worrying than at any time since the 1994 return to democracy."³¹

The UN, however, continued to be involved in Haiti and between 1993 and 2001 the Security Council and the General Assembly established a total of six UN Missions in Haiti broadly mandated to "sustain a secure and stable environment" and professionalize the Haitian police force.³² Although the interventions achieved important gains, notably in restoring the elected President, promoting and strengthening a human rights culture, organizing elections and containing violence, the broader legacy of these numerous UN Missions remains in doubt: almost one decade of UN peacekeeping and billions of dollars spent in foreign assistance have failed to consolidate democratic state structures and done little to improve the general living situation for

²⁹ Buss (2008); Khouri-Padova, Lama, "Haiti Lessons Learned, Discussion Paper," (UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, March 2004); Maguire (1996)

³⁰ Malone, David, *Decision-making in the U.N Security Council: The Case of Haiti*, (Clarendon Press, 1998)

³¹ Amnesty International quoted in Malone (1998).

³² Security Council Resolution 940 (1994).

most Haitians.³³ Resurgent political instability towards the end of the 1990s undermined the achievements of the police reform process, halted any attempts at reforming the justice sector, and brought forth the dangerous corollary of an aborted disarmament and reintegration process. Many of the same problems that the UN faced during its involvement in Haiti during the 1990s would resurface and challenge MINUSTAH years later.³⁴

3.2 MINUSTAH: the Security Council Responds

As conflict broke out in Haiti in early 2004, starting in Gonaïves and quickly spreading to other cities, the OAS Council and CARICOM submitted requests to the Security Council to send troops to “end the spiral of violence.” However, the Council was not willing to support Aristide’s regime: in the Security Council meeting convened on February 26, 2004 “to consider options for engagement,” the US made clear that it would only support an international force once a political solution was reached, while France (in a letter sent by the foreign minister to the Council) recommended the deployment of a civilian force. France was relatively forthright in its desire for Aristide to go:

“As for President Aristide, he bears heavy responsibility for the current situation. It is up to him to accept the consequences while respecting the rule of law. It is his decision; it is his responsibility. Everyone can clearly see that a new page must be turned over in Haiti’s history, while the dignity and integrity of all the protagonists must be respected.”³⁵

Following Aristide’s departure, the Security Council passed resolution 1529 on February 29, 2004, authorizing the deployment of a 3,000-strong multinational interim force comprised of US, French, Canadian and Chilean troops. This Multinational Force would three months later be replaced by MINUSTAH. The US and France, their forces stretched thin due to their involvement in Iraq and Cote D’Ivoire, respectively, pulled out their troops shortly after the deployment of MINUSTAH. Latin American countries, Brazil in particular, would for the first time take the lead in sending peacekeepers to a UN operation in the Western Hemisphere.

Haitian support for the international presence in their country seemed even weaker than in the 1990s, owing to the fact that Aristide’s successor in 2004, Gerard Latortue, lacked political backing and the circumstances surrounding the departure of Aristide continued to be contested. CARICOM, in particular, considered the “coup” as undermining democracy in the region and requested a UN investigation of the events. An investigation was subsequently rejected.

3.3 Mandate: Intent, Interpretation and Evolution

In reporting to the Security Council in April 2004, then Secretary-General Koffi Annan went beyond the Security Council’s traditional concerns of ensuring a secure environment, organizing elections and assisting the development of a sound legal and penal system. He recommended that

³³ Cullity (2009), Khouri-Padova (2004)

³⁴ Police reform, for example, was initially considered a success, with 6,500 officers vetted and trained between 1994 and 1997. However, with increasing political instability and politicization of the police force by Aristide, donors phased out funding and police support ended in 2001. World Bank (2007).

³⁵ de Villepin, Dominique, “Declaration by Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin on the situation in Haiti,” (25 February 2004).

MINUSTAH assist the transitional government in basic service delivery and humanitarian assistance, and that it support employment-generating activities and assist the government in developing a comprehensive framework for “key policy issues related to nation-building and durable development.”³⁶ The structure of the operation, with a strong civilian component and integration with other branches of the UN system, is central to the secretary-general’s definition of MINUSTAH’s “multidimensionality” and its mandate.

The mandate that was finally passed in the Security Council established MINUSTAH for an initial period of only six months.³⁷ It calls on MINUSTAH to support the constitutional and political process in Haiti and to assist the transitional government in its efforts to bring about a process of national dialogue and reconciliation. It also calls for MINUSTAH to facilitate the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance and it explicitly calls on member states, UN agencies and international and regional organizations to promote long-term development efforts in the country in order to achieve and sustain stability and combat poverty.

3.4 Significant Achievements

The improved security environment in Haiti is testament to the work of MINUSTAH. Indeed, the mission has made some notable achievements in a number of areas, but the gains remain fragile. In supporting Haiti’s democratic institutions, MINUSTAH played an instrumental role in facilitating the February 2006 presidential elections, as well as the local elections that took place later that year, and has continued to support electoral activities up to the recent senatorial elections in April and June of 2009. Furthermore, the Mission actively supports local governance activities. The Haitian National Police Reform Plan, aimed at building a self-sufficient security apparatus, improved the overall efficiency of the Haitian National Police (HNP), albeit with some difficulty. As security gains became more consolidated, MINUSTAH reoriented its focus towards strengthening government institutions and placing increasing emphasis on border management.

The 2006 presidential and legislative elections in Haiti provided numerous operational challenges, among them an unstable security and political environment, a severely underdeveloped and decaying transportation infrastructure, a largely illiterate population, and a Provisional Electoral Council that was severely limited in its capacity and plagued by political partisanship. Although postponed four different times, the presidential elections held on February 7, 2006 were widely considered to be a success. Indeed, the European Union, among other election observation bodies, noted that the elections were conducted peacefully and marked a positive step in Haiti’s democratic transformation.³⁸ Their success was largely due to the assistance provided by MINUSTAH, in coordination with the OAS.³⁹

³⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, S/2004/300, 16 April 2004

³⁷ This despite the advocacy of the secretary-general’s special advisor for Haiti at the time, John Reginald Dumas, who stated that a 20-year peacekeeping presence in the country is necessary if the international community is serious about breaking the cycle of violence and establishing the rule of law in the country.

³⁸ Warsinski, Maria. “Haiti, Presidential and Legislative Elections, February – April 2006,” (Nordem Report, 2006)

³⁹ The UN and the OAS signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2004 to form a committee of electoral cooperation.

To sustain the political gains achieved with the presidential elections, a concomitant effort to improve democratic governance at the local level was needed. The Civil Affairs section of MINUSTAH works actively with local government officials to build capacity and improve coordination with the central government. Civil Affairs is the only international body in the country that has a comprehensive, functioning presence in all ten departments.⁴⁰ Mission staff, however, generally lacks both expertise in public administration and management, and the necessary operational budget to effectively implement local government capacity-building initiatives.⁴¹ This has led to a situation where Civil Affairs officers in the rural areas rely on Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs) for the resources needed to assist local authorities. Through the use of QIPs, efforts have focused on both training sessions for local officials and on the rehabilitation of municipal offices.

Utilizing the momentum from the successful elections and with support from President Préval, MINUSTAH moved into Port-au-Prince's most notorious slums to confront the pervasive gang problem. Between December 2006 and March 2007, nineteen operations were launched in Cite Soleil and Martissant with the goal of removing gang members and reestablishing state control. Although armed opposition was encountered at the beginning, sound local intelligence and increased patrols in the slums effectively secured the areas. In Martissant, satellite police headquarters were established, and a number of gang-controlled buildings were transformed into medical centers. By July 2007, 850 gang members were arrested.⁴²

Reforming the HNP is an integral part of sustaining the security gains achieved by MINUSTAH. The HNP forms the basis of the security apparatus in Haiti. Indeed, since Aristide disbanded the military in 1994, the HNP has been the only state security structure in the country. The Haitian National Police Reform Plan, established by Security Council Resolution 1608 (2005), called for priority to be placed on "training, quality of command, recruitment, actual troop strength, resource management, the discipline essential to an armed force, intelligence, both judicial and institutional, and development of community policing."⁴³ According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's October 2006 report, sixty percent of the police are considered corrupt. The Chief of National Police and MINUSTAH claimed a more optimistic twenty-five percent.⁴⁴ The reform plan delineated a specific calendar for the recruitment, training, and vetting of police, setting the goals of having 9,000 fully trained and resourced police officers by 2008, and 14,000 by 2011.⁴⁵ To accomplish this, the reform plan anticipated the need for an expansion rate of at least 1,400 new police officers per year.⁴⁶ A critical component to the expansion of the HNP is the goal of attaining at least thirty percent women, although this goal seems unlikely to be met in the short term. Increased involvement of female officers in the anti-kidnapping unit would be especially useful

⁴⁰ Interview, J Carter, Chief of Civil Affairs, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, (9 January 2009)

⁴¹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situations – From Fragility to Resilience." (2008), p. 29 Interview, Civil Affairs, Les Cayes

⁴² United Nations Secretary General, Report on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2008/586, 14 October 2008

⁴³ United Nations Secretary General, Report on Haitian National Police Reform Plan, S/2006/726, 12 September 2006

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, "Haiti: Justice Reform and the Security Crisis," (31 January 2007)

⁴⁵ S/2006/726

⁴⁶ Graduates in the month of January 2009 brought the number of active HNP to just over 9,000, but the goal of reaching 14,000 by 2011 will be difficult to achieve. Interview, Hedi Annabi, Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Mission Assembly, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, (9 January 2009).

because most victims are women and children, but this has yet to be fully implemented. Furthermore, the promotion of women through the ranks, thus providing increased motivation for females to join the HNP, is likely to run into obstacles.⁴⁷

Haitians hold this institution in impressively low regard. The HNP are widely viewed as being corrupt, human rights abusers, and tools of the political and economic elite. For example, in June 2009, when students protested against the country's low minimum wage, their unrest largely targeted the HNP and UN Police with attacks on UN vehicles and rock-throwing at police officers. Furthermore, in many rural areas that have traditionally lacked a police presence, communities have devised their own forms of justice and are resistant to the idea of the police interfering in their affairs.

MINUSTAH struggles to form a sound and competent police force in collaboration with various donor countries, but one area of significant progress is the training and vetting of the HNP. The importance of vetting corrupt and incompetent police officers cannot be overemphasized. MINUSTAH now plays the role of certifying the highly delicate vetting process due in no small part to the improved relationship with the Inspector General of the HNP.⁴⁸ Moreover, the HNP has invited MINUSTAH to audit their budgeting system, essential to increasing transparency and mitigating corrupt practices.⁴⁹

In August of 2007 President Préval urged MINUSTAH to reorient its commitments away from security in order to focus on strengthening state institutions, particularly the judiciary, and emphasizing border management. On October 15, 2007, the Security Council authorized this reorientation with Resolution 1780. As the HNP has gradually increased in number and operational capacity, the comparative improvement in the judiciary system has been largely disappointing. The weaknesses of Haiti's rule of law institutions include summary arrests, a lack of judicial oversight, and failure to maintain detention records and investigation reports.⁵⁰ Resolution 1502 gave MINUSTAH a mandate to develop a strategy for judicial reform, subsequently upgraded to Resolution 1608 to provide a more robust mandate to rebuild the court and correctional systems.⁵¹

The border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti has long been a conduit for trafficking arms, drugs and people, weakening the rule of law and depriving the government of revenue. MINUSTAH has thus been involved in border management initiatives that aim to secure the border and increase tax revenue for the Haitian government. A Border Task Force has been established and MINUSTAH troops have set up camps and increased patrols at the main border crossing points. Difficulties in finding personnel with substantial expertise in border issues, however, have been a hindrance to further progress.⁵² In addition to land border issues, Haiti has over 1,125 miles of unprotected shoreline and numerous uncontrolled seaports. The maritime

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ MINUSTAH has received 5,000 HNP case files and to date has gone through about 1,000. Seven percent of those cases were identified by MINUSTAH as not suitable to serve, signed off on by the Inspector General. Interview, Jean Michel Blais, Deputy Police Commissioner, UNPOL, (9 January 2009).

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ S/2008/586.

⁵¹ Carter (2009)

⁵² Ibid.

borders have been a primary entry and exit point for illicit trade. To address this, sixteen boats were recently donated by Uruguay (a troop-contributing country) to help increase maritime border patrols.

4 The Fragility of the Haitian State

4.1 Elements Contributing to Haiti's Fragility

Poverty is pervasive in Haiti. Seventy-eight percent of the population live on less than US\$2 a day, and fifty-four percent live on less than US\$1 a day.⁵³ Even before the global food crisis hit the country in 2008, one out of every four children under five years of age suffered from chronic malnutrition, and nearly one out of ten suffered acute malnutrition.⁵⁴ FAO data from 2007 indicates that up to forty-seven percent of the population was undernourished in 2005. Women, adolescents and children are the most vulnerable groups of society: sexual and domestic violence affect roughly one-third of women, the highest percentage in the Western hemisphere. UNICEF estimates that up to 300,000 children are given away to work as unpaid servants – *restaveks* – because their families cannot afford to care for them.⁵⁵

The extreme vulnerability of the individual and instability at the household level translate into increased fragility for the whole state. Based on a review of the literature focusing on peacekeeping and international interventions in conflict and post-conflict contexts, below is an analytical framework identifying the key elements of state fragility in Haiti.⁵⁶ The four elements that help explain the fragility of the Haitian state are:

- ❑ **The demographic and socio-economic conditions affecting households and individuals;**
- ❑ **The limited institutional capacity of the government to provide basic public services to the average Haitian and households;**
- ❑ **The specific interests and strategies of political actors, including members of Parliament and political parties, that may be contrary to stability of the country, and**
- ❑ **The lack of a social contract between the Haitian state and its citizens.**

The analytical approach focusing on the fragility of the Haitian state allows not only for a consideration of each of the components, but also of the complementary process between them (Figure 1). Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the fourth element is both an underlying cause and a result of the fragility process. As Haiti is not a typical “post-conflict” scenario for peacekeeping, a focus on state fragility offers the possibility of incorporating specific conditions in Haiti within a broader analytical framework.


⁵³ World Bank, “Haiti Country Brief,” World Bank website, (2008a)

⁵⁴ United Nations Country Team Haiti, Food Crisis Response Report, FAO website (July 2008)

⁵⁵ United Nations Children Fund, “Child Alert: Haiti,” (2 March 2006)

⁵⁶ The framework is based on Collier et al, “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy,” (Oxford University Press, 2003), the World Bank (27 April 2006), World Bank, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti,” (2007), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situations – From Fragility to Resilience,” (August 2008).

Figure 1. Schematic representation of the elements of state fragility



Source: Adapted from Verner & Heinemann (September 2006) and OECD (2008).

The absence of a social contract between the Haitian state and its citizens is at the core of Haiti’s fragility. Abstract notions of state authority and legitimacy become very concrete to the average Haitian when faced with the incapacity of the state to respond to his or her needs and expectations. The lack of a social contract magnifies the ability of private interest groups – often the economic and political elite – to influence the political process and create conflict, further compromising the ability of the Haitian state to carry out basic functions. The result has been a vicious cycle of political conflict, social unrest and the threat of widespread violence.

4.2 Socio-Economic Trends Localized: Demographics, Poverty, Inequality, Livelihoods and Unemployment

Extremely high levels of inequality plague Haiti. This is critical because “the more unequally income is distributed, the less effective economic growth is in reducing poverty.”⁵⁷ While data on inequality is very limited for Haiti, a 2001 assessment yielded a 0.66 Gini coefficient, which at the time was the second highest in the world.⁵⁸

Agriculture remains the primary economic activity, with over seventy percent of Haitians engaged in this sector.⁵⁹ Historically, both government and the private sector have provided limited assistance to the development of agriculture. In 1989, only five percent of the federal budget went

⁵⁷ World Bank (2007), p. 19-20

⁵⁸ Ibid., p 76

⁵⁹ ActionAid. “Agriculture in Haiti. Priority Projects”, ActionAid website (no date)

to the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development.⁶⁰ Weak infrastructure, a lack of appropriate technologies and capital investment, insecure land tenure, high commodity taxes, and environmentally unsound coping mechanisms, such as charcoal burning, pose significant hardships on farmers. Serious ecological challenges, including extreme deforestation, soil erosion, droughts, flooding, and other natural disasters, exacerbate the farmers' situation. Regions such as the Northwest are no longer capable of supporting large populations. Explaining the consequences of this neglect, Joël Boutroue, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, stated, "Haiti is totally deforested. There is no investment worth mentioning. There is no industry worth mentioning... If we don't invest in the short and medium term, we'll have additional hardship, deepening poverty and we will enter a vicious circle of instability, unrest, insecurity."⁶¹

Unemployment and underemployment are widespread in Haiti, particularly among youth and women. A World Bank survey in 2001 produced surprising figures on Haitian unemployment. With 38.9 percent unemployment, Port-au-Prince is where the problem is most serious, but unemployment also plagues other urban and rural areas with levels of 19.4 percent and 17.5 percent, respectively. Youth are particularly vulnerable, with a 47.4 percent youth unemployment rate nationwide.⁶² Women head forty-two percent of Haitian households and the incidence of extreme poverty is much higher in these circumstances.⁶³ According to the latest Survey on Living Conditions in Haiti in 2001, the incidence of extreme poverty in urban areas is significantly higher in households where the head of household is a woman. In some urban areas extreme poverty affects nearly two in three female-headed households (sixty-four percent).⁶⁴ This creates a cycle of economic dependence on men that leads many women to accept domestic and sexual violence in exchange for the survival of themselves and their children.

The high rates of poverty and unemployment among women also have a direct effect on the wellbeing of families, particularly children, as female heads of households are forced to choose between essentials, such as feeding or educating their children. A survey in 2005 showed that the bottom quintile of the population ranked by income spends 53.4 percent of household income on food, while it is only 9.8 percent for the top quintile.⁶⁵ A recent World Bank report notes, "more than half of twenty-year-olds have not completed secondary education and of the 1.6 million Haitian youth aged fifteen–twenty-four, only thirteen percent are content with their lives."⁶⁶ Demand for small arms and aggression often originates from community insecurity, fuelled by lack of basic physical needs, work, land, education, honor and respect.⁶⁷ Unemployment amplifies all these factors. This is now acknowledged as a critical threat to any effort to build stability in the country.

⁶⁰ United States Library of Congress. "Country Studies: Haiti," (no date)

⁶¹ United Nations News Center. "Haiti in desperate need of investment and contributions, warns top UN official," United Nations website, (15 October 2008)

⁶² World Bank (2007), p. 34-36

⁶³ United Nations Development Program, "La Vulnérabilité en Haïti: Chemin inévitable vers la pauvreté? Rapport Nationale sur le développement humain – Haïti," (2004)

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Republic of Haiti, "A Window of Opportunity for Haiti: Interim Poverty Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)," (27 September 2006)

⁶⁶ Justesen, Michael and Dorte Verner. *Factors Impacting Youth Development in Haiti*. (World Bank, January 2007), p. 1

⁶⁷ American Friends Service Committee Haiti Program and the Quaker United Nations Office. "A Summary of Lessons on Small Arms Demand and Youth." (8-13 June 2003). Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

4.3 Provision of Basic Public Services

State authority and legitimacy rests partly on the ability of a government to provide basic public services to its people.⁶⁸ Yet Haitian governments have a long history of either struggling, or deliberately declining, to provide basic services, including education, health care and security, to the majority of its citizens.⁶⁹ At present, non-state providers (NSPs) supply four-fifths of Haiti's public services.⁷⁰ However, the provision of these services is far from comprehensive: only about twenty-eight percent of Haitians have access to healthcare and less than twenty-five percent of rural children attend elementary school.⁷¹

With provision of public services like education and healthcare left almost completely to the open market or to philanthropic organizations, the result is a highly inequitable system of public service delivery that disproportionately favors the wealthy. Historically, a small percentage of government resources were allocated to rural areas where most of the population lives. Access to quality services in rural areas is irregular and often offered at unaffordable prices. While Haiti is still sixty percent rural, cities get the vast majority of state funding. In the late 1990s, only around twenty percent of state resources went to rural areas.⁷² Children are particularly affected: a survey in 2005 indicated that 2.7 million children did not have access "to at least one known basic social service".⁷³

With a weak domestic revenue base, erratic aid flows and inconsistent expenditure targeting, the government is severely restricted financially. The Haitian government relies significantly on international aid for fiscal sustainability. In 2007, it was estimated that sixty-five percent of the budget was comprised of foreign aid.⁷⁴ Within these limitations, government financing for the education and health sectors as a percentage of GDP is particularly low when compared regionally.⁷⁵ The country generally, and the public sector in particular, also lack technicians, managers and public administrators. In addition to a significant amount of international migration of the most qualified Haitians (commonly referred to as "brain-drain"), there is also a domestic movement away from the public sector to the private sector, or to the non-state sector, among professionals. Sixty-seven percent of university-educated Haitians live abroad, including over half

⁶⁸ While there is continuing international debate over what should be considered a "public service", it is generally agreed certain services should be universally available. These include, but are not limited to, security, health care, education, waste management, basic infrastructure and access to clean water sources.

⁶⁹ The Haitian state lacks a tradition of public service delivery. In 1860, the government signed an agreement with the Vatican and transferred responsibility for education and health to the Catholic Church. Since then, church-based organizations have been dominant actors in health and education. Ninety-two percent of all schools are non-state, seventy percent health care facilities are private, and Haiti has more private security personnel than police officers. Interview, Michele Pierre-Louis, Prime Minister of Haiti (13 January 2009); World Bank (2007).

⁷⁰ NSPs in Haiti cover a wide range of actors, including grassroots level community organizers, Haitian NGOs, faith-based groups and associations, private sector for-profit, international NGOs, and bi-lateral and multilateral agencies. Because of the significant number of actors, it is difficult to know who does what. Buss, Terry, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It*, (Brookings Institution Press and National Academy of Public Administration, 2008); World Bank (2007).

⁷¹ Buss (2008)

⁷² World Bank (2007), p. 30

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ CIA World Fact Book, "Haiti", CIA website, (2009); World Bank (2007).

⁷⁵ During 2006, Latin American countries averaged five percent of GDP for public domestic financing for education. The Haitian government was projected to spend 1.7 percent of GDP. If all donor financing is included, this increases to 2.1 percent of GDP. World Bank (2007).

of Haiti's trained doctors.⁷⁶ Though not unique to Haiti, the temptation to seek employment with international NGOs, rather than with the state, is particularly pronounced in Haiti where public salaries are low and irregularly paid.

Empowering municipal governments with increased authority and capacity would allow them to better target expenditures towards underserved rural populations. Constitutional stipulations for decentralization, however, have not yet been implemented, resulting in limited regional and municipal participation in development planning and policy-making outside Port-au-Prince.⁷⁷ This often results in disconnect between the national, regional and municipal governments. While some municipalities display impressive development plans, proposed programming is often not prioritized, competition for limited funds is intense, and timely support is seldom forthcoming.⁷⁸ Moreover, these plans tend to be of limited operational use, lacking a detailed strategy for implementation.⁷⁹ This has led to a bifurcated system of basic service delivery, illustrated by a sharp drop in quality and quantity of services outside the capital and major urban centers.

The government, together with the international community, asserts that long-term efforts to create a stable environment for economic growth are not possible unless the state takes a more proactive role in the delivery of basic public services to all Haitians.⁸⁰ While NSPs offer valuable services, in the long run their positive role is ambiguous and unregulated, as there is little shared vision or common standards amongst these actors. While some government officials express a desire for the state to eventually be involved much more in the provision of Haiti's public services, they acknowledge that the government should focus on regulation while state capacity for service delivery is built.⁸¹

5 Persistent Challenges and the Potential for Instability

Although MINUSTAH was able to achieve important gains, particularly in the area of security sector reform and elections, the UN's broader goal of creating lasting security and establishing sustainable and democratic state institutions in the country has proven elusive. The ouster of Haitian Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis, due to the instability provoked by the international food crisis

⁷⁶ Schifferes, Steve, "Migration strains rich and poor," (*BBC News*, 20 February 2008)

⁷⁷ Verner, Dorte and Alessandra Heinemann, "Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti: Breaking the Conflict Poverty Trap", *En Breve* (September 2006).

⁷⁸ In Moron (Grand'Anse Department), the research team was shown a detailed and comprehensive development plan for the town. The mayor stated that while the central government has many priorities to address, he hoped that at some point the government would also be able to attend to local concerns. Interview, Joel Georges, Mayor of Moron (14 January 2009). In the past, the Moron municipality had received little money from the government; moreover, government coffers alone are insufficient to meet the needs of all its citizens. In 2005, central government revenues were only nine percent of national GDP. Verner and Heinemann (2006).

⁷⁹ World Bank (2007)

⁸⁰ The World Bank states, "Development, poverty reduction and conflict prevention will not be possible unless attention is paid to strengthening the state's capacity to provide basic public goods, including security and the rule of law." (World Bank 2007, p. 80) Actors as varied as the Inter-American Dialogue, USAID, and the Prime Minister of Haiti all have emphasized the importance of the Haitian government assuming a stronger regulatory role.

⁸¹ "Through the PRSP, we've said we intend to assume our responsibilities," stresses Yves Robert Jean (interview, 13 January 2009), Director General for the Ministry of Planning and External Communication. "Of course, we cannot do this all at once. We must do it progressively. But services like education are the responsibility of government." Previous government attempts at regulation have had mixed results. An accreditation system was instituted by the government to regulate private schools, but less than a quarter of non-state schools have so far consented. Razafimandimby, L. "Improved Access of the Poor to Social Services in Haiti: The Role of the World Bank." (The World Bank, 2006).

and the increases in the price of oil during 2007 and 2008, underscored the continued volatility and precariousness of the political process in the country.

5.1 *Lavichè*: The April Food Riots

The global food crisis has severely affected the 854 million people in the world who were already experiencing undernourishment, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the most recent report published by the High-Level Task Force on the global food security crisis, the FAO index of food prices rose by nine percent in 2006, twenty-four percent in 2007 and fifty-one percent in 2008.⁸² However, the spike in international prices has also impacted the well-being of 100 million more people living in the poorest countries of the world such as Haiti, particularly in the urban poverty belts.⁸³

The mounting tension among the poorest Haitian families because of the rapid increases in basic food items started to be particularly noticeable towards the end of 2007. November and December are traditionally the months of hunger, given the agricultural cycles of the country. The Atlantic hurricane season of June to November in 2007 had already resulted in damage to food crops, which in turn increased the prices of seeds for the 2008 planting season beginning in April. Between October 2007 and April 2008, the price of imported rice increased by sixty percent, the price of imported flour by seventy-three percent, nationally grown maize by ninety-one percent, sorghum by 30.5 percent and beans by forty-two percent.⁸⁴

In April 2008, the Haitian government estimated that 2.5 million people (one out of every four Haitians) were food insecure. Food insecurity, however, has not been the only problem. With the record-setting international prices of crude oil during 2007 and 2008, prices of diesel and kerosene, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs increased by forty-seven percent, thirty-one percent and thirty-seven percent, respectively.⁸⁵ The dramatic fall of purchasing power has particularly hurt women and children given the large percentage of households with single mothers. Increases in the cost of living heighten the spread of communicable diseases and maternal mortality.⁸⁶

Some unrest was already visible in February of 2008 with public demonstrations in front of the National Palace in Port-au-Prince. The government was incapable of addressing market forces beyond its control, given the limitation of international aid and its budget.⁸⁷ On February 28, Parliament responded with a vote of no confidence. In this context, the critical point for the price of imported rice, local maize and wheat flour (in Port-au-Prince), was in March 2008, when in the course of one week (from March 24 to March 31), the prices for imported rice increased from 115

⁸² High-level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, "Comprehensive Framework for Action" (July 2008) <http://www.un.org/issues/food/taskforce/Documentation/CFA%20Web.pdf>

⁸³ United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research [UNU-WIDER]. 2008. Rapid growth in large emerging economies is changing the balance of world power. Retrieved 07 October 2008, from www.wider.unu.edu/media/press-releases/2008/en_GB/23-06-2008-press-release/_.../wider-press-release-cibs-june-2008-d.pdf

⁸⁴ United Nations Country Team (July 2008)

⁸⁵ *Ibid*

⁸⁶ *Ibid*

⁸⁷ Gauthier, Amélie, "Haiti: empty stomachs, stormy politics," (Open Democracy, 21 July 2008)

Gourd/6 lb sack, to 150 Gourd; wheat flour from 100 Gourd to 120 Gourd, and local maize from 80 to 90 Gourd (eventually reaching 110 Gourd at the start of the food riots).⁸⁸

The inability of the Haitian State to support the most vulnerable of Haiti's households in light of the food crisis caused a social and political conflict in April 2008. Beginning on April 3rd, thousands of protesters marched in the streets of Les Cayes, Port-au-Prince, Petit Goâve, Léogâne and Gonaïves. Although there was rock-throwing, tire-burning and the destruction of vehicles, demands from community leaders were articulated. These included government intervention to lower food prices, and some references to the planned departure of UN peacekeepers and an end to damaging economic policies.

These riots and the vote of no confidence from Parliament resulted in the ouster of Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis. This, in turn, weakened the already fragile government and limited its capacity to respond effectively to the crisis. The absence of an effective and visible government response due to the political impasse between Parliament and the executive branch further aggravated public frustration. At the end of July, the price of imported rice was above 170 Gourd, while the prices of maize and flour were comparable to what they had been in early April.

5.2 Food Insecurity in Haiti

The origins of Haiti's current food insecurity are numerous and complex.⁸⁹ As recently as the early 1970's, Haiti's agriculture sector was relatively robust and self-sufficient, with agricultural exports earning much-needed foreign exchange.⁹⁰ Production of rice, Haiti's primary staple food, was almost completely local.

However, Haiti currently produces only forty-three percent of its food; it depends on imports to meet fifty-two percent of its demand for food and eighty percent of its demand for rice, with five percent covered by food aid.⁹¹ Between 1985 and 2000, local rice production in Haiti decreased from approximately 163,000 metric tons (MT), to 130,000 MT, while rice imports from the US increased from 7,300 MT to nearly 220,000 MT – a thirty-fold increase.⁹² The largest single-year increase in rice imports from the US occurred in 1995 when a “structural adjustment” agreement between Haiti and the IMF went into effect.⁹³ Tariffs on rice imports went from thirty-five percent

⁸⁸ Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire/MARNDR/Famine Early Warning Systems Network. (July 2008). Haiti: Food Security Update No. 19: July - December, 2008.

⁸⁹ Numerous agronomists concur that Haiti's current food insecurity is caused by factors including inconsistent land tenure policies, a lack of investment in modern agricultural technology, deforestation and environmental degradation, and ineffective government policy. Devereux, S. and S Maxwell, *Food security in sub-Saharan Africa*, (Intermediate Technology Development Group, 2001); Jean, A, *The Role of Agriculture in the Economic Development of Haiti: Why are Haitian Peasants so Poor?* (Booksurge Publishing, 2006)

⁹⁰ In 1973, Haiti's trade balance was nearly even, with total imports virtually on par with total exports. Agricultural commodities made up almost sixty percent of all Haitian exports during 1973. By 2001, Haiti had a trade deficit of US\$650 million, with agriculture comprising around twenty-five percent of all exports. Jean (2006).

⁹¹ United Nations Country Team Haiti, “Food Crisis Response Report,” (July 2008)

⁹² Georges, Josiane, “Trade and the Disappearance of Haitian Rice,” Ted Case Study, (June 2004)

⁹³ Georges (2004); Mobekk, E., and Spyros Spyrou. “Re-evaluating IMF involvement in low-income countries: the case of Haiti.” *International Journal of Social Economics*, (2002)

to three percent in the case of Haiti, while the Common External Tariff on rice in the Caribbean Community zone (CARICOM) was twenty-five percent in 1999.⁹⁴

Thus over the course of two decades, the local market has been nearly destroyed by IMF structural adjustments, a trade embargo, the removal of nearly all rice import tariffs, prolonged humanitarian assistance, and substantial imports of subsidized US rice.⁹⁵ The importance of declining agriculture production and food self-sufficiency is crucial to *lavichè*, as fifty-five percent of the average Haitian income is now spent on food.⁹⁶ With such a significant portion of household spending on food imports, Haitians are increasingly vulnerable to exogenous shocks due to their greater dependency on international commodities markets. Rising costs further limit the ability of Haitians to access basic services, forcing them to choose between such necessities as food, education and healthcare. When prices spike, a common coping mechanism for Haitians is to cut back on expenditures for education and healthcare, which disproportionately affects women and children.⁹⁷

5.3 The Impact of the 2008 Hurricane Season

The hurricane season of 2008 did not spare Haiti. In a period of three weeks, tropical storms Fay (August 15-16) and Hanna (September 1-2), and hurricanes Gustav (August 26) and Ike (September 6-7) hit Haiti and caused severe damage to infrastructure and agriculture in at least six departments. Although the material damage was less than predicted by the Haitian government in July of 2008, the food insecurity caused was comparable to the government's "worst-case" scenario.⁹⁸

According to Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (CNSA), the number of people facing food insecurity rose 20 percent in one month, to three million at the end of September.⁹⁹ Critically, the storms hit Haiti at the end of the spring harvest and affected agricultural capacity just before the activities of soil preparation and sowing of crops during October and November. Another critical indicator for the immediate food insecurity of the people was the shortfall in the autumn harvest between December and February.

The total material damage, however, to homes and infrastructure has been enormous: nearly 70,000 homes, bridges, irrigation infrastructure, gravity-fed potable water lines, and public buildings, such as schools and hospitals, have been damaged or destroyed. According to OCHA, 826,685 people have been directly affected by the damage caused by the storms. According to the

⁹⁴ Georges (2004)

⁹⁵ Haiti is now the world's fourth largest importer of US rice. Georges (2004); Jean (2006); Mobekk and Spyrou (2002).

⁹⁶ Absolute poverty lines are often constructed around the concept of a "food basket." The most common items in a typical Haitian food basket are cornmeal, millet, rice, wheat flour, pasta, and French bread. Haitians are highly vulnerable to changes in world commodity prices as a significant portion of their food staples are now imported. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, "United Nations Country Team Food Crisis Response Report," (July 2008); Pedersen, Jon and Kathryn Lockwood, "Determination of a Poverty Line for Haiti," Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies website, (no date).

⁹⁷ At current prices, FAO estimates that one dollar buys only half a meal per day. Thirty-two percent of Haitian households note that they would use any additional income to improve their food security, while twenty-four percent would use this income for the education of their children. Republic of Haiti, "Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)," (30 November 2007).

⁹⁸ Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire/MARNDR/Famine Early Warning Systems Network, "Haiti: Food Security Update No. 19: July - December, 2008," (July 2008)

⁹⁹ Ibid.

government of Haiti, 793 deaths have been attributed to the severe weather events and damages, with 310 still missing.

Among those suffering from hunger and malnutrition in the aftermath of the hurricanes, the situation was most dire for pregnant women, those living with HIV/AIDS, the elderly and the disabled who lacked access to necessary services.¹⁰⁰ In addition, people were forced to live in small spaces, often impinging on their dignity.¹⁰¹ While quantitative data on women's post-hurricane experiences is sparse, the available information indicates that women were highly vulnerable and living in conditions of extreme poverty. UNFPA found that women living in the shelters faced risks of sexual harassment both within shelters, as well as in the formal and informal settlements outside the shelters. Some women reported exchanging sex for food to feed their families.

The Senior Protection Officer of OCHA noted widespread allegations of rape, particularly in the shelters in Gonaïves, but since few cases were documented, it is difficult to ascertain how many assaults occurred.¹⁰² As of December 7, 2008, only fourteen cases of gender-based violence (GBV) were documented by UNFPA. Compared to the aftermath of Hurricane Jeanne in 2004, levels of GBV were significantly lower in 2008. This could be due to stronger protection mechanisms for women including mobile latrines placed in shelters to decrease the risk of sexual violence, along with awareness-raising campaigns on GBV.¹⁰³

Likewise, compared with the loss of human life suffered in September of 2004 with Hurricane Jeanne, which caused approximately 3,000 deaths in Gonaïves, the death toll in 2008 has been far less. This can be partially attributed to the coordinated efforts of the Haitian government, MINUSTAH and other international agencies to develop and implement the National Risk and Disaster Management System. This included the establishment of contingency plans at the community level, training, early-warning mechanisms and repositioning of financial, material and logistical resources.¹⁰⁴

The devastation caused by tropical storms and hurricanes in August and September 2008 has brought into sharp relief the extreme environmental vulnerability of the country and the still limited capacity of the Government to adequately address the issues of food insecurity and emergency preparedness and response. Instead, people relied on MINUSTAH and other UN Agencies for immediate relief and humanitarian services, bypassing overwhelmed local authorities and national institutions.

5.4 Livelihoods

Si pa gen lapé nan tèt, pa ka gen lapé nan vant

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Population Fund, "Field Trip Report Summary," (2008)

¹⁰¹ In some formal shelters women reported having to bathe themselves outdoors with a complete lack of privacy. Interview, Caroline Ort, Senior Protections Officer, (January 2009), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Thirty-six latrines had been placed in shelters by 21 November, 2008. The lack of sanitation facilities in the shelters forces women to resort to large open fields, which can be dangerous, especially at night.

¹⁰⁴ Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire/MARNDR/Famine Early Warning Systems Network (2008)

If you don't have peace in the head, you cannot have peace in the stomach
- Haitian Proverb

The term “livelihood” describes the capacities, capital (human, social, productive/economic, natural), and activities needed to sustain life.¹⁰⁵ The development of livelihoods includes five key elements: 1) employment generation, 2) poverty reduction, 3) increasing wellbeing and skills, 4) the ability to adapt and recover from vulnerability, and 5) sustainability of natural resources in rural communities.¹⁰⁶ This concept differs thoroughly from “job creation” in its consideration of sustainability and of personal and community welfare. Increased development of livelihood opportunities, especially for women and youth, may provide a key prospect for lasting security gains in Haiti.

One aspect of creating livelihood opportunities in Haiti would include the creation of productive employment. The potential for this exists in increased investment in Haiti’s infrastructure and export zones. Haiti has a great need for infrastructure reconstruction, especially following the hurricane season suffered in 2008. Reconstruction of infrastructure will be a labor-intensive undertaking, potentially creating many temporary income opportunities. The expansion of export zones for garment manufacturing could also take advantage of low Haitian labor costs and employ tens of thousands of people. Increasing employment opportunities alone, however, may prove insufficient in a context such as Haiti for several reasons. First, this kind of job creation has the potential to disrupt families due to youth migration to urban centers. Second, low-skilled and low-wage labor in these fields often takes place under exploitative conditions, which can be frustrating and demeaning.¹⁰⁷ Third, examples from the Latin American region demonstrate that women often face increased insecurity and vulnerability to violence in export and textile-industry zones.¹⁰⁸ Finally, unless longer-term strategies to enhance the education and skill level of the labor force are also implemented, any potential short-term benefits may not establish the groundwork for medium-term economic security.

In the context of Haiti, the creation of livelihood opportunities would necessarily include strengthening the agricultural sector: the primary economic sector in Haiti in which more than sixty percent of Haitians are actively engaged.¹⁰⁹ Current agricultural production in Haiti does not yield enough staple foods for national consumption and as a result, only forty-five percent of all food consumed is produced domestically.¹¹⁰ Economic development strategies for Haiti may be more effective, therefore, if they also seek to re-incentivize and support the growth of Haitian agriculture.

¹⁰⁵ Chambers, Robert, and Gordon Conway, “Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century,” (Institute of Development Studies, 1992)

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Bradshaw S. and B.J. Linneker, “Challenging Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Exclusion in Nicaragua: Some Considerations for Poverty Reduction Strategies,” (Ave Maria College of the Americas, 2001).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ According to recommendations made by Dr. Jeffrey Sachs in 2006, Haiti requires a Green Revolution, as current crop yields are less than one ton per hectare and have declined over the past forty years, reflecting a severe lack of basic inputs (e.g., fertilizer, improved seeds, small-scale water management) for small farmers. Sachs, Jeffrey, et al, “Recommendations to Support Haiti’s Economic Development,” (Pan American Health Organization, 9 May 2006); ActionAid (no date).

¹¹⁰ Republic of Haiti (2006)

Livelihood responses in Haiti would benefit greatly from a gender-sensitive approach, capitalizing on women's roles and capacities to improve the conditions of Haitian families. Evidence from Latin America illustrates that when women have more control over resources this translates into greater improvements in the wellbeing of children and the family.¹¹¹ While men on average earn more than women, they may withhold up to fifty percent of these earnings from the household's "common-pot."¹¹² When women make decisions, they often choose to improve general household wellbeing rather than to improve their own situation.¹¹³ Furthermore, this approach has the potential to address many of the root causes of violence against women and girls, as described below.

6 Human Security Threats

A major challenge facing the UN Security Council and the international community is that security continues to be perceived as separate from development. A definition of security strictly limited to security sector reform and policing is not sustainable, since the lack of livelihood opportunities for Haiti's poor, either through formal employment or agricultural activities, represents the single largest threat to stability and lasting peace. As long as the Security Council chooses to define peace as the absence of war and conflict and to deal primarily with only "hard security" issues, the sources of instability and fragility in Haiti will not be adequately addressed.

The signing of the UN Charter on 26 June 1945 advanced the principle of "collective security."¹¹⁴ Following the Cold War, the term "human security" gained prominence, demonstrating the recognition that security represents more than physical security and the right of common defense. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained, "Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be understood in purely military concerns. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and rule of law."¹¹⁵ This reflects the current UN understanding that international security comprises both state security and human security.

In the implementation of its mandate, as discussed in the previous section, MINUSTAH has made some important gains. Fulfillment of MINUSTAH's mandate as a peacekeeping operation, even an integrated one, however, will not address each aspect of human security, a prerequisite for sustainable stability in Haiti. The mandate, for example, does not specifically address the insecurity women and children experience in the forms of sexual and domestic violence. Thus the security threats that Haitians face can be separated into two different but equally important categories: hard security and human security threats. Hard security threats include drug trafficking, kidnapping, gang violence, and border issues, while human security threats include GBV, environmental

¹¹¹ Inter-American Development Bank, "La Red de Protección Social, Fase II," (2003)

¹¹² Bradshaw S. and B.J. Linneker (2001)

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Collective security entails establishing the goals of practicing tolerance and living together in peace with one another as good neighbors, uniting international strength to maintain international peace and security, ensuring that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and employing international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations: Preamble," (26 June 1945),

¹¹⁵ Annan, Kofi, "Towards a Culture of Peace," (23 August 2006)

degradation, widespread extreme poverty, and the specific interests of portions of the economic elite who appear to have much to gain from fomenting violence, insecurity and political instability.¹¹⁶

6.1 Security for All: Women and Girls

From a peacekeeping perspective, security often means the cessation of hostilities between warring groups or armed gangs, whereas for women, security includes being able to carry out daily activities without the fear of being sexually assaulted. The prevalence of domestic and sexual violence is a primary obstacle to women's effective engagement in Haitian public life. There cannot be true security in Haiti if fifty-two percent of the population is prevented from participation in their communities by threat or consequences of violence. Security in Haiti will only be meaningful if realized for women, adolescents and children, as well as for men.

Pervasive and widespread, violence against Haitian women mirrors worldwide trends showing the home and community as key sites where women and girls are at risk.¹¹⁷ While reliable data on the actual levels of sexual and domestic violence remains scarce, the available evidence, collected on an ad hoc basis by service providers, demonstrates a severe problem.¹¹⁸ Nearly one third of all women surveyed in 2006, reported physical or sexual abuse.¹¹⁹ More than fifty percent of the victims of sexual violence are girls below the age of eighteen.¹²⁰ The repercussions of such violations are severe: survivors face stigmatization and some families blame the survivor for the attack, refusing to support her.¹²¹ The perpetrators, often known to the survivor, may mock and threaten reprisal, all contributing to serious trauma.¹²²

The Haitian government has supported the protection of women and security sector reform in ratifying several major international treaties and UN Conventions on preventing violence against women.¹²³ These policies provide a legal framework and a comprehensive set of measures that the

¹¹⁶ International Crisis Group, "Reforming Haiti's Security Sector," (18 September 2008)

¹¹⁷ Data on Haitian men's vulnerabilities to violence is not readily available. Much of the GBV research available describes GBV as a binary phenomenon between men's violence and women's insecurity. The available data on men's experiences of physical and sexual violence explain that one percent of the victims of these types of attacks are men. United Nations Development Fund for Women, "SGBV Prevalence and UN Coordination on Response and Prevention – Haiti," (2008); Unité de Recherche et d'Action Medico – Légale, "Agressions sexuelles: Considérations médico-légales," (2004).

¹¹⁸ These service providers include the members of the National Plan to Combat Violence Against Women: *Solidarite Fann Ayisyen* (SOFA), *Groupe Haïtien d'Etude du Sarcome de Kaposi et des Infections Opportunistes* (GHESKIO), *Kay Fann*, and *Médecins Sans Frontières/France*.

¹¹⁹ Domestic sexual violence, according to a 2000 study, is the highest in Haiti compared with the region, at seventeen percent, contrasted with six percent in the Dominican Republic. Haitian domestic violence has remained constant since 2005, according to reported evidence from organizations that are members of the National Plan. In 2008, the National Plan cited a significant rise in reported rape cases, which demonstrates an increased belief in the utility of reporting GBV violations. *Concertation Nationale contre les Violences Faites aux Femmes* reported that the percentage of reported gang rapes has fallen since 2005, reflecting the general improvement in the security situation in Haiti. Larrain, Soledad and Elisa Fernandez, "A Response to Violence Against Women in Haiti: A study on Domestic and Sexual Violence," (May 2008).

¹²⁰ Amnesty International (2008)

¹²¹ Interview, Stephanie Ziebell, United Nations Development Fund for Women (February 27, 2009)

¹²² *Ibid.* Identified perpetrators were mainly criminals, but also the HNP, and anti-Lavalas groups. Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers has also been a recurring issue. United Nations Development Fund for Women (2008).

¹²³ Haiti ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1981, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, and is party to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, calling for child protection from all forms of violence. Article 276-2 of the Haitian Constitution grants

state should undertake to ensure the human rights of women and girls. To implement this, the government supports several national initiatives to combat violence against women.¹²⁴ The Ministries of Women's Affairs and Women's Rights, Social Affairs, and Education are each working on raising national awareness of gender discrimination and sexual violence.¹²⁵

Among those working to eliminate sexual violence against women, all agree that there is outstanding progress to be made in the application of laws and there is general skepticism of the judiciary's ability to adequately respond.¹²⁶ As a result of this, few women seek out official justice for the perpetrators of sexual violence and the prosecution rate for sexual offenses is extremely low.¹²⁷ While women acknowledge that informal means of community justice (including monetary payment or crude bartering with the families of sexual violence survivors) are insufficient, they cite these as the better and oftentimes only available option for survivor compensation.¹²⁸ The HNP and the UN Police offer insufficient services at the local level for survivors of sexual violence.¹²⁹ Many women fear additional attacks while reporting and do not believe that reporting will lead to any positive results.

It should be noted that MINUSTAH has made several major security achievements for women and girls. First, the general improvements in overall security in Port-au-Prince, including the increased safety in Cité Soleil and other slum areas, supports women's general safety in these neighborhoods. In addition, the reduction in gang violence since 2005 contributes to a decrease in sexual violence.¹³⁰ On the basis of Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, MINUSTAH supports an active Gender Unit that seeks to mainstream gender concerns throughout the peacekeeping operation with training for the military, police, and civilian components and creating gender focal points throughout the mission.¹³¹

Despite these gains, according to a female civil society leader in Cité Soleil, most women do not feel comfortable seeking out MINUSTAH to express their security needs.¹³² To improve this situation, UNFPA has provided gender sensitivity training to the HNP that they believe effectively generated

international treaties the same status as national legislation. The provisions of these three treaties can be invoked in national courts. Amnesty International (2008).

¹²⁴ In 2005, a National Plan to Combat Violence Against Women 2006-2011 was created through joint efforts between the Haitian Government, civil society groups, and international NGOs. The document sets out a national strategy to establish a system for collecting quantitative data on sexual violence, reinforcing and creating support systems for survivors, preventing sexual violence through a national campaign, and strengthening the capacity of national institutions to respond to the needs of survivors, in partnership with women's organizations and NGOs. Additionally, a modification to the Penal Code on 11 August 2005 amended the provisions relating to sexual violence and other forms of discrimination against women. Larrain and Fernandez (2008); Amnesty International (2008).

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ The physical absence of judges and prosecutors in a number of key zones is a primary obstacle to the enforcement of laws. United Nations Development Fund for Women (2008).

¹²⁷ Interview, Women's Civil Society Leaders in Fore Liberté, (12 January 2009); Amnesty International (2008).

¹²⁸ In addition, many survivors of domestic violence desire punishment for the perpetrator, but would not favor prison sentencing. This is often the case in situations where the woman has children with the perpetrator and is dependent on him for food and basic needs. This reluctance by women to come forward is one of the chief barriers to prosecuting more cases of GBV. United Nations Development Fund for Women (2008); Women's Civil Society Leaders in Fore Liberté (2009).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Interview, Natalie Man, MINUSTAH Gender Unit (15 January 2009)

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Interview, Marie Danielle Dourlier, Lig Famn (10 January 2009)

awareness and top-level support for the protection of women from violence.¹³³ UNFPA reports that as a result of these trainings, women are more likely to rely on the HNP rather than on the UN Police for support.¹³⁴

Despite these efforts, there are still outstanding gaps in the provision of security for women and girls. While there is considerable discourse among many actors in Haiti on this issue, the lack of a strategic and comprehensive strategy prevents the provision of adequate protection.¹³⁵ In interviews with various offices within MINUSTAH and local government officials, numerous staff reduced the gravity of women's security by relegating it to a "soft" issue for development practitioners to address once the hard security threats have subsided.¹³⁶

7 Beyond the Security-Development Debate

*"My biggest concern is the socio-economic situation in the country that, if not addressed, might reverse everything we have achieved in the last four years. We don't do development but we should do everything we can to create an environment and advocate for more efforts on the part of the Haitians and the international community."*Hedi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, MINUSTAH¹³⁷

7.1 The Link between Security and Development

The case of Haiti clearly demonstrates that peace and security cannot be considered as separate from development. Although Haiti is not a typical post-conflict country, it does suffer from chronic political instability, fragile state institutions and extreme poverty.¹³⁸ In a country with a long history of political and state-sponsored violence, high levels of poverty and social exclusion increase the risk of renewed political violence and conflict. Lacking any stake in the social, economic and political processes in their society, the majority of disaffected, unemployed and hungry youth are susceptible to manipulation and incitement to violence and public unrest.

When the UN Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 2004, the Security Council acknowledged that peacekeeping alone would be insufficient to address the root causes of Haiti's chronic political instability. The Secretary-General emphasized the complexity of the problems facing Haiti and the need to address security concerns, build democratic institutions, including the rule of law, promote social and economic development, and encourage good governance: "The key political, security, humanitarian, social and economic

¹³³ Interview, Laurenceau, Barbara. Deputy Representative in Haiti, United Nations Population Fund. (12 February 2009)

¹³⁴ Each UN peacekeeping battalion brings their culturally specific conceptions of gender to the peacekeeping mission. Some battalions are therefore more gender sensitive than others. Finding effective gender focal points within each battalion is a significant challenge for MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, since the positions are often assigned to a low-ranking officer who does not speak French or wield significant power to influence the battalion's practices. Laurenceau (2009).

¹³⁵ Amnesty International (2008)

¹³⁶ Interview, MINUSTAH Political Affairs Staff (8 January 2009); Georges (2009).

¹³⁷ Annabi (2009)

¹³⁸ Unlike many of the post-conflict countries with which it is often grouped, including Liberia or Sierra Leone, Haiti lacks warring factions, conflict-plagued neighbors, influx of refugees, religious divisions and ethnic conflict.

challenges and problems that Haiti is facing are interrelated and require an integrated response by the Haitians and the international community.”¹³⁹

In light of this recommendation, MINUSTAH was established as a multidimensional integrated mission to facilitate the coordination and integration of the different components of the UN system.¹⁴⁰ It also received an important institution-building mandate, which called on the mission to support the political process in Haiti. However, MINUSTAH, like any peacekeeping mission, faces challenges in integrating the different bodies of the larger UN system. Different organizational cultures, funding mechanisms, and structures of authority impose barriers to the effective cooperation between peacekeeping activities and agencies forming part of the UN Country Team.

Despite coordination challenges and varying interpretations of its mandate, the Civil Affairs section of MINUSTAH does engage in some small local development activities, most predominately through its QIPs.¹⁴¹ These projects, designed as a political tool, are meant to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people and in the early phase of a peacekeeping operation and to build confidence in the mission. They are limited in scale, highly visible and designed in support of the mission’s mandate implementation. Since 2004, MINUSTAH has financed 569 QIPS, including limited infrastructure projects, income-generation projects, non-recurrent training activities, prison rehabilitations, well-digging, provision of start-up office kits to municipal offices and repairing of public parks. One of the challenges in designing and selecting appropriate QIPs is to combine immediate impact with longer-term development strategies of other UN actors.

There are limits, however, to what can be achieved by the UN system alone. MINUSTAH does not have a development mission and even with a fully cooperative and integrated UN mission in Haiti, the UN’s funds and programs account for only approximately twenty percent of total foreign assistance to the country.¹⁴² It is crucial, therefore, that other actors step in to complement the work MINUSTAH is doing. Only an intervention that simultaneously addresses the security, development and state-building needs of the country will ensure lasting security. Socioeconomic development is in itself the fifth benchmark that will formally allow for the drawdown of the

¹³⁹ S/2004/300, p. 15.

¹⁴⁰ There is now widespread acknowledgment that the “integrated mission” concept is the future of UN peacekeeping. In their report on Integrated Missions, the UN ECHA Core Group defines integrated missions as “an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework.” The aim is to improve the sustainability of UN peacekeeping by integrating the perspectives for long-term economic development and peace-building with the more narrowly defined politico-security mandates of a peacekeeping mission. But the UN system struggles to institutionalize this system-wide coordination and coherence. Problems with compromising the impartiality of the humanitarian space by collaborating with military forces add further obstacles to effective integration. Eide, Espen Barth et al, “Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations,” (2005).

¹⁴¹ The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations highlighted the need to make a “demonstrable difference” in the lives of the people in the early phases of a peacekeeping mission in order to build confidence in the mission, and the mandate. For this purpose, the report recommended that a small percentage of the mission’s budget should be made available to the Special Representative of the Secretary General to implement Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs can enhance the credibility and acceptance of the peacekeeping mission and improve the environment for effective mandate implementation. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,” S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).

¹⁴² Annabi (2009)

peacekeeping force, as specified in the Secretary-General's report on MINUSTAH of 27 August 2008.¹⁴³

With levels of crime now significantly lower than in 2004, MINUSTAH has created a space for political dialogue and economic development.¹⁴⁴ As confirmed by the donor conference of April 2009, a large-scale and concerted development and reconstruction effort is needed on the part of the wider donor community to capitalize on the security gains achieved by MINUSTAH. In order to ensure that this assistance is sustainable, however, issues of institution building, strengthening the capacity of the public sector, good governance, and state-building will need to be addressed.

7.1 The Importance of Building State Capacity

Although the international assistance effort has exceeded US\$9 billion over the past few decades, Haiti is not yet a resilient, self-sufficient autonomous state. At the same time, the living conditions faced by the average Haitian have barely improved over the past two decades.¹⁴⁵ Although Haiti experienced significant improvements in macroeconomic growth during 2007, many of these gains were quickly and dramatically wiped out by the impact of the international food crisis and the devastation caused by the hurricane season in 2008.¹⁴⁶

Many prominent observers have concluded that the major shortcoming of the international community's engagement in Haiti over the past two decades has been its failure to prioritize state-building and governance issues.¹⁴⁷ Ignoring the similarities of Haiti to many fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa, the international community has often applied a "Latin American aid model" to Haiti that presupposes a functioning democratic political process, State stability and public sector capacity, including absorptive capacity.¹⁴⁸

In addition, limited donor coordination, lack of consultation with local authorities and the design of aid policies based on foreign state interests are often cited as factors that further undermined the failure of the foreign assistance effort. Because of high levels of corruption and chronic political

¹⁴³ The fifth benchmark is defined as follows: "lasting stability will require the prevention of any further decline in living conditions, delivery of basic services to the most vulnerable, tangible improvement in the living standards of the population and creating the conditions for economic recovery" S/2008/586 p. 25

¹⁴⁴ Crime rates in Haiti are now below levels seen in many other Latin American countries. In 2007, there were 5.6 homicides per 100,000 people in Haiti. The mean for the Caribbean was thirty per 100,000, with Jamaica averaging forty-nine homicides. In 2006, the neighboring Dominican Republic counted more than four times more homicides per capita than those registered in Haiti: 23.6 per 100,000, according to the Central American Observatory on Violence. Even the United States would appear to have a higher homicide rate: 5.7 per 100,000 in 2006, according to the US Justice Department. Lindsay, Reed, "Haiti's violent image is an outdated myth, insist UN peacekeepers," *Guardian*, (11 May 2008).

¹⁴⁵ Due to previously raised issues including demography and widespread inequality, Haitians have seen few dividends of government efforts to improve national GDP. Economic growth is much less effective in reducing poverty in countries with high levels of inequality. World Bank (2007).

¹⁴⁶ By mid-2007, the government of Haiti had stabilized inflation at around eight percent and increased the GDP growth rate to 3.2 percent, surpassing population growth rates. In 2008, GDP growth fell to 2.3 percent. CIA World Factbook (2009); World Bank (2007).

¹⁴⁷ Buss (2008); World Bank (2006); Khouri-Padova (2004); Malone (2006)

¹⁴⁸ Buss (2008)

instability, during the past decades the international community has largely bypassed the Haitian government and development projects and programs were for the most part administered and implemented by donors themselves or by international partner NGOs.¹⁴⁹

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, endorsed by more than 100 governments and development agencies in March 2005, underscores the importance of local ownership, donor alignment and mutual accountability in the provision of aid.¹⁵⁰ The experience of donor relations in Haiti has demonstrated that lack of government ownership can severely undermine the sustainability of development activities, for example, when the government fails to provide for or undertake maintenance of infrastructure projects. Rather than building the technical and management capacities of the government, donor-administered projects have created parallel structures of authority and legitimacy.¹⁵¹ More recently, the World Bank has emphasized the importance of building state capacity and strengthening state legitimacy in Haiti.¹⁵²

7.2 State Authority and Government Credibility

A central driver of state fragility is the lack of legitimacy of the Haitian state in the eyes of its citizens. State legitimacy is consolidated by, among other things, a sustained and mutually beneficial set of interactions between the state and the people. One of the primary functions of a state is the provision of security and other basic goods and services to its citizens. In return, people are expected to fulfill their obligations, including paying taxes and respecting the enforcement power granted to state authorities. Through these interactions a social contract develops between the state and its citizens. This is critical for social cohesion, peace and development.¹⁵³ The stability of a state, therefore, depends on the nature and sustainability of the societal relationship between its people and the state.

This social contract does not exist in Haiti. The Haitian state does not have a tradition of public service delivery. Thirty years of dictatorship under Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier undermined and eroded important state functions and institutions.¹⁵⁴ Given the limited revenue base of the Haitian government and the lack of technical and management capacity among its institutions, building and maintaining strong state institutions will require considerable effort. One step, already proposed by Haitian authorities, could be to increase the state's regulatory and supervisory role vis-à-vis current service providers. The government would assume an important role in negotiating between the recipients of the services and the non-state sector, increasing its visibility and credibility in the eyes of the Haitian people.

¹⁴⁹ USAID, for example, has had a general policy in Haiti since 1982 to funnel aid through NGOs instead of the government. Many donors have followed the US's lead.

¹⁵⁰ "The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness," High Level Forum, (28 February – 2 March 2005)

¹⁵¹ Gary Mathieu (interview, 13 January 2009), National Coordinator for the National Food Security Coordination Unit, states that while NGOs currently have a much greater ability to implement in the field, with over 4,000 different actors it is very difficult for the state to know what they are all doing.

¹⁵² "This is about *Securing Development* – bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence." *Securing Development*, prepared for delivery by Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank, at the United States Institute for Peace "Passing the Baton" Conference, (8 January 2009).

¹⁵³ Verner and Heinemann (2006)

¹⁵⁴ Panel Discussion, Michelle Montas, "Haiti: A Future Beyond Peacekeeping?" (7 April 2009)

Once mechanisms are in place through which people are able to demand their rights to basic public services and local authorities have the capacity to respond to these demands – if only through a referral or regulatory function - a consolidation and transformation of state-society relations can take place. With an established participatory process, the political process between the state and the people will improve. This in turn will undermine the potential of private interest groups and political spoilers to destabilize the country, a common occurrence in Haiti.¹⁵⁵

The relationship between the Haitian people and the state is further undermined by the imposing presence of MINUSTAH, paradoxically, the institution most capable of providing security. As Haitians look to MINUSTAH to guarantee a basic level of stability in their country, they often expect the mission to perform additional functions normally ascribed to the state, including providing social and economic security and responding to humanitarian needs. This reliance on the international community, especially MINUSTAH, rather than on local authorities, increases during times of crises.

Following the destruction caused by the tropical storms and hurricanes of 2008, many Haitians looked to MINUSTAH and other UN agencies for immediate relief, and not to the Haitian government. Given Haiti's extreme vulnerability to natural disasters, the Haitian government developed a national emergency response plan.¹⁵⁶ During the aftermath of the 2008 hurricane season, however, the Haitian government struggled to implement this plan, as cities like Gonaïves were effectively cut off from the rest of the country due to massive infrastructure damage and widespread flooding. International actors with sufficient logistical capacity assumed life-saving humanitarian functions, but were limited in their efforts to support overwhelmed local authorities to assume a role in the immediate disaster response.¹⁵⁷

7.3 The Challenges of Effective Public Administration

As the international community seeks more effective ways of engaging in Haiti, there is an increasing need to prioritize public sector reform alongside any comprehensive socioeconomic development strategy. In particular, donors could agree on a concerted effort to build the technical and managerial capacity of the civil service, increase accountability and transparency in the government sector, and extend state authority to rural areas. Effectively addressing these challenges is crucial to sustaining an effective public administration, establishing the credibility of the government, and furthering the legitimacy of the state.

The highly decentralized state structures provided by the 1987 Constitution amplify the challenges of effectively administering the state. The 1987 Constitution was drafted as a direct response to the end of the Duvalier regime, aiming to divert as much power as possible from the central level. It divides the country into ten departments, which are each subdivided into three to seven

¹⁵⁵ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situations – From Fragility to Resilience," (2008)

¹⁵⁶ Most recently the government prepared a strategic plan for the 2008 hurricane season: *Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres*.

¹⁵⁷ Interview, MINUSTAH Civil Affairs in Les Cayes, (14 January 2009)

arrondissements, which are further subdivided into communes. At each of these levels the law provides for the institution of an administrative structure and associated elections.¹⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the government of Haiti lacks the financial and logistical capacity to effectively administer this complex system of governance. In many rural communes, these administrative structures are either very weak or non-operational and there is little consultation between political actors of the local and central levels.

Further complicating matters is a continued reluctance of key donors and partners to channel money through a government that some consider corrupt, inefficient or incompetent. In order to begin breaking this deadlock, the government of Haiti and the international community could agree to put mechanisms in place, for example, that increase financial transparency and for comprehensive and long-term training of civil servants and Ministry staff.

The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Plan (GEMAP) that was implemented in Liberia, for example, following the end of the civil war in 2003, while possibly too intrusive for the current political situation in Haiti, offers compelling lessons on how to conciliate donors and promote transparent economic governance. Less intrusive methods could expand measures already in place, including strengthening the prosecutorial powers of the Anti-Corruption Unit, publishing government budgets on a regular basis and requiring public officials to declare their assets both before assuming office and upon stepping down.

During the donor conference in Washington, DC, on April 14th, 2009, Haiti's partners committed themselves to providing direct budget support, thus recognizing the need to channel resources directly through state institutions. At the same time, a complementary long-term capacity building strategy could be designed to strengthen human and technical resources in the public sector. Although there have been multiple efforts in this regard, including within the framework of MINUSTAH's institution-building mandate, they have too often been piecemeal and short-term.

It is important to note, moreover, that none of these problems, including lack of institutional capacity and corruption, are unique to Haiti; many countries in the region struggle with similar issues. Yet no other country in Latin America is as fragile as Haiti. Until the challenges of effective public administration are addressed, the government's capacity to respond to and rebound from crises like the 2008 hurricanes is limited. Public sector reforms typically take time and require significant resources. While not glamorous, they are fundamentally important for long-term stability and are intrinsically linked with the fragility of the Haitian state.

8 Haiti in a Regional Context

8.1 Challenges and Opportunities

¹⁵⁸ Communal Sections Council (CESACs) members are elected at the local level as administrators, while Communal Section Assembly members (ASECs) provide technical support to the CASECs and supervise budgetary proceedings. In addition, each commune sends one ASEC to the Municipal Assembly, which sends one ASEC to the Department Assembly, which finally sends one representative to the Interdepartmental Assembly. In theory, this should create a "pyramid of parliamentary counterparts".

Situating Haiti in its broader regional context reveals both challenges and opportunities for the Americas. Haiti presents numerous challenges to the Caribbean region, including trafficking of persons, weapons, and drugs, as well as organized crime, and immigration within the region, to Canada and the United States. Haiti also reflects the region's struggle with inequality and social cohesion. These challenges, in addition to Haiti's fragility, make the country a potentially destabilizing force in the region.

According to a 2007 report prepared by the United States Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Haiti is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labor.¹⁵⁹ About 30,000 Haitians are smuggled each year into the Dominican Republic, of which approximately 2,000 are children, to work in the sugar industry under conditions that Ambassador John Miller, formerly from the Office of Human Trafficking at the US State Department, has defined as "slavery."¹⁶⁰ According to USAID, at least 280,000 Haitians live in the Dominican Republic without any form of identification, identity papers or nationality. The Dominican Republic has a long history of refusing to grant Dominican citizenship to Haitians born in the country, creating a situation of extreme marginalization for people of Haitian descent who are unable to access health, education, or employment opportunities. Dominican women and girls are also reportedly trafficked to Haiti, where many work in brothels catering to expatriates.¹⁶¹

Haiti is a pivotal point in the drug trade from Colombia to the US and Canada. A stable state and a capable government in Haiti could facilitate actions to address and curtail the flow of drugs through the country. The US identifies the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Haiti as "major" drug transit countries with about ten percent of the cocaine consumed annually in the US passing through Haiti.¹⁶² According to the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, after the collapse of its coffee and assembly sectors, Haiti's top sources of foreign exchange are remittances, foreign aid, and the drug trade.¹⁶³

Migration is also an important regional issue, even beyond the politicized "boat people" that US authorities have sought to divert from Florida's shores. Neighboring countries, particularly smaller islands, such as the Bahamas and Guadalupe, also receive an upsurge of immigrants during instability increases in Haiti. US immigration policies differentiate between country of origin and type of refugee. As many Haitians fleeing their country are classified as "economic refugees," they are not entitled to the same immigration privileges that "political refugees" from Cuba, for example, receive. A more stable Haiti would provide incentives for qualified professionals to remain in the country, thus reinforcing the country's long-term development prospects.

¹⁵⁹United States Department of State, "Human Rights Report: Trafficking in Persons Report," (12 June 2007)

¹⁶⁰ Inter-American Development Bank, *Country Program Evaluation: Haiti*, (Office of Evaluation and Oversight, 30 April 2003).

¹⁶¹ United States Department of State (12 June 2007)

¹⁶² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Caribbean Region of the World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean," (March 2007)

¹⁶³ Shamsie, Yasmine and Andrew Thompson, *Haiti: Hope for a Fragile State* (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006). In 2004, Dominican authorities said that sixty-seven percent of the cocaine coming into their country came from Haiti. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "The Threat of Narco-Trafficking in the Americas," (October 2008).

In a region of middle and high-income countries, Haiti lags far behind in development. Haiti ranked 146 (out of 177 countries) in UNDP's 2007-2008 Human Development Index (HDI). No other Latin American country ranked below 118 and Haiti's own neighbor, the Dominican Republic, was far ahead, at number 79 in the HDI rankings. Latin America is also the most unequal region in the world and Haiti is among the most unequal countries of the region. Income inequality in Haiti not only reflects a larger trend throughout Latin America, but it also increases the potential for violence, instability and contributes to the deterioration of social cohesion.

There is a clear regional interest in Haiti's advancement, given that nearly sixty percent of troop-contributing countries in MINUSTAH are from Latin America.¹⁶⁴ Brazil has visibly taken an active role within the peacekeeping mission as the lead troop contributor. Haiti is also an opportunity for the US to demonstrate to the world that a decisive change in US foreign policy is taking place. President Barack Obama has emphasized that respect for multinational institutions, diplomacy, and international law will be central to his administration's foreign policy. Achieving a respectable degree of success in Haiti could be a powerful indicator for the US and the UN that international engagement can succeed in complex environments. As a relatively small country of 9 million people, Haiti presents a feasible opportunity for the international community—in particular, the neighboring countries—to show the world that progress is possible in a fragile state.

8.2 Strategic Interests: Is Stability Possible without Development?

A stable Haiti is clearly in the best interest of the Haitian people, the region, and the international community. But as long as international interventions aim at short-term attempts to maintain a minimal level of stability, and do not invest in a coordinated strategy for long-term development, any gains in security will not be sustainable in Haiti. The past two hundred years provide ample evidence that an underdeveloped Haiti cannot be a stable Haiti.

The recent legislation passed in the US Congress, HOPE II, gives Haiti preferential access to the world's largest textiles market and has the potential to contribute to economic security in Haiti. HOPE II may provide an important opportunity for substantial economic growth in Haiti. Past experiences in Haiti and in Latin America, however, indicate that economic security based on a single sector, such as textiles, is likely to be unsustainable, benefit only a small segment of the population, and potentially exacerbate inequality.

As a candidate for a permanent seat on the Security Council, Brazil has an opportunity to assume active leadership among Latin American countries in a regional issue such as Haiti. Brazil and other regional actors such as the US and Canada could establish a coordinated and regional strategic effort towards the country that would align regional interests for short-term stability with lasting development in Haiti. Piecemeal and bilateral efforts could be replaced with a strategic vision shared with the Haitian Government in which regional actors and the international community would be willing to invest the time, resources, and patience necessary to foster long-term development in Haiti. Stability in Haiti ultimately means greater stability for the entire region.

¹⁶⁴ Of the 7,039 troops, 4,107 are from Latin American countries. United Nations Peace and Security Section, "MINUSTAH Facts and Figures," (Department of Public Information: 22 February 2009)

8.3 The Haitian Diaspora: An Untapped Resource

The Haitian diaspora living in the US, Canada, and, to a lesser degree, France and neighboring countries in the Caribbean, is a diverse group that represents almost a quarter of the total Haitian population. Haitians living abroad have been intimately involved in the affairs of their home country and have often been able to exert pressure to influence internal politics. They possess a largely untapped reservoir of skills and knowledge, and, although not necessarily free of the potential conflicts that have marked social and political discord in Haiti, their constructive engagement could represent an integral component to a comprehensive development strategy for Haiti.

The Haitian diaspora began to take shape as a direct result of adverse conditions and periods of political and social upheaval. During the 1950s and 60s, many Haitians, predominantly from the educated middle and upper classes, began to leave in order to seek better opportunities in the US, thus precipitating the “brain drain” that has eroded human resources within Haiti. Indeed, from 1957-1963, only three of the 264 graduates of Haiti’s medical school remained in Haiti.¹⁶⁵ During the 1970s under Jean Claude Duvalier, the first vessel carrying Haitian migrants – too poor to afford air travel and unable to secure visas – began to arrive on the shores of Florida.¹⁶⁶ Likewise, the political violence that accompanied the overthrow of President Aristide in 1991, mostly targeting followers of the President’s *Lavalas* movement, forced many of Haiti’s most destitute citizens to risk their lives on the open seas. From 1991 to 1992, an estimated 37,000 Haitians were interdicted at sea.¹⁶⁷

Garnering increased political and economic influence in the US and Canada, the Haitian diaspora has been able to greatly influence the internal situation in Haiti. Those that fled during the Duvalier regime in the 1960s were vocal in their opposition to the dictator. After *Baby Doc* had assumed power, Haitians - with the support of many non-Haitians - played a pivotal role in destabilizing and eventually ending the Duvalier dictatorship. Furthermore, many Haitian organizations that promoted democracy were active in calling for the restoration of Aristide.¹⁶⁸

Today, members of the diaspora are making important contributions to development efforts in Haiti, including lobbying international financial institutions for debt relief, working to enhance press freedoms, and promoting human rights.¹⁶⁹ Other initiatives include Home Town Associations, which are development projects funded by prominent Haitians abroad that target the needs of specific communities. Although initially implemented with little coordination with local officials, who were often perceived to be corrupt, greater cooperation with municipal and local governments has been achieved through higher standards of accountability.¹⁷⁰ These activities

¹⁶⁵ Trinity College Haiti Program, “The Evolution of the Haitian Diaspora in the USA,” (no date)

¹⁶⁶ The deepening crisis and economic stagnation that characterized the rule of Jean Claude Duvalier precipitated a massive exodus from Haiti. In the 1970s and 1980s, around 50,000 to 80,000 “boat people” arrived in the US. By 1981, the number had reached 1,000 arrivals per month. Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Trinity College Haiti Program, “The Emerging Presence in the US of the Haitian Diaspora and its Impact on Haiti,” (October 2002)

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 15.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 10.

should be encouraged and further facilitated by the Haitian government as they improve the credibility of the state through the increased provision of basic services.

Although the diaspora has contributed to Haiti's development in important ways, a number of issues need to be resolved in order to facilitate more constructive engagement between Haiti and those living abroad. Among these is the issue of dual citizenship and political representation. With remittances contributing to a substantial portion of GDP, the diaspora expects to see a concomitant level of inclusion in local politics. Currently, however, the Haitian Constitution prevents those who have become citizens in other countries from running for office. Furthermore, even those who have maintained their citizenship and are eligible to vote in embassies and consulates are often prevented from doing so, due to weaknesses in the diplomatic service.¹⁷¹ This situation is not likely to change in the short-term. The 1987 Constitution is virtually inalterable, and the wealthier and better-educated Haitians from abroad are perceived as a direct threat to those currently in power.¹⁷² The exclusion of this highly skilled group of Haitians inhibits the government's capacity to implement financial and development policies.

Haitians abroad are not likely to make substantial private investments in the country until there is a greatly improved business climate. MINUSTAH has contributed to a security environment that is increasingly conducive to attract investments, but increased efforts to address endemic corruption, insecure property rights and other obstacles to starting new businesses are still needed. According to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Haiti ranks 154 out of 181 countries in the "ease of doing business" index.¹⁷³ Haiti has a number of favorable qualities that could be utilized to attract private investment, but, unless the government takes concrete steps to mitigate persistent weaknesses, preferential trade agreements like HOPE II may be inconsequential.

9 Haiti: A Future beyond Peacekeeping?

9.1 Past Challenges and Deadlock

Despite the serious challenges facing Haiti over the years, the country has had to compete for attention and donor support with other countries facing crisis. Before the recent donor conference held in Washington, DC in April 2009, there were signs of donor fatigue: the sense that although the international community does not want Haiti to destabilize, there is little willingness to do what is necessary for it to develop in a sustainable way. In late 2008, for example, the Flash Appeal for Haiti, created to support humanitarian relief following the destruction caused by the hurricane

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁷² "The 1987 Constitution can only be amended by two thirds of the current Parliament during its last ordinary session (autumn 2011) and by two thirds of the next one (2012-2016) during its first session. The entry into force of the amended text must start with the next president's mandate (2016-2021). If this procedure was followed successfully, a modified Constitution would not be applied before 2016." International Crisis Group Report, "Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad," (December 2007), p. 18, Interview, Ugo Salinas, Political Advisor, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (18 November 2008).

¹⁷³ World Bank, "Doing Business 2009: Country Profile for Haiti," Doing Business website, (2008)

season, received just half of the desired response.¹⁷⁴ In the context of the current global financial crisis, matters have become even more delicate. The financial crisis doubly impacts Haiti because of its dependence on remittances from the diaspora in the US and Canada and on direct foreign assistance.

An important challenge facing Haiti is the mutual lack of trust between the Haitian government and the international community. The international community has regarded the Haitian government as institutionally weak, with limited absorptive, technical, administrative and operational capacities. High levels of corruption and insufficient or fragmented political leadership are often cited as persistent challenges when it comes to engaging the Haitian government. Haiti, for its part, is keenly aware of the long history of foreign interventions and internal meddling on the part of outside powers. More recently, Haiti's heavy dependence on foreign assistance and the frequency with which aid has been delayed, withheld or used as a political tool have meant that the Haitian government displays a certain measure of hesitancy, skepticism and misgivings in their dealings with donors and the international community in general.

Another key challenge is the lack of effective coordination and strategic vision among the key actors of the international community. Many of the development agencies and actors working in Haiti have operated in a piecemeal and singular fashion, without following a broader, widely agreed-upon strategic plan. Despite its continued efforts, MINUSTAH alone cannot deliver Haiti from the conflict-poverty trap or work to overcome Haiti's fragility. Concerted efforts by the multiple actors of the international community, beyond the UN system, will be needed.

9.2 The Importance of the State

The most central challenge is the lack of a social contract between Haitians and the state. The Haitian people currently do not feel entitled to demand their rights or provision of basic services, given the long history of weak or manipulated political processes, coupled with the insufficiency of current service delivery. In order to consolidate the social contract between Haitians and the state, three aspects will have to be addressed. The legitimacy of the Haitian state needs to be fostered in terms of transparent and participatory political processes and electoral legitimacy. Additionally, responsible state authority in a rule-of-law context needs to be established, exercised and maintained. Finally, the credibility of the state needs to be established and fortified through regulation, provision and guarantee of basic services.

This requires the strengthening of government institutions whereby the state can assume its functions responsibly in order to consolidate its legitimacy and authority, which in turn entails a priority on governance and institution-building in those sectors that are a priority for the wellbeing of Haitians. The Haitian government, with the assistance of the international community, could pursue an explicit and simple strategy to assert its role in the regulation and supervision of basic services (e.g. security, social protection, livelihood opportunities, education, health, and private

¹⁷⁴ Of the US\$127 million requested by OCHA for hurricane relief, just US\$68 million (fifty-two percent) was contributed. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Emergency: Haiti - Hurricane Gustav and Tropical Storm Hanna - September 2008," (19 November 2008).

sector development), while it increases its capacity to provide those services it considers strategic for the functioning of the Haitian state (e.g. civil registry, fiscal reform, and land-tenure reform). With a visible, concerted and legitimate effort of the government to increase the welfare of average Haitians, the credibility of the government increases and creates the basis to construct a social contract between Haitians and the state. Although it may take many years to consolidate, it is the single most important factor for an inclusive and transparent political process to emerge.

9.3 The Importance of Political Will and Leadership

Only through renewed political will and leadership can the Haitian government and international community address the key challenges described above. To accomplish this, a concerted and united international community is a prerequisite for establishing a meaningful and lasting compact with the Haitian government. With a united proposal for Haiti, the international community will be able to establish transparent mechanisms of accountability and co-responsibility with both the Executive and Parliamentary branches of the government. Since there is no structural authority with jurisdiction over the many actors and partners involved (bilateral donors, international financial institutions, NGOs, development agencies and the UN family), political leadership is needed to provide coordination and authority for a concerted and strategic engagement with Haiti. Finally, experience in Haiti has clearly shown that strengthening state institutions and functions is necessary for a sustainable security and development initiative. By addressing these challenges, the international community and the Haitian government will send clear signals to potential spoilers and those that benefit from the current status quo, that a new way forward has been agreed upon for Haiti.

9.4 Epilogue – A Change of Paradigm in 2009?

On 14 April 2009, the *Conference on the Economic and Social Development of Haiti*, hosted by the IDB and the Haitian government took place in Washington, DC. Headed by Prime Minister Pierre-Louis with members of the Haitian Parliament, the delegation of the Haitian government presented a strategy paper entitled “Towards a New Cooperation Paradigm.”¹⁷⁵ Several aspects of the donor conference and its aftermath are particularly relevant.

The proposal presented by the Haitian government builds heavily on separate visions for Haiti’s development prepared by Drs. Paul Collier in 2009 and Jeffrey Sachs in 2006. Collier’s more recent report emphasizes Haiti’s “window of opportunity”, highlighting Haiti’s advantages over other fragile states, the significant gains the country has made in security and governance, and the Obama administration’s renewed focus on the region. The proposal advocates for a targeted economic strategy implemented simultaneously by international actors, the Haitian government, and investors. Job creation is the highest priority. Labor-intensive reconstruction of infrastructure, the expansion of export zones for the garment industry, and the increase of agricultural productivity are the primary focus. Additionally, Collier campaigns for improving basic services through “independent service authorities”, alleviating food insecurity by increasing food

¹⁷⁵ Republic of Haiti, “Conference sur le Developement Economique et Social d’Haiti – Vers un nouveau paradigme de cooperation,” (14 April 2009)

production with targeted infrastructure and price-security measures, and promoting environmental sustainability via land reform, fruit orchard reforestation and regulation against commercial charcoal. Sachs's earlier report focuses more on creating conditions for long-term sustainable growth. Agriculture and health reform, focused on the rural poor, are combined with improving infrastructure networks and strategies to encourage a demographic transition. Sachs champions his Millennium Villages concept as the model for community-based rural development.

The Haitian government drew from both Collier and Sachs's reports to form the basis for their new strategy paper. The proposal put forward by the Haitian government presents, therefore, the expected sector-based and thematic priorities: job creation, investment, public finances, agricultural development, electricity, infrastructure, education, health, water and sanitation, and emergency preparedness vis-à-vis the hurricane season. The most salient issue repeated throughout the Haitian government's proposal is the importance of strengthening the legitimacy, authority and credibility of the Haitian state¹⁷⁶. The proposal clearly underlines the need to strengthen the capacities of the state through direct budget support to the Haitian government from its main partners in the international community.¹⁷⁷ This represents an explicit strategy change for the international community.

In addition to the more than US\$324 million in new pledges from Haiti's partners for fiscal years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, another important aspect of the donor conference was the high-profile leadership assumed by US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton.¹⁷⁸ Secretary Clinton emphasized the need to coordinate effectively and strategically among the international community. The naming of former President William J. Clinton as Special UN Envoy to Haiti shortly after the donor conference confirms the implicit leadership and political will of the US towards Haiti.

With political will and leadership implicitly assumed, and with a clear strategic framework that emphasizes the importance of the state for lasting security, stability and development in Haiti, three challenges still remain. First, Haiti needs to develop a constructive political process between the president, prime minister and Parliament. Second, the Haitian government must enhance the absorptive, institutional and operational capacities of the state to enable implementation of their strategic framework. Lastly, Haiti requires sustained engagement and coordination among the many actors involved in implementing this strategy. A new partnership is needed between the government of Haiti, the private sector and the international community for this new initiative to succeed. Now that the initial euphoria of the donor conference has waned and the 2009 hurricane season looms ever closer, the question of whether the donor conference marked a paradigm shift or more false promises for a fragile state, still remains to be seen.

¹⁷⁶ "A firm mutual commitment between the Haitian government, international partners and the private sector is vital for success. Speedy implementation of the measures laid out above, designed to improve governance and raise Haiti's competitiveness, is critical... The government has laid out a plan with clear commitments... mutual accountability." Ibid. p. 6-7

¹⁷⁷ In the context of the donor conference, the ten principle partners for Haiti are the IDB, the IMF, the WB, the EU, the UN, Canada, France, US, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

¹⁷⁸ Inter-American Development Bank, "Summary of New Pledges – April 14, 2009," (March 2009)

APPENDICES

- A. Comments on the Report by Dr. Paul Collier
- B. Women's Survival Strategies
- C. List of persons interviewed and consulted
- D. Profile of Columbia University Research Team