Arvid Lukauskas is the executive director of the Picker Center for Executive Education and the MPA in Economic Policy Management (MPA-EPM) program at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.  He also directs SIPA’s summer program offered in collaboration with the School of Continuing Education.

Lukauskas teaches and conducts research on international and comparative political economy, with a focus on the political economy of finance and trade policy.  His books are the Handbook of Trade Policy for Development, edited with R. Stern and G. Zanini (Oxford University Press, 2013); The Political Economy of the East Asian Crisis and its Aftermath, edited with F. Rivera-Batíz (Edward Elgar 2001); and Regulating Finance: The Political Economy of Spanish Financial Policy from Franco to Democracy (University of Michigan 1997).  His articles have appeared in various scholarly journals, including Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Japanese Journal of Political Science and Review of International Political Economy.  He is currently working on a book-length project examining the links between economic and social development in East Asia.

Through the Picker Center, Lukauskas has helped develop or direct a number of major executive training programs in Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Republic of Georgia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, and Thailand as well as for UNDP and the World Bank.  He was the principal investigator for a four-year USAID grant, in conjunction with the East-West Management Institute, to develop educational capacity in the Republic of Georgia.  He has served as a consultant to UNDP and the World Bank Institute.

Lukauskas received a BA from University of Wisconsin, Madison, an MPA from University of Oklahoma, and his PhD from University of Pennsylvania.

Research & Publications

July 2013|Handbook of Trade Policy for Development|Arvid Lukauskas, edited with R. Stern and G. Zanini

Handbook of Trade Policy for Development

October 2006|Japanese Journal of Political Science|Arvid Lukauskas, Yumiko Shimabukuro

In 1997, the Japanese Diet revised the Bank of Japan law thereby granting the central bank greater independence in monetary policy making. The revision was an attempt by Japan's political class to weaken the authority of the powerful Ministry of Finance over the central bank and augment its own influence. The Bank of Japan, however, gained more autonomy than politicians ever intended, leading to frequent confrontations between the government and the central bank over monetary policy. This paper explores the new strategic relationship that emerged between the Bank of Japan and government and the nature of monetary policy implemented in the post-reform period. We demonstrate that several factors contributed to the Bank's unexpected ability to enhance its independence: the astute leadership of the first post-reform governor Hayami Masaru; the Bank's ability to turn politicization of monetary policy to its advantage; and its pursuit of a ‘power through knowledge’ strategy achieved by augmenting its own research capacity. On a theoretical level, our findings show that the passage of a new legal framework only marks the completion of one stage of institutional change and the start of the next; post-enactment politics have as much importance as pre-enactment politics in shaping outcomes. In the post-enactment phase, various factors, including the state of the economy and informal institutions or processes, matter greatly and may shift the direction of institutional change away from the intended path.

October 2002|Comparative Political Studies|Arvid Lukauskas

Recent financial crises in Asia have renewed debates over the appropriate degree and scope of government intervention in financial markets. Governments in two countries affected by financial crises, Japan and South Korea, have historically implemented extensive controls over the financial system. Here, the author asks: What motivated government officials in these countries to implement financial restriction and to keep it so long? Why did Japan and South Korea apparently succeed unlike other countries? It is argued that East Asian officials designed financial policy in part to appease powerful social groups, like banks and industry, and to advance their own political goals. Their intervention produced better results than elsewhere because political and security imperatives to promote rapid industrialization and growth restricted the degree of inefficiency introduced into financial regulation. This study's findings thus highlight the importance of a nation's political institutions and security context in shaping incentives facing public officials.

October 2001|Edward Elgar Publishers|Arvid Lukauskas, Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz

The East Asian crisis has sparked debate regarding the future of emerging markets and the globalization of world capital markets. This study, with contributions by leading economists and political scientists, provides an assessment of the causes and consequences of the crisis and the policy lessons drawn from it. In contrast to much of the existing literature, the volume presents the view that the crisis and its aftermath were not simply the result of purely economic and financial phenomena but also the reflection of some fundamental institutional, historical and political forces. The collection begins with a comparative and historical analysis of the crisis, placing it in the context of other financial and debt crises. This is followed by a discussion of the domestic political and economic factors behind the events, delineating the differences and similarities among affected countries. The contributors also examine how global political forces influenced the unfolding crisis in various countries. Using data, experts present the economic situation in East Asia, the contagion effects in the rest of the world, and the role played by international institutions such as the IMF. Finally, the volume provides a roundtable debate on the policy alternatives confronting emerging markets and the world monetary system in the aftermath of the crisis.