Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs comprises more than 70 full-time faculty and more than 200 adjunct faculty, scholars, and practitioners. All have distinguished themselves in research and leadership in the policy world, and have produced scholarship in a wide variety of subjects, including international relations, democratization, elections, demography, and social policy.

October 1994|University of Michigan Press|Sharyn O'Halloran

Relying on the New Economics of Organizations (NEO), or New Institutionalism, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy shows why conventional models do not adequately describe the formation of American trade policy. Rejecting both the pressure group model and the presidential-ascendancy model, this study's institution-based approach emphasizes the influence Congress has in setting trade policy, connecting theories of institutional design with the procedural details of regulating trade policy. To reach her conclusions, Sharyn O'Halloran uses time series data and econometric analysis to test a set of propositions concerning trade policy. She examines detailed case studies and provides a comprehensive history of the institutions that govern trade policy making. Unlike most scholars who see trade policy as disparate and ad hoc, O'Halloran is able to explain both early and contemporary American trade policy in a consistent and integrated fashion. She argues that a single set of procedures may lead to apparently different outcomes under differing initial conditions; therefore, the key is to identify the common logic, derived from constitutional imperatives, that underlies all policy outcomes.

July 1994|with Julia Fernald and Frank Keane, FRBNY Quarterly Review, Vol. 14, No. 3|Patricia Mosser, Julia Fernald, Frank Keane

Mortgage Security Hedging and the Yield Curve

May 1994|Praeger Publishers (co-authored)|Merit Janow

The Competition: Dealing with Japan

May 1994|W.W. Norton & Co. (Chapter in The United States, Japan and Asia)|Merit Janow

Trading with an Ally: Progress and Discontent in U.S.-Japan Trade Relations

November 1993|Jossey-Bass|Steven Cohen, Ronald Brand

This groundbreaking book sheds light on applying TQM in the real world of government organizations. Drawing on extensive research and their own school of hard knocks experience implementing TQM, Steven Cohen and Ronald Brand present straightforward, practical advice on implementing TQM in government settings. They cite examples of successes in specific government agencies--including the Treasury Department, U.S. Air Force, and Department of Veteran Affairs--to reveal how the principles of TQM can be applied at all levels of government. And, they describe not only how to introduce TQM, but also how to overcome barriers to change, and make TQM a success story of any government agency. Numerous charts and diagrams show concretely how to apply the concepts and techniques of TQM within any governmental unit.

The authors offer case examples that detail what organizational changes--from modifications of clerical procedures to major alterations of agency policy--need to be implemented when TQM is introduced in government agencies.

October 1993|Princeton University Press|Kimberly Marten

Did a "doctrine race" exist alongside the much-publicized arms competition between East and West? Using recent insights from organization theory, Kimberly Marten Zisk answers this question in the affirmative. Zisk challenges the standard portrayal of Soviet military officers as bureaucratic actors wedded to the status quo: she maintains that when they were confronted by a changing external security environment, they reacted by producing innovative doctrine. The author's extensive evidence is drawn from newly declassified Soviet military journals, and from her interviews with retired high-ranking Soviet General Staff officers and highly placed Soviet-Russian civilian defense experts.

According to Zisk, the Cold War in Europe was powerfully influenced by the reactions of Soviet military officers and civilian defense experts to modifications in U.S. and NATO military doctrine. Zisk also asserts that, contrary to the expectations of many analysts, civilian intervention in military policy-making need not provoke pitched civil-military conflict. Under Gorbachev's leadership, for instance, great efforts were made to ensure that "defensive defense" policies reflected military officers' input and expertise. Engaging the Enemy makes an important contribution not only to the theory of military organizations and the history of Soviet military policy but also to current policy debates on East-West security issues.

July 1993|with C. Steindel, in Causes and Consequences of the 1989-92 Credit Slowdown, FRBNY|Patricia Mosser, C. Steindel

Economic Activity and the Recent Slowdown in Private Sector Borrowing

July 1993|Causes and Consequences of the 1989-92 Credit Slowdown, FRBNY|Patricia Mosser

The Influence of the Credit Crunch on Aggregate Demand and Implications for the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy

November 1992|University of Chicago Press|Ester R. Fuchs

Mayors and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago

October 1992|Comparative Politics|Arvid Lukauskas

In a restricted financial system, the government attempts to control the allocation of credit and obtain revenue by fixing interest rates, implementing selective credit policies, blocking the development of direct financial markets, and heavily taxing the banking system. This dissertation asks three major questions: What are the political and economic foundations of restricted financial systems? Which political and economic factors lead to financial deregulation in restricted systems and determine its timing? Which actors drive the process of deregulation? To examine these issues, the dissertation looks at the foundations of Spain's restricted financial system in the period 1940-1974 and its intense process of deregulation from 1974 onwards. The case study is based on in-depth interviews with financial policy makers and financiers as well as a thorough examination of primary and secondary sources.

I argue that political factors best explain the existence of restricted financial systems. Politicians, with the consent of banks and well-connected firms, attempt to establish financial restriction to pursue political goals. A restricted system helps politicians to retain power, by creating a means of delivering patronage, and to raise revenue, by enabling them to tax the banking sector indirectly. I contend that public officials initiate the movement for deregulation in restricted financial systems. Changes in the political environment or institutions may provide politicians with an incentive to pursue the greater financial efficiency deregulation produces. In Spain, a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime was the key factor driving change in financial policy. A transition to democracy gave politicians an incentive to place less emphasis on providing particularistic benefits through the financial system and more on promoting financial efficiency, and led them to adopt more effective means of raising revenue. The Spanish experience with deregulation differs from that of states with non-restricted financial systems. In these systems, regulated financial entities promote deregulation in an effort to cope with unregulated competitors. In Spain, the financial status quo did not challenge the regulatory regime because these market pressures were absent.