Optimal Bank Capital Regulation

thursday, February 23, 2017

OPENING REMARKS

• Merit Janow, Dean, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
• Greg Baer, President, The Clearing House Association

Panel: Benefits and Costs of Capital Regulation

• Chair: Charles Taylor (George Washington)
• Douglas Elliott (Oliver Wyman)
• Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (IMF)
• Jas Ellis (Bank of England)

Paper Session: Unintended Consequences

• Chair: TBD
• Jill Cetina (Office of Financial Research) “Do Higher Capital Standards Always Reduce Bank Risk? The Impact of the Basel Leverage Ratio on the U.S. Triparty Repo Market”
• Nicola Garbarino (Bank of England) “Specialization in Mortgage Risk under Basel II”

Discussants:

• James Weatherly (Capital One)
• Richard Herring (Wharton)

LUNCH

Keynote: Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and conversation with Patricia Mosser (Director, MPA Program in Economic Policy Management)

Paper Session: Capital Requirements and Financial Stability

• Chair: Patricia Mosser, Director, MPA Program in Economic Policy Management
• Moritz Schularick (CEPR and Bonn), “Bank Capital Redux”
• Christoph Basten (FINMA),” Higher Bank Capital Requirements and Mortgage Pricing: Evidence from the Countercyclical Capital Buffer”

Discussants:

• Andreas Lehnert (Federal Reserve Board)
• Steven Strongin (Goldman Sachs)

Paper Session: Models of Optimal Bank Liability Structure

• Chair: William Nelson, The Clearing House Association
• Douglas Gale (NYU), “Bank Capital Structure, Fire Sales, and the Social Value of Deposits”
• Zhenyu Wang (Indiana), “Bank Liability Structure”

Discussants:

• Francisco Covas (The Clearing House Association)
• Patrick Bolton (Columbia)

Panel: Impact of Regulation on Bank's Internal Capital Allocation

• Chair: Charles Calomiris (Columbia)
• Michael Hsu (Federal Reserve Board)
• Chris Mazingo (McKinsey)
• Scott Albinson (JPMorgan Chase)

RECEPTION