THE VALUE OF REGULATORS AS MONITORS: EVIDENCE FROM BANKING

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Motivation and Research Question

- Policy debate highlights costs of regulation for bank shareholders
 - Decline of small US banks often attributed to regulatory burden
 - Regulatory costs concern policymakers

"We will continue to consider appropriate ways to ease regulatory burdens while preserving core reforms." Powell (Nov 28, 2017)

- Since 2014, multiple reforms to reduce (small) bank regulatory burden
- However, financial regulators monitor banks
 - Such supervision can reduce shareholder monitoring costs
 - Agency theory suggests this can be valuable to shareholders
- \Rightarrow Does supervision increase or destroy bank value?

This Paper: Supervision Increases Bank Value

- I study the impact of financial supervision on bank value
- I exploit a quasi-natural experiment that reduced small-bank supervision
 - Examine changes in value due to reduced regulatory monitoring
- I show that reduced supervision *decreases* bank value
 - 1% decline in Tobin's *q*
 - 7% decline in equity Market-to-Book

Mechanism

- Regulatory monitoring reduces shareholder monitoring costs
- To guide tests, I build a stylized model of monitoring (Townsend (1979))
 - Interpret reduced Fed monitoring as shock to shareholder monitoring costs
 - Use model to attribute value losses to their economic drivers
- Empirical evidence
 - Consistent with model, I document two sources of value losses
 - Internal monitoring: Show increase in internal controls' expenditure
 - Managerial rents: Show increase in earnings management
 - Additional support for mechanism: Value losses are larger for banks with high cash flow risk, non-bank subsidiaries
 - In paper, show little evidence for alternative hypotheses
 - E.g. changes in risk, implicit government guarantees

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Institutional Framework

Fed Supervision and Bank Reporting

- 86% of US banks are part of a Bank Holding Company (BHC)
- Federal Reserve is primary BHC supervisor
- BHC Supervision Manual details Fed officials' monitoring tasks
 - BHC financial statement collection
 - Off-site financials' verification, peer group analysis
 - On-site inspections based on results/flags from off-site analysis
- Financial statements collected by Fed vary with BHC size
 - Large BHCs: Consolidated financial statements, quarterly (FR Y-9C)
 - Small BHCs: Parent-only, annually (FR Y-9SP)
- \Rightarrow BHC reporting, Fed off-site monitoring functions of BHC size

Quasi-Natural Experiment: Small-Bank Definition Change

- Quasi-natural experiment: March 2006 increase in threshold defining small banks
 - \$150M in assets before Q1-2006
 - \$500M in assets starting Q1-2006
- Experiment reduces Fed's supervisory attention to banks below new threshold
 - Treated banks excluded from peer group analysis
- In a few slides, will provide support for experiment validity

Empirical Setting

- Data sources
 - Fed Regulatory Data: BHC assets (treatment assignment)
 - Quarterly Compustat Bank: Balance sheet/income statement
 - CRSP: Stock prices
 - I/B/E/S: Analyst profitability estimates
- Sample period: Q1-2004 to Q4-2007

Treatment Assignment

- Treatment: Shock to regulatory monitoring for banks below \$500M
- Using 2005 asset data, assign banks to treated/control groups

Treated Group

- 108 BHCs
- 2005 assets \$150-\$500M
- Below new threshold
- Average assets: \$387M

Control Group

- 100 BHCs
- 2005 assets \$500-\$850M
- Above new threshold
- Average assets: \$720M

Treatment Assignment: An Example



- 2005 assets: \$455 million
- Large for 2005 reporting

Timberland Bancorp, Inc.



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


- 2005 assets: \$547 million
- Large for 2005 reporting
- Large for 2006 reporting
- \Rightarrow Part of control group

- Identification assumption
 - Quasi-random assignment around new threshold before change
 - Controlling for observables, Landmark and Timberland are "equal" before treatment
 - Value differences *after* change are only due to differences in regulatory monitoring
- Two potential violations of this assumption
 - Systematic pre-treatment differences in treated/control value (Trends
 - Pre-treatment size manipulation

Size Manipulation around New Threshold?

- Regulation details prevent ex-post size manipulation
 - Threshold change announced in late 2005, based on early 2005 assets
- McCrary (2008) tests show no signs of manipulation
 - Idea: Manipulation leads to concentration on either threshold side
 - No density discontinuities ⇒ No manipulation



$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left(\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treated}_i \right) + \beta_2 X_{it} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- *Y_{it}*: Value outcome (e.g. Market-to-Book) for bank *i* in quarter *t*
- Post_t: Post-treatment indicator for quarter t
- Treated_i: Treatment indicator for bank *i*
- *β*₁: Treatment effect

Main Result: The Value of Regulatory Monitoring

Fed Monitoring Increases Bank Value

	1	og Tobin's q		log l	Market-to-Boo	ok
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Post \times Treated$	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.074*** (0.03)	-0.083*** (0.03)	-0.078*** (0.02)
Leverage		0.337*** (0.12)	0.274*** (0.10)		5.640*** (0.81)	5.387*** (0.67)
Tier 1 Ratio		0.381*** (0.08)	0.285*** (0.07)		2.573*** (0.52)	1.778*** (0.49)
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.365 2,076	Yes Yes 0.398 2,076	Yes Yes 0.424 2,076	Yes Yes 0.416 2,076	Yes Yes 0.476 2,076	Yes Yes 0.511 2,076

• Treatment effect: 1% Tobin's *q* loss, 7% Market-to-Book loss

- Result not affected by controls (e.g. leverage, ROE, asset growth)
- On average, \$4M relative market cap loss, \$430M total loss
- In paper, provide robustness tests on main result
 E.g. change sample bandwidth, run placebo tests, event stud

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Mechanism: Regulatory Monitoring Reduces Shareholder Monitoring Costs

A Stylized Model of Monitoring

- In the paper, I build a stylized model of monitoring by bank outsiders (Townsend (1979))
 - Interpret experiment as shock to monitoring costs
 - Use model to attribute value losses to economic drivers, test mechanism
- Model gives three testable predictions
 - Increased monitoring costs decrease shareholder value
 - Value losses come from monitoring expenditure, managerial rents
 - In the data, treated banks increase their internal controls' expenditure, earnings management
 - Value losses increase with bank cash flow risk
 - In the data, value losses are larger for treated banks with high cash flow risk, non-bank subsidiaries (Pogach and Unal (2018))

Results: Monitoring Expenditure

	log Professional Fees			log <u>Professional Fees</u> Net Interest Income			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Post \times Treated	0.243** (0.09)	0.254*** (0.09)	0.224*** (0.07)	0.210** (0.09)	0.212** (0.09)	0.213*** (0.07)	
Leverage Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.070 978	Yes Yes 0.097 978	Yes Yes 0.191 978	Yes Yes 0.046 978	Yes Yes 0.064 978	Yes Yes 0.152 978	

- Treatment leads to 25% increase in professional fees
 - $\circ~$ Discounted PV of increased expenditure ${\sim}25\%$ of value loss
- Consistent with model predictions
 - Professional fees related to internal controls in my sample
 - Professional fee growth strongly correlated with value losses



Results: Managerial Rents

		log Int. Expense Total Loans		<u>LLP</u> al Loans	log DI	NLLP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Crisis \times Unmonitored$	0.053** (0.02)	0.054*** (0.02)	-0.151 (0.18)	-0.289* (0.15)	0.610** (0.25)	0.614** (0.25)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.673	0.760	0.380	0.526	0.336	0.351
Observations	899	899	746	746	543	543

- Use August 2007 interbank lending distress as funding shock
 - Study response to funding shock for banks around \$500M
 - Coefficient captures crisis effect on banks below \$500M
- Results
 - Funding cost increase for banks below threshold
 - Loan Loss Provisions decrease after controlling for observables
 - Discretionary LLP increase ⇒ Earnings management

- Third model prediction: Value losses increase in cash flow risk
 - Intuition: Cash flow risk increases likelihood of low cash flows or high managerial rents
- Test prediction with different cash flow risk proxies
 - Absolute difference between consensus forecast of one-year-forward EPS and realized EPS
 - Equity volatility and tail risk (Ellul and Yerramilli (2013))
 - Presence of non-bank subsidiaries (Pogach and Unal (2018))
- Sort treated banks by cash flow risk
 - Show that value losses are larger for banks with high cash flow risk

Results: Cash Flow Risk and Value Losses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post \times Treated	-0.033 (0.03)	-0.052** (0.03)	-0.025 (0.03)	-0.035 (0.03)	-0.026 (0.03)	-0.029 (0.03)
Post \times Treated \times High CF Risk	-0.165** (0.06)	-0.102* (0.06)				
Post \times Treated \times High Eq. Vol.			-0.121** (0.06)	-0.106** (0.05)		
Post \times Treated \times High Tail Risk					-0.104* (0.05)	-0.111** (0.05)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Low-Order Interaction Terms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.429 2,076	Yes Yes 0.519 2,076	Yes Yes 0.423 2,076	Yes Yes 0.516 2,076	Yes Yes 0.421 2,076	Yes Yes 0.516 2,076

- Dependent variable is log Market-to-Book
- CF risk is absolute difference between forcasted and realized EPS
- Treated banks with above-median risk experience 10% higher losses

Results: Non-Bank Subsidiaries

	log l	Market-to-B	ook	lo	g Prof. Fee	s
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Post \times Treated$	-0.053 (0.03)	-0.051* (0.03)	-0.060** (0.03)	0.032 (0.10)	0.045 (0.10)	0.022 (0.10)
Post \times Treated \times Non-Bank Subs	-0.066 (0.05)	-0.091** (0.04)	-0.080* (0.04)	0.313** (0.14)	0.270* (0.15)	0.277* (0.15)
Leverage Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Low-Order Interaction Terms	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.099 1,039	Yes Yes 0.227 1,039	Yes Yes 0.271 1,039	Yes Yes 0.051 512	Yes Yes 0.060 512	Yes Yes 0.090 512


- Value losses, monitoring expenditure larger for treated BHCs with at least one non-bank subsidiary
- Result also confirms role of Fed monitoring
 - Bank subsidiaries are monitored by FDIC, Fed, OCC
 - Non-bank subsidiaries are monitored exclusively by Fed

Conclusion

- What is the impact of financial supervision on bank value?
- Exploit quasi-natural shock to small-bank supervision to answer question
- Consistent with agency theory predictions, show
 - Reduced supervision induces large value losses
 - Value losses come from internal monitoring and managerial rents
 - Value losses are larger for banks with high cash flow risk, non-bank subsidiaries
- Implications:
 - Policy: Possible unintended consequences of current small-bank deregulation
 - Economics: Large impact of (regulatory) monitoring on firm value


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Pre-Treatment Market-to-Book Differences?




- Similar pre-treatment average Market-to-Book across two groups
- Statistically equal before treatment? Quarterly averages are noisy

Pre-Treatment Market-to-Book Differences?



- Local polynomial approximates value trend before/after
- No differences across groups before treatment

Pre-Treatment Market-to-Book Differences?



- Local polynomial approximates value trend before/after
- Visual preview of main result



Robustness: Sample Bandwidth around Threshold

	Deper	ndent Variable	e: log Market	-to-Book		
	\$400M-600M		\$300M-	-700M	\$150M-1B	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Post \times Treated$	-0.087** (0.04)	-0.088** (0.03)	-0.055** (0.03)	-0.072*** (0.02)	-0.052** (0.02)	-0.073*** (0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.149 355	Yes Yes 0.338 355	Yes Yes 0.106 724	Yes Yes 0.296 724	Yes Yes 0.068 1,313	Yes Yes 0.250 1,313

- Possible concern: Results driven by sample bandwidth
- Strategy: Experiment with different bandwidths
- Results not affected by bandwidth choice

Placebo: Arbitrary Treatment Assignment

]	Dependent	Variable: l	og Marke	t-to-Book				
	\$300M Threshold		\$1B Th	\$1B Threshold		After 12/2004		After 12/2006	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
$Post \times Treated$	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)	
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.432 1,056	Yes Yes 0.528 1,056	Yes Yes 0.427 2,076	Yes Yes 0.532 2,076	Yes Yes 0.038 1,028	Yes Yes 0.145 1,028	Yes Yes 0.407 2,177	Yes Yes 0.496 2,177	

- Possible concern: Results driven by sub-samples of banks/specific time periods
- Strategy: Experiment with placebo thresholds/treatment dates
- Results disappear when using different thresholds/dates



	Daily Fi	requency	Weekly Frequency		
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control	
Cumulative Abnormal Return <i>t-</i> stat Observations (Event Window)	-0.0180 -2.144 24	0.00264 0.277 24	-0.0139 -3.315 5	0.00725 1.189 5	

- Event study around March 6, 2006
- 2% negative CAR for portfolio of treated banks
- No CAR changes for portfolio of control banks



		Dep	endent Variab	le: log Market-	to-Book			
	2005-2006 Sample		2004-2008	4-2008 Sample Surviv		rs Only	Listed in 2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\text{Post} \times \text{Treated}$	-0.078*** (0.02)	-0.094*** (0.02)	-0.072** (0.03)	-0.074** (0.03)	-0.061** (0.03)	-0.070** (0.03)	-0.074*** (0.03)	-0.079*** (0.02)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.089 1,064	Yes Yes 0.260 1,064	Yes Yes 0.650 2,599	Yes Yes 0.738 2,599	Yes Yes 0.426 1,454	Yes Yes 0.522 1,454	Yes Yes 0.408 2,004	Yes Yes 0.511 2,004

Back

- Results robust to
 - Shorter, longer sample analysis
 - Exclusion of non-surviving banks
 - Exclusion of post-treatment listings

Quarterly Treatment Effect

		log Tobin's q		le	og Market-to-Book	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Q1-2006 × Treated	-0.010**	-0.011****	-0.010**	-0.060**	-0.066***	-0.063**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Q2-2006 \times Treated	-0.011**	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.071**	-0.078***	-0.075**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Q3-2006 \times Treated	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.084***	-0.093***	-0.089**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Q4-2006 \times Treated	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.075**	-0.083***	-0.078*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Q1-2007 \times Treated	-0.010**	-0.011***	-0.011**	-0.077**	-0.083***	-0.077*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Q2-2007 \times Treated	-0.008*	-0.010**	-0.010**	-0.070*	-0.084**	-0.083*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Q3-2007 \times Treated	-0.009*	-0.010**	-0.010**	-0.079**	-0.085**	-0.077*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Q4-2007 \times Treated	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009	-0.081*	-0.090**	-0.082*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Leverage Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-Squared	0.366	0.399	0.424	0.417	0.476	0.511
Observations	2,076	2,076	2,076	2,076	2,076	2,076

Falsification: Non-Fed-Regulated Financial Firms

	log Tobin's q			log Market-to-Book			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Post × Small Non-BHC	0.109 (0.20)	0.040 (0.19)	-0.032 (0.15)	0.131 (0.20)	0.112 (0.18)	0.040 (0.15)	
log Assets		-0.383* (0.20)	-0.415* (0.20)		-0.105 (0.18)	-0.164 (0.17)	
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE Firm FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.231 299	Yes Yes 0.337 299	Yes Yes 0.508 299	Yes Yes 0.310 299	Yes Yes 0.314 299	Yes Yes 0.558 299	

- Non-BHC Financials (SIC Code 6000-6799)
- No effect in falsification test around \$500M
- Same result for non-financials



Post-Treatment Monitoring and Value Losses

	le	og Tobin's q		log Market-to-Book			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$Post \times Treated$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.003	0.005	0.004	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Prof. Fees	-0.037	-0.062	-0.075*	-0.103	-0.416	-0.437	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.52)	(0.42)	(0.36)	
$Post \times Treated \times Prof. \ Fees$	-0.139***	-0.101**	-0.124**	-1.447***	-1.300***	-1.188***	
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.39)	
Risk Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
Other Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
BHC FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
R-Squared	0.290	0.338	0.376	0.368	0.452	0.485	
Observations	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641	1,641	

- Interact professional fees with treatment indicator
- Treatment effect's significance absorbed by professional fees
 - Strong correlation between value losses and professional fees



Funding Costs and Profitability during the Crisis

	log Funding Costs			log Loan Loss Provisions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$Crisis \times Unmonitored$	0.051** (0.02)	0.044** (0.02)	0.054** (0.02)	-0.175 (0.18)	-0.208 (0.18)	-0.215 (0.17)
Leverage Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.676 873	Yes Yes 0.727 873	Yes Yes 0.758 873	Yes Yes 0.383 723	Yes Yes 0.389 723	Yes Yes 0.416 723

• Small bank cost of funding increase, LLP decrease

	log Discretionary LLP-v1			log Discretionary LLP-v2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Crisis × Unmonitored	0.610** (0.25)	0.611** (0.25)	0.731*** (0.27)	0.704*** (0.24)	0.699*** (0.24)	0.715*** (0.26)
Leverage Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.336 543	Yes Yes 0.342 543	Yes Yes 0.353 543	Yes Yes 0.344 549	Yes Yes 0.350 549	Yes Yes 0.360 549

 Discretionary Negative LLP: absolute negative residual from first-stage regression of LLP on observables (Kanagaretnam et al. (2014))

Results: Government Bailout Guarantees

	Factor Loading (Market Model)			Factor	Factor Loading (GL Model)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Post \times Treated	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		
Liquidity Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes		
Other Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes		
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.016 1,955	Yes Yes 0.023 1,955	Yes Yes 0.045 1,955	Yes Yes 0.013 1,955	Yes Yes 0.018 1,955	Yes Yes 0.037 1,955		



Dependent Variable: log Market-to-Book								
	Volu	Voluntary Reporting			Not Reporting			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
$Post \times Treated$	-0.090** (0.04)	-0.096** (0.04)	-0.092** (0.04)	-0.083*** (0.03)	-0.090*** (0.03)	-0.080*** (0.03)		
Other Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes		
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.424 1,351	Yes Yes 0.493 1,351	Yes Yes 0.509 1,351	Yes Yes 0.411 1,837	Yes Yes 0.469 1,837	Yes Yes 0.521 1,837		



	log Tier 1 Ratio		log Tier	log Tier 2 Ratio		log Combined Ratio	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
$Post \times Treated$	0.029 (0.03)	0.035 (0.02)	-0.065 (0.05)	-0.065 (0.05)	0.011 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Year-Quarter FE BHC FE R-Squared Observations	Yes Yes 0.029 2,077	Yes Yes 0.178 2,077	Yes Yes 0.047 2,062	Yes Yes 0.054 2,062	Yes Yes 0.061 2,100	Yes Yes 0.176 2,100	

