SIPA News

The U.S. and the World
From the Dean

With this issue of SIPA News we inaugurate a new format and, I hope, a new opportunity for debate and discussion in the larger and far-flung SIPA community. Over the course of the last several years, SIPA News has grown from what was little more than a desktop published newsletter into an increasingly attractive magazine, as we sought to convey more accurately the richness and diversity of the activities that occur at the School. This issue takes that effort one step further. Inspired by our student magazine, Slant, we have asked faculty and students to contribute longer, feature-style articles on a topic of pressing public moment. Naturally, the war in Iraq appeared most compelling this spring, and the commentary in this issue is largely devoted to that question.

As will be apparent, most of the faculty at SIPA shared the skepticism with which their academic colleagues across the United States viewed U.S. policy on Iraq. These articles are drawn from the remarks their authors made in campus forums throughout the spring semester. They invited debate, and they got it, and the resulting engagements were among the most interesting and important discussions at the School this semester.

We hope to continue to publish articles and interviews, essays and editorials that provoke and enlighten our readers—alumni and friends of SIPA. I do not expect that we will always agree with everything published here; indeed, even in this issue, the authors do not always agree with each other, so there is little doubt that our readers will not always agree with them. I do hope our readers will be provoked to think, however, and be moved to write to us when they are. Our next issue will include letters to the editor.

The class that graduated this May began its tenure at SIPA about ten days before September 11 and ended it only weeks after the United States ended the Saddam regime in Iraq. It is a special class in many ways, though entirely typical in many, perhaps more important aspects. One of the leaders of this class—Saurabh Dani, MPA '03, and the animator of this year's Follies—captured it very nicely in an article in the student newspaper. "SIPA is unique," he wrote. "It's like a giant cauldron into which 500 people jump willingly each year, realize that there are 500 students already swimming around inside, and then try to make a small pocket in this bowl for themselves. . . . I am glad I was in SIPA between September 11 and the Iraq war. The time has been well-spent with hours of discussion, coffee, beer, vodka, classes, arguments, war protests, papers, exams, break-ups, summer internships, two-cheek kisses, computer anguishes, group presentations and deadlines. I will leave knowing that I want to make a positive change and have the ability and strength to do it."

We could not ask for anything better.

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Inside SIPA
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There is a basic paradox, or at least puzzle, in the inability of the United States to coerce Saddam Hussein to comply with U.S. demands that Iraq disarm despite having—and being willing to use—the ability to defeat him. What contributed to, and what detracted from, the credibility of American threats?

This situation was fundamentally different from the Cold War, which was a game of chicken. Neither side would (or should) have been willing to exercise the ultimate sanction of all-out war. The new U.S.-Iraq configuration made that kind of credibility difficult to establish.

By Robert Jervis
Coercing Saddam to give up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should have been both hard and easy. It was hard in that the United States sought to overcome very intense preferences. Clearly, Saddam’s WMD programs were very important to him, as shown by his willingness to pay a high price to continue to pursue them. Furthermore, while complying would bring a definite loss, standing firm seemed to run a risk of a greater loss but also some chance of avoiding all losses. Prospect Theory tells us that these conditions will lead most people to be risk acceptant (although this does not mean that most people would stand firm if they were in Saddam’s place). Still, the situation was conducive to compliance because the United States had overwhelming force at its disposal, a high motivation to use it, and gave an ultimatum. What were the indications that Bush was not bluffing? There were several, but none that were decisive. First, the troop movements were at least a necessary condition for war and entailed significant monetary and political costs. But these sunk costs were slight compared to the gains that would accrue if Iraq were to disarm without a war and so are not inconsistent with a bluff. Second, Bush’s constant reiteration of the need for Iraq to disarm not only staked his reputation on carrying out the threat, but led to the commonsense inference that he really believed what he said. Relatedly, Bush elaborated a coherent explanation of why Iraq must be disarmed. The fact that many informed people accepted this argument reinforced its credibility. Third, according to the administration, not only was there a need to go to war, but it expected that there would be positive secondary effects in the Middle East. Thus, while both threats and opportunities were foreseen, the administration seems to have believed that there were strong reasons to attack. Furthermore, the costs that the administration said it perceived were low. Finally, the credibility of Bush’s threat may have been enhanced by a reading of his character, even though this is not necessarily flattering. It appeared to many that Bush was strongly driven by a sense of religious mission to smite the evildoers, that he was obsessed with Iraq, and that he was generally stubborn if not impervious to facts and logic. If this picture is accurate, he was not likely to retreat. It is not clear, however, that Saddam understood Bush the same way we do.

Why did Saddam not believe the threat? Perhaps he did believe it, but not the (intermittent) American promises to be restrained if he did disarm. He then had no reason to comply. Moreover, Saddam may have thought that he could inflict such high casualties on the United States that it would withdraw, or that even if he were defeated he would go down in history as a great martyr (assuming he preferred this outcome to living in Iraq without WMD). Similarly,
According to the administration, not only was there a need to go to war, but they expected that there would be positive secondary effects in the Middle East. Thus, while both threats and opportunities were foreseen, the administration seems to have believed that there were strong reasons to attack.

Saddam may have been willing to take very high risks or may have only had a tenuous grasp on reality. He seems to have had an inflated view of his own power and to have systematically denigrated the will and power of his adversaries.

Ironically, if Saddam believed that the United States wanted not only to disarm him, but to consolidate its position as a hegemony, then he should have found the threat credible because the perceived gains for Bush would be very great. But this perception could also have led Saddam to believe that the United States would fight even if he conceded. Alternatively, Saddam might have looked back on previous incidents with other presidents and concluded that the United States often bluffs. His ability to survive so long in the face of so many setbacks may have led him to think that he was invulnerable. In addition, he may not have believed that Bush himself believed the arguments he was making.

There is another irony here: if Saddam sought to dominate the Arab world and would have been more aggressive were he to get nuclear weapons, then he should have been more likely to believe that Bush believed this, giving Bush high incentives to attack. Moreover, to the extent that Saddam thought that oil was the major American objective, he may have believed that his counterthreat to damage the oil fields would have been credible and effective.

The normal operation of cognitive and motivated biases can have made the American threats less than fully credible. There are lots of cases in the past where a country was prepared to take some action, and many disinterested observers did not doubt this, but the adversary was not convinced. Much of the standard work on deterrence failures can apply here, even though this is a case of failed compliance. Saddam was not alone in being skeptical. Until late January, many people in the United States thought that Bush would not proceed without allied and UN support.

What could the United States have done to have increased the credibility of its threats? Perhaps the most important contribution would have been for the French, Germans, Russians, and Chinese to tell Saddam that the United States would fight even if they maintained their opposition and blocked a UN vote. We do not know if they did this.

This set of observations leaves us with several important questions: Does Saddam's refusal to comply indicate that he could not have been deterred from coercing his neighbors if he had gotten nuclear weapons? In other words, does the fact that a war was required in order to disarm him show that the war was necessary? And did Bush's behavior in trying to make his threats credible generally conform to what we think is common and efficacious under these circumstances? It is questions like these to which researchers and analysts must now turn.

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IRAQ:
In previous forums I gave my views on why it would be a mistake to launch this war. Nothing that has happened has changed my mind about its being a mistake. But that question is no longer a policy issue. The main policy issues now will concern how to pick up the pieces and remake Iraq in a way that does as much as possible to produce benefits in peace that might make up for the costs of the war.

The transition from war to peace may prove messy and indistinct. Postwar internal disorder, frontier justice, score-settling, and agitation may keep the country a violent place for some time after the overthrow of the old regime. But pacification will probably be sufficient within the near future to focus on the phase where American physical capacity to impose and control change will be weaker than in the conventional military sphere.
There are grounds for optimism—at the least, because expectations among critics are low. The war went better than I guessed it would, and so may the peace. But to keep focused on where we need to worry and expend effort, rather than to celebrate, I will concentrate on the challenges and obstacles to success, all while hoping as usual that my instinctive pessimism will be proved wrong.

The main questions now are what will be the scope, nature, and duration of occupation? Will the model for occupation be the American military governments of Germany and Japan in the years after 1945? Or the U.S.-NATO-UN occupations of Bosnia and Kosovo (which, in an article I published just before September 11, I called “institutionalized temporizing,” and which still show no signs of coming to a conclusion)?

The dilemma is that the best chance for moderating anger and suspicion in the Arab world is to have a military government that rules briefly and with a light hand—to get out of occupation quickly, leaving Iraq a healthy, happy, and independent country. But the best chance of accomplishing the transition to a moderately healthy country, in political terms, is to rule with a heavy hand for an extended period, cracking heads in a manner designed to suppress malign antidemocratic forces, to instill understanding of and confidence in representative institutions and processes—in short, to force the country to be free.

The Germany and Japan cases appear as the most promising examples of how this might be accomplished. But in those cases we were dealing with relatively homogeneous societies, both of which had prior experience with constitutional democracy, both of which had the social capital and economic culture and institutions to function efficiently in rebuilding a vibrant market economy, and one of which was firmly embedded in the western cultural tradition.

Can we democratize Iraq? That is the question that dominates at the moment. But should we even be absolutely sure that we want to democratize it? I say the answer is definitely yes, but that we need to be prepared to accept substantial negative side effects. Democracy and stability do not necessarily go together, especially in the early phase of democratization. If near-term stability were our primary objective, we would probably be safer leaving the country in the hands of a moderate authoritarian regime that could keep the lid on the country’s internal tensions and rivalries.

Whether it is at all realistic to believe that we can make democracy take root in Iraq is only one of the issues. On that, who knows? I’m not optimistic, but stranger things have happened. It is more of a stretch, however, to believe that we can turn the country into the kind of democracy we mean when we talk about democracy. For Americans, democracy means liberal democracy—democracy with a high premium on individual liberty, with protections for minority rights, with respect for freedom of speech, association, and religion. More likely a liberated Iraq will be, if anything, a simple majoritarian democracy, with what Tocqueville warned about—tyranny of the majority. Can we settle for illiberal democracy, in which the ambitions and values of a majority of citizens are honored and protected, but those of Sunnis, or Christians, or Kurds, or other groups are not?

Can we democratize Iraq without recreating an enemy? Government of the people, by the people, and for the people in Iraq should not be expected to yield a Minnesota on the Euphrates. Rather, we should expect it to liberate the people’s aspirations, and as just suggested, to enable a majority of them to control the country. One majority is the Shiites. Shiites elsewhere, as in Iran, have, to say the least, not generally been pro-American. Should we expect Shiites in power in Iraq to continue to love us? Will there be a secular majority, a domestic coalition that

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will it be something unlike any of those models?

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cross-cuts religious, tribal, or regional divisions within Iraq? If so, will a governing majority of any sort necessarily have the same aims as the United States?

Even if a postoccupation Iraq is sympathetic to the United States, it will almost inevitably be anti-Israel. (Some in the Bush administration reportedly foresee an Iraq with a benign policy toward Israel that will help push other Arabs toward acceptance of the Jewish state. What reason is there to expect this unless we are talking about an Iraq that remains under the thumb of the United States—that is, an Iraq that has not been rehabilitated and set free in a manner that justifies the original American war plan?)

Will a reformed and open Iraq, out from under the oppressive control of a centralized police and domestic intelligence system, be better for American security? If Iraq is liberalized and becomes untotitarian and less politically centralized, it will be more available to all sorts of groups, more penetrable. This will make it another possible place for Al Qaeda or other radicals to move to, to use as a base, like Pakistan, Indonesia, and so forth. (Recall that the Al Ansar group that the Bush administration cited as evidence of Iraqi support for terrorist groups was in the Kurdish area of the country, outside of Baghdad’s control as well as that of the United States, until we invaded. Will we re-invade if such groups gravitate to a free Iraq?) Can the United States police this situation better than in Afghanistan, where we and our client government in Kabul still lack control of vast sections of the country? Or if we want to exert strong intelligence and population controls, is it feasible to do so without remaining a coercive occupier rather than leaving like a liberator?

How do we keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) eliminated for good? If the aim is to make the country a beacon of freedom in the Middle East, that means eventually leaving Iraqis back in control of their own country. The new regime may be a good one, but will it stay good? Any regime, good or bad, may tell itself, “Don’t even think about producing chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) again.” But is there any reason to be certain? Iraq, like other countries with incentives to proliferate WMD, will have security problems—for example, Iran (at least if we have not by then moved on to conquer and occupy Iran too). Can we be sure that Iraq will not decide at some future postoccupation date that, like Pakistan, it needs a strategic equalizer to deal with its enemies? We may retain the leverage and control to prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons, since it is far harder to import, build, or conceal a program to produce fissionable material, but we are less certain to be able to prevent an independent Iraq, out from under sanctions and occupation, from joining the dozen other countries with clandestine biological or chemical weapons programs.

Can we finance an energetic occupation without using oil revenues? Not likely. Even with less than the full tax cuts proposed by Bush, the United States is headed for crushing annual deficits over $400 billion. No other rich countries are likely to pony up and pay a big part of the tab. Who can be surprised if most of them tell us, “You broke it, you fix it”? With all that oil sitting there, demands to make the occupation at least partly self-financing will be strong.

But can we use the oil revenues without in effect expropriating them or appearing to do so by controlling how much oil is sold and what programs get the proceeds? Will that not at least appear to discredit the pledge that we fought the war to ensure that the oil wealth would belong to Iraq’s people? This is especially an issue if Iraq is now expected to pay its old debts (leaving Iraqis collectively worse off economically than before liberation). Those debts are huge, by some estimates approaching $130 billion, owed to the Kuwaitis for damage inflicted in the rape of 1990, to Russia, to France, and other claimants. If forced to pay, how many Iraqis will feel that the war really liberated them?

Should debts be cancelled, as a gesture to supporting the new era in Iraq? Who will make such a decision—the United States, which will have governing authority, and which is not among the principle claimants? Should the U.S. share the loss with the debt holders? Or should we just say the Kuwaitis can afford to do without payment, and we want to punish France and Russia anyway—that is, exacerbating the disastrous breach in relations with both those countries?

O.K., I’m just giving a catalogue of what can go wrong. Statesmen who accomplish great things often must refuse to take counsel of their fears. Perhaps the statesmen of the Bush administration will rise to the occasion and cut through the obstacles, forge ahead with a reconstruction strategy that works as well as the war strategy, and make critics once again look like nincompoops. I doubt that this will happen, but I certainly hope that it does.

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MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR HYPOCRISY

T he eerie whine of precision-guided missiles over Baghdad contrasts with the equally shrill but increasingly muddled debate over the legality of the conflict. The trans-Atlantic war of words has laid bare competing visions of the purpose of the United Nations Security Council. Was the council meant just to pass judgment on the use of force—or to organize its collective use? Given the imbalance of power between the United States and the rest of the world, should it embrace American military might—or seek to constrain it?

Unless these contradictions are reconciled, the council will be relegated to dealing with local crises, as in East Timor and Sierra Leone. The United Nations will retain operational roles in peacekeeping, mediation, humanitarian relief, human rights, development and nation-building. But if lesser powers contrive to turn the council into a forum for counterbalancing American power with votes, words and public appeals, they will further erode its legitimacy and credibility. Given the experience of the League of Nations, the architects of the United Nations were determined to bind American power and global decision-making, not to set them at odds.

The United Nations, sadly, has drifted far from its founding vision. Its Charter neither calls for a democratic council nor relegates the collective use of force to a last resort. It was a wartime document of a military alliance, not a universal peace platform. Pleas for reform of the Security Council, however, stress equity and representation—not effectiveness and responsibility. The reformers would mimic the political correctness and practical impotence of the League’s Council. Then, as now, most states had little stomach for enforcement.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. By combining muscle and legal authority, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter promised to set the United Nations apart from the feckless League. Yet, as France, Russia and China looked the other way, Saddam Hussein stripped the United Nations Security Council of its credibility layer by layer.

Last September, President Bush ungallantly pointed out that the council, like the proverbial emperor, has no clothes. However weak his multilateral credentials, on this he is right: the council has shed credibility for so long that more worldly leaders have forgotten what it looks like. His warnings about the United Nations morphing back into the League of Nations have fallen on deaf ears in capitals that would prefer a weak council to a strong one dominated by the United States. They are as ambivalent about American power as Washington is about international organization.

Reforming the Security Council is inconceivable without a reconciliation among the major powers. Paris and Berlin should understand that neither European unity nor global leadership can be built on a platform of denial and demonstrations. Neither Paris nor London is about to cede its permanent seat to the European Union, and intra-European bickering has been a major obstacle to Security Council reform.

For its part, the Bush administration should do more listening and less preaching. Most countries are neither friends nor foes, and none likes to be taken for granted. If Washington shows more respect for the agendas of others, they are more likely to respond to ours.

As long as the United States has more military and economic power than any other country, the voting rules in the Security Council will appear arbitrary. Under such conditions, the council should vote less and seek consensus more, giving rogue states less opportunity for employing splitting tactics. Projecting a positive vision, the United Nations Charter speaks of concurring votes of the permanent members, not of their vetoes. The Big Five—the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China—were meant to seek common ground, not to deny the validity of one another’s security concerns or to posture for public approval.

Since the United Nations no longer tries to organize or oversee the use of force itself, this has been left largely to the discretion of member states. Even Secretary General Kofi Annan has acknowledged that unilateral military action is sometimes necessary. The forced removals of Idi Amin in Uganda, or the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, were justified “in the eyes of the world” because of “the internal character of the regimes,” he said in June 1998. Likewise, the council did not authorize the use of force by the West in Kosovo, the United States in Afghanistan, Russia in Chechnya, or, most recently, France in Ivory Coast.

Opponents of the war in Iraq have been highly selective in their reading of the United Nations Charter. It is a compact by which the member states accept constraints on their use of force in the context of a binding system of collective security. Those who for years have sought to weaken the sanctions and inspections efforts in Iraq—undermining this compact—have set the stage for the use of force. It is hypocritical for them now to claim that the rest of the Charter’s rules are sacrosanct.

Unless both the enforcement and legal pillars of the Charter are reinforced, what is left will indeed look a lot like the ill-fated League of Nations. Will the real United Nations please stand up?

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North Korea
Iraq and North Korea have been the two most consistent crisis points of the post–Cold War era. The first Bush administration labeled Iraq, North Korea, and several other regimes as "rogue states" beyond the pale of normal diplomacy.

Next Iraq?
The 1991 Gulf War was followed shortly after by controversy over North Korea’s alleged diversion of fissile material from its Yongbyon nuclear power plant, possibly in order to produce nuclear weapons. In March 1993, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), touching off an escalating crisis with the United States that brought the two countries to the brink of war in June 1994.

War with North Korea was averted, however, and the nuclear issue was solved—now, it seems, only temporarily—by the Agreed Framework of October 1994, which froze North Korea’s nuclear program in exchange for the construction of two light-water reactors by a U.S.–South Korean–Japanese consortium, as well as annual supplies of heavy fuel and other promises to move toward economic and political normalization.

Nearly a decade later, the twin crises of Iraq and North Korea again seem uncannily joined. On October 16, 2002, just as the second Bush administration’s confrontation with Iraq was coming to a head, the State Department announced that, some eleven days earlier, Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly had confronted his counterparts in Pyongyang with evidence that North Korea had “a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements.”

According to U.S. accounts (North Korea publicly neither confirmed nor denied the accusation), the DPRK officials acknowledged the existence of this program and declared the Agreed Framework “nullified.” But North Korea insisted that the United States was to blame for the failure of the Agreed Framework and offered to enter a new set of talks to resolve the crisis. The United States repeatedly refused to negotiate with North Korea before Pyongyang ceased all of its nuclear-related activities, and in November, Washington suspended deliveries of fuel oil to North Korea that had been required under the Agreed Framework.

This was followed by a rapidly escalating set of moves on the part of North Korea toward restarting its plutonium program, frozen by the 1994 Agreement: Pyongyang announced its intention to reopen its nuclear power plant at Yongbyon, expelled South Koreans have lived under the threat of North Korea for decades, knowing that North Korea not only has large numbers of conventional weapons, but chemical weapons as well. They know what war would mean on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, they believe that their country was never safer until resumption of the North Korean nuclear crisis.

With the support of its close ally, the United States, South Korea has developed rapidly over the last four decades, and its economy is now ten times greater than that of North Korea, which currently suffers from famine. In some sense, the game is over. As long as Kim Jong Il is smart enough not to wage war against South Korea and the United States, North Korea should continue to receive international assistance.

The support of the Korean people for the “Sunshine Policy” is in line with this view. Such support rests on two points: (1) strong confidence based on South Korea’s economic dominance over the North; and (2) North Korea will be changed slowly only through economic cooperation, instead of a dangerous and costly sudden collapse. Indeed, economic support and cooperation did play a role in opening a window to dialogue with a previously reluctant North Korean regime.

The North Korean regime may seem unpredictable, but its decisions indicate a certain logic if we review the previous nuclear crisis, which led to the Agreed Framework of October 1994. Under the terms of this accord, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for construction of two light-water reactors by an international consortium, as well as annual supplies of heavy fuel and promises to move toward economic and political normalization.

I see no fundamental difference between previous and current nuclear crises. Even though new South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun wants to rebalance South Korea–U.S. relations, this doesn’t change South Korea’s stance toward North Korea in collaboration with the United States. Fortunately, the U.S. government seems to recognize this approach again, and the international community should be expected to seek diplomatic solutions rather than immediate sanctions.

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1 The “Sunshine Policy,” which ex-president Kim Dae-jung promoted during his term of office, is that engagement rather than confrontation is the only way the two Koreas can avoid war, creating conditions for a positive-sum game on the Korean peninsula. South Korea would help North Korea to overcome its chronic fear and mistrust of South Korea and the United States by providing aid and reassurance unconditionally.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors at the end of December 2002, announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003, and began to remove spent nuclear fuel rods from storage in February—the very acts that had nearly led to war in 1994.

The Bush administration has repeatedly stated that it wants to solve the problem with North Korea diplomatically. President Bush, Secretary of State Powell, and other high officials have insisted that the Iraq and North Korea issues are distinct: the former required the use of force, if necessary by the United States alone; the latter should be resolved through multilateral diplomacy. Many outside the administration expressed puzzlement at this distinction.

If the critical issue were possession of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states—or, as the younger Bush called them, “evil regimes”—then surely North Korea, with a much more advanced nuclear program, was a greater threat than Iraq. Yet the administration refused even to call the North Korean situation a “crisis,” while at the same time launching a full-scale war against Iraq. It may also appear puzzling that the administration insists on multilateral diplomacy to solve the North Korea problem, while its presumptive partners in this negotiation—South Korea, China, and Russia—have all called for direct talks between the United States and North Korea, something North Korea demands and the United States has refused to do unless North Korea dismantles its nuclear program first.

The deadlock over the North Korean nuclear issue, while North Korea continues to move forward with its nuclear program and the United States is preoccupied with the Iraq war, raises the distinct possibility that diplomacy will fail and the United States will be left with only two unpalatable options: allowing North Korea to go nuclear, which could lead to a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia; or launching a pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities, which could trigger a catastrophic war.

Is North Korea determined to become a nuclear power? Past experience suggests that this is not North Korea’s first option. Pyongyang’s overriding concern over the past twelve years of economic disaster and international isolation has been the survival of the regime. Following the revelations of October 2002, North Korea has stated that it is willing to forego any nuclear ambitions in exchange for a nonaggression pact with the United States, the end of American economic sanctions, and American “noninterference” with North Korea’s economic development—all steps that were embedded or implied in the 1994 Agreed Framework.1

As before, North Korea appears to be playing a game of brinkmanship in order to gain maximum bargaining leverage for a new negotiated settlement. But if a new agreement of some sort is not reached, North Korea may have decided that the perceived threat from the United States can only be deterred by the possession of nuclear weapons. Should this happen, any hope for externally induced “regime change” in North Korea will have been drastically reduced. Moreover, there will be a tremendous temptation for Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear defenses against a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. And of more direct relevance to U.S. security, an impoverished, isolated and nuclear-armed North Korea will have a great incentive to sell weapons and fissile material to those willing and able to use them—as North Korea, at the moment, is not—against the United States.

On the other hand, if the United States decides that the best option is a “surgical strike” against North Korea’s nuclear facilities before weapons are developed, the consequences could be disastrous. It is impossible to imagine that North Korea would suffer an American attack without retaliating, and the North does not need weapons of massive destruction to wreak havoc on Seoul: artillery alone could kill millions in a very short time. A full-scale war on the Korean peninsula would result in untold Korean and American casualties, as well as ruin the South Korean economy and potentially destabilize the entire region.

If recent history repeats itself, then the Iraqi issue will be resolved militarily and North Korea issue diplomatically, just as they were in the early 1990s. But the situation is in some ways more dangerous now than it was in 1994. What little trust may have existed between North Korea and the United States has been profoundly undermined by the unraveling of the Agreed Framework, and putting together a new agreement would therefore be that much more difficult. North Korea may have been emboldened by the examples of India and Pakistan, who went nuclear without severe or long-term punishment from the international community. The Bush administration is demonstrably more hawkish than the Clinton administration, and for all its talk of diplomacy, the current administration may be more willing to resort to the military option in the end.

But perhaps the most interesting new development is the position of South Korea. Unlike the government of Kim Young Sam in 1994, the government of South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun is strongly in favor of direct U.S.–North Korean negotiations to solve the nuclear crisis. South Korea today is also much more willing to engage with North Korea directly and has been pursuing engagement with some (albeit limited) success for several years. A negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue, beginning with U.S.–North Korea dialogue and linked to improved South-North relations, is a far preferable option to a nuclear North Korea or a second Korean War.

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NOTES
Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way, with silence from everyone. . . . we feel, your excellency, that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people, who have committed themselves to your country’s policy.” These were words from Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish “greater rights” movement in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, to Henry Kissinger. Needless to say, his call was never answered.
The calls of the Kurdish people were not answered 15 years ago this month when Saddam Hussein proceeded to exterminate women and children in the city of Halabja with chemical gas, succeeding in massaging 5,000 people that day and 180,000 in the course of four years. After the second Gulf War, George Bush Senior deceived the Kurds, asking them to rise up against the Iraqi regime while ultimately failing to support them. “Covert action,” Kissinger said, “should not be confused with missionary work.” Well then, a war in Iraq should most certainly not be confused with just liberation.

The history I just now posited was the recent history of the Kurds in Iraq; the history of Kurds elsewhere is just as atrocious and just as telling of the United States’ unwillingness to intervene in genuine humanitarian tribulations. In the Persian Gulf alone, the United States has been directly responsible for the most atrocious events that have taken place over the course of two wars, from providing satellite imagery to Saddam when he was using chemical weapons against Iran, to using its share of weapons of mass destruction. I learned about some of this first hand. I was a researcher at Halabja Rescue International, an organization started out of Livermore, California. The group sought to obtain compensation for the victims of the Halabja massacre in Iraq from the private organizations in the United States and Europe that, with the tacit support of their governments, sold chemical components to the Iraqi government.

The reality is, whether or not Americans themselves know, the Kurdish people surely know the United States’ guiding principles of foreign policy. They have dealt with its debris in the past. The decision by the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government to support the war against Iraq, therefore, is based on one fundamental issue. Do we take the hand of the unmerited in time of need, or do we not? There are varying opinions among the Kurdish leadership in Northern Iraq. Perhaps foolishly, not having to deal with the realities on the ground in Kurdistan these days, I emphatically say no. If we abandon our dignity and our true notion of justice, even victory is bitter. These were the ideals of the great Saladin, another Kurdish historical figure.

In the early 1990s, the United States saw it in its ultimate interest to establish no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. The Kurds in the north took the initiative to establish autonomous rule, which had been promised to them continually by the central government, knowing that Saddam would be hard pressed to repatriate the North through a ground battle. The Kurds calculated correctly, and Saddam never attempted to return his bureaucracy to this Kurdish region.

In reality, however, not all Kurdish lands were included under the patrol of the no-fly zone. Most notably, the oil rich city of Kirkuk (which holds about half of Iraq's oil), an historically Kurdish city, was left to the central government. Saddam Hussein thus began his ethnic cleansing campaign on the population of Kirkuk, bringing Sunni Arabs to live in the homes of non-Arabs, attempting to change the ethnic character of the city. Kurds were told to either realize that their Kurdish identity was a mistake and officially change it or leave. Most of them left.

Considering all these issues and more, imagine a population that has been autonomous for more than ten years finally able to teach its language at the university level and live free from Baghdad's oppression. A region in the North exists where hundreds of independent papers and satellite channels are allowed to operate without hindrance, and the standard of living tops that of Baghdad's (even with the same deadly sanctions imposed on the rest of Iraq). This war threatens all of the advancements of the last decade in northern Iraq.

As if the situation weren't thorny enough, the Turks, one of the Kurds' greatest historical oppressors (and a NATO member), have manufactured an illegitimate claim to the historic cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. The “liberator” has been seeking Turkey's cooperation nonetheless, as they together covet the riches of the historic soil. The Kurdish Peshmerga militia is known as one of the fiercest and most competent fighting guerilla forces in the world, but recently the Kurds have tried desperately to gain U.S. favor diplomatically, apparently to no avail. Their ultimate reaction cannot be known. The conclusion to this fairy tale I leave for others to realize, but let me suggest that it won't be pretty for us as Kurds and as Americans. This war for God knows what is going to blow up in our faces, perhaps literally.

Ali Ezzatyar is a first-year MIA student concentrating in International Security Policy. He is also pursuing a Middle East Certificate.
HARD AND COMPLEX DECISIONS

By Meltem Aslan ‘95

We are what we read. These days, even more so. Those of us who can read multiple languages at times find ourselves caught in between opposing representations of reality and, hence, of self. But then again, “in between” has always been a familiar state for my reality and self. As a Turkish citizen living in the United States for ten years, I often struggle with trying to reconcile my two selves. Lately, this struggle has intensified as I contemplate the parallels between my experience and that of Turkey.
Turkey is a long-term strategic ally of the United States, the only secular constitutional democracy in the Muslim world and the only predominantly Muslim member of NATO. That description entails many layers of identity and brings with it tensions that are rooted in the country’s geographical and historical position. Any assessment of the Turkish government’s recent decisions without an appreciation of those tensions is bound to result in oversimplification and shunning Turkey’s actions as a “wrong turn,” as was done by a prominent New York Times journalist.

Although based on somewhat different causes and concerns, there is also a contingent in the Turkish media subscribing to the “wrong turn” argument. This is the pragmatist point of view, which contends that the war was inevitable, so Turkey should have sided with its long-time strategic ally. Doing otherwise, argue the proponents of this view, is detrimental both to the economy and to the country’s long-term interests. From a purely economic and pragmatic perspective, they may be right. Again, the forces at play are far more complex than pure economics and pragmatism. It is one thing to disregard public opinion, concerns over illegality, and international opposition when you are a superpower across the ocean. The decision to support war against a neighboring country in a region full of ethnic and historical tensions is a completely different one.

Turkey was one of the first countries after Britain to send troops to Afghanistan. So why was Turkey so reluctant to take part in the war against Iraq? Was it simple “foot-dragging” to negotiate for more money, as has been alleged? Was it the newly formed AKP government’s lack of experience in diplomacy? Or was it simply democracy at work, the parliament reflecting the public will, with almost a quarter of the deputies of the ruling party openly defying their leaders? There is no doubt that each of these factors played a role; however, perhaps the most complicated factor in Turkey’s decision has to do with its Kurdish minority and its experience after the first Gulf War.

The general sentiment in the region is that after the first Gulf War, Americans went home and Turkey had to cope with an influx of refugees. The Kurdish uprising after the war led to fighting between Turks and Kurds throughout much of the 1990s and resulted in a large number of deaths on both sides. The Turkish government is concerned that the same might happen again, this time even with more grave consequences. For this reason, it is important to understand the complexity of the reasons underlying Turkey’s decision and take them into account in dealing with the aftermath of the war. There is no easy solution to the Kurdish issue, and how the Turkish government handles the situation will be critical to the region’s long-term stability. Similarly, how the United States deals with the representation of the ethnic and religious groups in the new Iraqi government will involve hard choices. One such choice for the United States will be the extent to which the new government in Iraq will reflect its Shiite majority—60 percent of the population. Given the perceived threat by the United States of a Shiite government with potential ties to Iran, one cannot help but wonder how far the United States will be willing to go against its self-interest to promote democracy and stability in Iraq.

In the coming weeks and months, as both Turkey and the United States are faced with the need to reconcile self-interest with Iraq’s move toward democracy, it will be clear that this is not as much about right or wrong turns as it is about hard and complex decisions—for all of the parties involved.

Meltem Aslan, MIA ’95, has worked as a strategy consultant in the private sector and is also a founding member of a women’s rights NGO in Turkey. She is moving to Venice, Italy, to pursue a European Union-sponsored postgraduate degree in human rights and democratization.
THE BUSH SECURITY STRATEGY:
REMARKS FROM THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY TEACH-IN
BY GARY SICK
At a time when emotions are running high, it is useful to stand back and try to take a more dispassionate view in a wider context. That is a function that a great university is uniquely equipped to do, and that is what I would like to do in this forum. About every 40 to 50 years, the United States goes through a major debate about its national strategy and place in the world. We are in the middle of one right now.

We had a huge debate at the time of the First World War and the League of Nations, which many thought didn’t go well at all. Then, after the Second World War, the United States adopted a containment policy that lasted until the end of the Cold War. Since then, we have witnessed a chaotic period with no real governing set of rules.

In September, President George Bush released the new National Security document (“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”), which outlines what he and his administration hope will be the defining set of principles for the United States for the next 40 or 50 years.

It’s important to be aware of the document’s intellectual origins—the policy was born almost ten years ago, when the first Bush administration was reluctantly getting ready to leave office. In January 1993, a group of intellectuals in the Department of Defense, working for Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and headed by Under Secretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, completed a grand strategy paper which they left on the desk as they walked out of Washington. The Clinton administration simply dropped it in the trash, and most assumed that was the end of that.

However, the ideas incorporated in that paper were reborn after 9/11 and were formalized a year later in the “National Security Strategy” document published by the White House. Since it may affect the lives of all of us for the next generation or more, I recommend that you take a few minutes and read it. It is available on the White House Web site http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html and is only thirty-one pages long.

The September document contains several elements that are quite unusual and original. First, containment and deterrence, the fundamental essence of foreign and strategic policy for the previous fifty years,
were in effect discarded. It wasn’t that we would never try to deter anybody, but that was no longer defined as an objective.

Instead, there were two new cardinal principles, the first of which—preemption—had begun to appear immediately after 9/11. The United States, like other countries, had practiced preemption in the past; that right is written into the UN Charter, so it is not a new idea. But basically saying that preemption is a primary foreign policy objective is new and needs to be taken very seriously.

The second element is what might be referred to as a doctrine of perpetual preeminence for the United States. The document says very clearly, “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a potential military build up in hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States.” In other words, we are dedicated to ensuring that we remain the world’s predominant military power. There’s no time limit put on that and it isn’t a wish; the United States is pledged to insure that it takes place. This is something quite new for policy, in the United States or, indeed, anywhere else.

Of course, everyone has recognized for years that the United States is the strongest power in the world and that we were likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. That the United States would try to preserve its relative power was not surprising, but it is far from clear what was to be gained by announcing to the world our intention to remain number one forever.

None of this has yet been tested; the reaction to Afghanistan was a clear response to a threat and was carried out fairly quickly. A lot of problems remain, but the initial attack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban was rather successful. At a minimum it destroyed the training camps and scattered Al Qaeda throughout the world. These groups are now operating in many other places all over the world, but Afghanistan was the first step in destroying the terrorist networks that had international reach.

There is another element that is not spelled out in the document. That is the idea that the United States is so strong that it can dominate the rest of the world. This is also new and needs to be taken seriously.

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Reactions around the globe in recent months to U.S. foreign policy and the war in Iraq in particular have been passionate and varied, from worldwide, coordinated antiwar demonstrations, to rallies to support American troops, to attempts to boycott American consumer goods. Drawing on the vast diversity here at SIPA, SIPA News interviewed a group of international students in April about their personal views on the conflict and the response to the war in their home countries.

How do you, and people in your country, view U.S. foreign policy and the war in Iraq? What are some of the factors that shaped those views?

**Ilya Tolstov, Russia, MIA ’03, International Finance and Business**

“I think there were two times in world history when the U.S. was as powerful as it is now—after the Second World War and after the Soviet Union collapsed. After the Second World War, the U.S. created the United Nations, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan. Now it’s destroyed all that. . . . In this war, Saddam was evil, and America was trying to do the best for the Iraqi people, but it’s always scary if someone has power and they use it against someone else.”

**Senait Assefa, Ethiopia, MIA ’04, Economic and Political Development**

“It’s difficult to say how the general population is reacting, but the Ethiopian government has supported the war, and it’s one of only two African countries that have come out and supported it. Both of them have political problems. I think part of it is trying to get the U.S. off their backs. How do I feel about that? It’s difficult to say. The whole thing about the war, and the U.S. doing everything on its own, I feel strongly against. But even if you had a U.N.-supported war, that wouldn’t have...
In the long run, this can be very bad for American interest. Stuart McCarthy, England, MIA '04, Individual Concentration in Foreign Policy

"When it started, I was against the war. I went to marches, and I've never protested anything in my life, but I felt quite strong in the right thing to do. But now I feel in a state of confusion. I don't really understand what it means to Iraqis at the moment. Globally, I think it does set the precedent for preemption. I think it's going to be damaging." [In Great Britain] the reaction is divided. People have rallied around the flag, like in America, but there's still a lot of dissent. Most people have a lot of respect for Tony Blair and his commitment to democracy. His willingness to expose himself to debate on the issues has been impressive. But I think he's misguided in thinking he can affect U.S. foreign policy.

Jaime Shaw, Panama, MPA '04, International Affairs Policy

"I am not against the removal of Saddam Hussein, but I am against the way it was carried out by the United States. U.S. troops were at the ready to attack before all diplomatic means were exhausted. I think that the U.S. should have been more receptive to discussions and ideas of other NATO members and the United Nations. Also, the policy goals were not very clear, the reasons for attack went from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to seeking freedom and democracy for Iraqis. People in Panama go both ways, depending on the issue. But I have a lot of respect for Tony Blair and his commitment to democracy. His willingness to expose himself to debate on the issues has been impressive. But I think he's misguided in thinking he can affect U.S. foreign policy.

Gary Sick is the acting director of the Middle East Institute and an adjunct professor of international affairs at SIPA.
The line wound long around Low Library’s pillars, down its wet marble steps, and past the Alma Mater statue, as hundreds of students and faculty waited patiently for a seat at the Columbia University “Teach-In on Iraq, the United States, and the World.” The March 26 event brought approximately 3,000 people to Low’s rotunda for five hours to hear 30 faculty members speak about the war’s impact on civil liberties, the Bush presidency, the Middle East, foreign policy, media, pre-emptive war, and more.

The teach-in was the capstone of a long day of antiwar activities at Columbia, which included a noontime walkout organized by the Columbia Anti-War Coalition that attracted about a thousand students to College Walk. In comparison to the afternoon’s rebellious tone, the evening teach-in had a serious, contemplative feel. Organized by faculty, it drew a diverse crowd, ranging from undergraduate hipsters in faded Army-issue jackets to devout Muslim women in head scarves. Parents carried babies, business types tucked briefcases beneath their chairs, and students took notes or typed quietly on laptops perched on their knees. Faculty from a range of schools and departments—including SIPA, the Law and Journalism schools, and the departments of Middle East and East Asian Languages and Cultures, Anthropology, English, Religion, History, Political Science, and Sociology—offered their perspectives on the war and its consequences.

“Teach-ins are a forum for dissent; they’re an opportunity for those with an expertise in the current crisis to give depth to the issue,” said Gary Sick, acting director...
of the Middle East Institute. “Faculty have a responsibility to provide a sense of balance and judgment—ideally, they should bring information and rational thought to a complicated situation.” The University has had a long history of peace activism, notably during the Vietnam War, when Columbia and the University of California at Berkeley became the nation’s bicoastal antiwar academic epicenters.

One professor’s remarks sparked a maelstrom of controversy on campus and in the national press, eliciting a barrage of angry e-mails, phone calls, and letters to the University. During his comments, Nicholas De Genova, assistant professor of anthropology, made a reference to a 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed. Many perceived his statements as a call for American casualties in Iraq as a way to teach the United States a lesson. In response, President Lee C. Bollinger stated his and the University’s position: “I am shocked that someone would make such statements. Because of the University’s tradition of academic freedom, I normally don’t comment about statements made by faculty members. However, this one crosses the line and I really feel the need to say something. I am especially saddened for the families of those whose lives are at risk.”

The March 26 teach-in format also prompted some criticism. There was no Q&A exchange between faculty speakers and attendees, and the message of the event was strongly antiwar. “Given the bombardment of biased messaging in the media, there is a rationale for giving antiwar speeches—they provide information counter to the dominant media tone,” said Brigitte Nacos, adjunct professor of political science. “However, at the next teach-in, it would be a better idea to have both sides represented. I would prefer a debate, and the opportunity for the audience to ask questions.”

The message of the evening was simple: Yes, there is a genuine basis for opposition, questioning, and concern. No, dissent is not simply a matter of leftist politics; it is rooted in a thoughtful, studied academic tradition. And—lastly—yes, the words and actions of the University are relevant to the nearby community and the world.

Elizabeth Ashford is a first-year MIA student concentrating in International Media and Communications.

administration is not thinking enough about the long run. Ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban is definitely a good thing in the short term, and ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein is a great change in the short term, but what’s going to happen in the long term?”

Vishnu Juwono, Indonesia, MIA ’03, International Finance and Business

“When September 11 happened, there was sympathy from Indonesian people towards the United States. There were peace demonstrations; they gave flowers to the United States embassy. But then the sentiment shifted 180 degrees when there was the war in Afghanistan, and radical Islamic groups took the opportunity to raise their issues. . . . These radical leaders tried to take advantage, to show that the United States is against Muslims, and is abusing human rights to conduct war. There were a lot of demonstrations. [Right now, though] the Indonesian people are against America, because they perceive that Americans do it alone, without the permission of the United Nations. But the government tries to emphasize that there’s a difference between being antiwar and maintaining a relationship with the United States, especially since we need economic help from the United States.”

Yaewon Yoon, South Korea, MIA, ’04, International Finance and Business

“From what I know, from my peers, people are very skeptical and against this so-called war with Iraq. The problem with South Korean policy is because there are such strong ties to the U.S., the government can’t speak out. It’s very deeply rooted to U.S. policy. . . . I think the war just started off on too many uncertainties. If the U.S. had been sure that this war would set an example, and got support with how to deal with terrorist-harbor ing countries and threatening countries, then it would have been successful. But at the moment, I don’t see that. I don’t see it as setting an example, except for maybe not to do this.”

The University has had a long history of peace activism, notably during the Vietnam War, when Columbia and the University of California at Berkeley became the nation’s bicoastal antiwar academic epicenters.
Imagine living in New York City during a municipal fiscal crisis aggravated by domestic recession, war in the Middle East, and an anemic financial service industry suffering from mismanagement and the end of a speculative bubble.

It's a familiar scenario today, but those who grappled with the New York City fiscal crisis of 1975 faced many of the same conditions, students and faculty learned during the M. Moran Weston II Distinguished Lecture in Urban and Public Policy by Felix G. Rohatyn on February 26.

Rohatyn, former chairman of New York's Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), recounted his harrowing tale of how MAC saved New York City from declaring bankruptcy in the late 1970s through critical political maneuvers and risky financial strategy. He recalled tough negotiations with labor union leaders, wrangling with the Ford administration, and last-minute legal maneuverings. A New York City bankruptcy at that time would have severely impacted New York City's quality of life, undermined the world's confidence in the American economy, and caused a global crisis of the dollar, Rohatyn stressed to the standing room only audience.

The city's present budget gap of $3 billion and debt load of approximately $35 billion is proportionally similar to the city's fiscal status of 1975, Rohatyn observed. "While the word 'crisis' has only been used recently by Mayor Bloomberg or by Governor Pataki, the unfortunate reality is that both the city and the state are facing a very serious crisis, a crisis that in some ways may be more difficult to deal with than the crisis of '75."

However, Rohatyn was careful to underscore critical differences between past and present debt structures and accounting practices in comparing the past and current fiscal emergency. Unlike the present fiscal crisis, the 1975 fiscal crisis was caused mainly by a City Hall accounting scandal.

Rohatyn was also quick to praise the relative financial sophistication of current New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and expressed confidence in Bloomberg's ability to resolve the municipal budget shortfall.

"The differences are many," Rohatyn said. "Our mayor, Mike Bloomberg, is energetic, financially sophisticated, and fully conversant with the real situation of the city and the state. His senior staff is similarly professional. This was not the case then. The city's accounts are trustworthy, transparent, and enable the city managers to plan and manage with accuracy. This is also different and positive."

Rohatyn stressed the need for city, state, and federal cooperation in problem solving, and called for the reinstitution of the New York City commuter tax.

"The city now faces a fiscal and social crisis more severe than in 1975," he said. "It can only overcome it if the appropriate coalition is mobilized, at the city level, the state level, and the national level. The federal government must recognize its obligations to state and local governments, and the state must stand alongside the city in making its case. The hour is getting late."

Rohatyn, who described his tenure with MAC (1975–93) as the "most rewarding experience of my professional life," is president of Rohatyn Associates, LLC, which provides financial advice to corporations. He was the U.S. ambassador to France from 1997 to 2000 and is the former managing director of the investment banking firm Lazard Frères & Co. Rohatyn was also a member of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange from 1968 to 1972 and served on the Board of Directors of several NYSE listed corporations.

"It was one of the best lectures I have been to at SIPA. Ambassador Rohatyn gave a good substantive background on the way New York City's politics really work," said Bridget Anderson, MPA '04.

Rohatyn follows other prominent speakers, including U.S. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), who have been invited by SIPA to deliver the annual Weston lecture. The Weston lecture was created to honor the legacy of the Rev. Dr. M. Moran Weston II, Columbia University's first African-American trustee, founder of the Carver Federal Savings Bank (the nation's largest black-owned financial institution), and distinguished leader in the Harlem and Morningside Heights communities.

Suchitra Saxena is a first-year MPA student concentrating in International Affairs/Institutional Analysis.
New Saltzman Institute Plans for a Peaceful Future

Excerpts from Arnold A. Saltzman’s remarks at the inauguration of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies on March 31, 2003

The newly named Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies was established by President Eisenhower 50 odd years ago, while president of Columbia University. That it will now carry our name is a particular honor that Columbia bestows on me and my family.

But it has another most important significance to me, which transcends the naming of the Institute. I have spent a good portion of my life involved in the affairs of our country—carrying out policy level, economic, and diplomatic assignments in peacetime and wartime during several presidencies, and serving as a young naval officer in World War II.

I am not new to the work of the Institute, which means a great deal to me. I understand what it is and the increased role it can play—particularly now.

It is said if you live long enough, good things will happen, and tonight certainly proves it for me. But bad things happen too, and I have seen and participated in more than I care to remember.

The Italian rape of a brave but defenseless Ethiopia; the brutal Spanish Civil War, Hitler’s testing ground for World War II, which brought its own horror of tens of millions dead; the war in Korea settling nothing; the endless bloodshed in Central America; the tragedy and travesty of Vietnam—so many people died and often no benefit to the living. And I wondered how God could, at the same time, be on the side of each of the opposing combatants who invoked his name—as continues to be the case today.

Alas, no bugles blow for peace, and peace is not simply an absence of war.

That will not come about without structural change in how our government addresses our nation’s problems. Hastily erected shelters after the lightning has struck, as is being done in the case of terrorism, is but one example. The various departments and agencies of our government are busy furthering the immediate economic and political objectives, which include the purposes of their constituents.

And so today, as in decades past, in Democratic and Republican administrations, we react to the crises after they arise, resulting from problems for the most part foreseeable. But there is no mechanism in our government to look beyond the immediate, to plan for a more peaceful future, to coordinate our frequently contradictory policies of commission and omission. That is what we must do to wage peace.

This institute can help provide the introspection that will change how our government makes policy.

And, the Institute, with its strong academic capabilities, increasingly will be reaching out to partner with political leaders to promote peace, retard war, combat terrorism.

Institutes Renamed

The Institute of War and Peace Studies was renamed this semester in honor of Arnold A. Saltzman (CC’36), the former ambassador and longtime supporter of the University. The new Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies was inaugurated on March 31 at a ceremony and reception in Low Library.

Richard K. Betts, director of the Institute and the first Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies, gave a lecture—“Three Visions of International Security”—at the event. “It is an honor to have Mr. Saltzman’s support,” said Betts. “It will allow us to continue what we are doing and take on additional projects and continue the tradition that began with our founder, [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.”

In addition to establishing a second chaired professorship that will bring distinguished practitioners to Columbia, the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies will continue to develop programs and promote research in the fields of international conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, and military and security studies.

** * * *

The East Asian Institute also got a makeover this semester. It has a new name—the Weatherhead East Asian Institute—a new logo, and a new lease on life. The new name acknowledges the continued support the institute has received from the Weatherhead Foundation since 1980, when the Weatherhead Fund at Columbia was established. The endowment has grown from $1.5 million to its present level of $18 million.

“The enhanced support will allow the institute to provide a greater degree of funding to students and expand its programs to include, among other things, public policy forums and contemporary East Asian culture and art,” said Director Xiaobo Lü.

In recognition of the change, a naming ceremony was held in Low Library on January 29.

Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies

Arnold A. Saltzman and his wife Joan with members of their family at the naming ceremony for the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in Low Library

Columbia, whose sons participated in the creation of this nation, is a most appropriate home for these endeavors.

Arnold A. Saltzman, CC ’36, is a diplomat and industrialist who has been a longtime supporter of Columbia University.
SIPA Gala Celebrates Honorees and Reflects on Current Events

By Christine Ostrowski

SIPA held its third annual Global Leadership Awards Dinner on March 4, 2003, at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. The honorees comprised an impressive group: Madeleine K. Albright '68, former U.S. Secretary of State, was awarded the Andrew Wellington Cordier Award for Distinguished Public Service; Richard M. Smith '69, chairman and editor-in-chief of Newsweek, was given the Harvey Picker Award for Distinguished Public Service; and The Community Service Society of New York was awarded the Schuyler C. Wallace Award for Distinguished Public Service.

Adjoint Professor Joan Helpern, of Joan and David, and Juan Sabater, of Goldman Sachs and a member of the Dean's Advisory Board, and his wife Mariana, served as co-chairs of the event. The honorary chair, Hillary Rodham Clinton, could not attend the ceremony but sent a videotaped message from Washington in which she saluted SIPA for training individuals willing to confront the many challenges of the world and build a better future.

Dean Lisa Andersen started off the festivities with remarks about the night's honorees. "We are here tonight to celebrate the work of two individuals and an organization who have had an enormous impact in shaping the world we live in," she said.

"They embody the things we look for in our students: ambition, courage, and a concern for the welfare of others," she added.

As testimony, she introduced four

Biosphere Program Moves to New York

The new Master of Public Administration (MPA) Program in Earth Systems Science, Policy, and Management has been renamed the Program in Environmental Science and Policy and has moved to Columbia's New York City campus. The multidisciplinary professional environmental master's degree was launched in June 2002 at the Biosphere 2 Center located near Tucson, Arizona.

The program's move will take advantage of the wide range of faculty expertise that exists in New York, including that of the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, located in Palisades, New York, 15 miles from the Morningside Heights campus.
current SIPA students whose diverse backgrounds and ambitious goals make them the perfect representatives of the SIPA student body. Albert Munoz (MPA), Ana Escrogima (MIA), Sarah Holloway (EMPA), and Charles Obimpeh (PEPM) each addressed what their SIPA education has meant to them thus far and how they believe it will help them and their fellow classmates achieve great things in the future.

Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger also stressed the importance of SIPA in relation to the issues facing the world today. “SIPA stands at the center of the effort because so much of what we need to focus on are policies that will shape our future,” he said.

Madeleine Albright, introduced by former State Department spokesman James P. Rubin ’84, graciously accepted the award from her alma mater and discussed the tough issues facing the world today, which she called “the perfect storm.” Included in the list were the war on terrorism, Iraq, the Middle East, India and Pakistan, and North Korea.

Above all, she stressed that American power can be good when the rest of world makes the U.S. do right. “The role of the United States is to provide leadership in the 21st century not bloated with our own power,” she said.

Another honoree and SIPA alumnus, Richard Smith, was presented his award by A. Michael Hoffman ’73. Smith took a moment to reflect on what the school meant to him. “SIPA opened new horizons, put me in touch with a new world, and literally changed my life,” he remarked. Like Albright, he also commented on the turmoil of the world and noted how these times makes schools like SIPA more important than ever. “If America is going to be able to navigate throughout the world, it needs leaders that understand different cultures. SIPA helps spread that message to this world,” he said.

The third of the night’s honorees was The Community Service Society of New York, which was represented by its president, David R. Jones. Jones thanked SIPA and the Honorable David Dinkins, who presented him with the award, and said he was proud that his organization had become “a beacon for society.” He talked about the role of public service in the world and the need for governments to respond to them,” he remarked.

The Leadership Awards Dinner raised $280,000, funds that will go toward SIPA’s fellowship program, helping current students finance their education.

The evening, hailed a success by organizers and attendees alike, was an opportunity for SIPA faculty, administration, alumni, and students to join together with public service activists to reflect upon the world today and renew SIPA’s mission to prepare its students to make a difference.

Christine Ostrowski, SIPA News editor, is a second-year MIA student concentrating in International Media and Communications.

intensive 12-month degree program is a joint collaboration between the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and The Columbia Earth Institute (CEI). It combines the SIPA curriculum in management and policy with a curriculum in Earth systems science. Students will take their science courses at Lamont during the summer and their policy classes at SIPA during the following fall and spring semesters.

“With the arrival of Jeffrey Sachs at The Earth Institute, our emphasis on environmental studies has increased, and this decision is in line with our intention to bring together the expertise of all the faculties that have an input in this program. Having all the concerned faculties in a single location is clearly an advantage,” said Steven Cohen, the director of the program.

He emphasized that the move would help students benefit from the variety that the different faculties represent, including both natural science and social and economic policy analysis. “The major intention is to integrate life, Earth, and social science to enhance sustainable development; this combination has assumed a very high priority at Columbia,” said Cohen, adding that he sees more resources going into environmental studies now than ever before.

Meanwhile, Cohen said the program received 25 percent more applications this year than last year. The program is a yearlong course beginning every June and ending the following May.
Carlyle Chaudruc:
An Artist's Journey
By Clara Perez
Faculty Profile: Victoria Murillo
by Celeste Taricone

A ssociate Professor Victoria Murillo’s research interest on labor unions dates back to her high school student days in Buenos Aires. Growing up in Argentina, where unions have played a prominent role in the nation’s history, Murillo, who began teaching at SIPA in January, was a student union organizer. At that time, in the early 1980s, Argentina’s military junta, which had been responsible for thousands of “disappearances” of leftist dissidents and for other human rights violations, was finally ending. The student union members, in addition to organizing activities and putting out publications for their peers, also went to human rights demonstrations to protest the government’s actions.

“My school lost quite a few students during the disappearances, probably about sixty. So it was a big deal for us, so many kids had been killed,” Murillo said.

In 1991, a year after completing her bachelor’s degree in political science at the University of Buenos Aires, Murillo received a graduate fellowship to Harvard. When she enrolled, she envisioned her research focusing on the democratic transitions in Chile and Argentina, as well as labor unions. During her fieldwork, she found the latter much more compelling and began to investigate explanations for why labor unions may or may not support economic market reforms. She began a comparative study of Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela that became her dissertation, which was published in 2001 as a book, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge University Press). It will be printed in Spanish next year by Siglo XXI in Madrid.

After finishing her PhD in 1997, Murillo spent five years teaching at Yale before coming to SIPA. In her first semester here, she taught the “State and Society in the Developing World” and “Labor in the Global Economy” courses.

The school’s academic environment fits well with her interest in studying policymaking. The resources and professors at the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) also drew her to SIPA, she said. “Because I’m interested in Latin America and policies, both SIPA and ILAS, in conjunction with the Department of Political Science, are a great combination,” Murillo added. “I think the kind of dialogue, in terms of social sciences and policy implications, you can have with people at ILAS is unique at research universities. That’s a great thing for the type of work I’m doing.”

Murillo has published extensively in English and Spanish journals ranging from World Politics to Foreign Affairs en Espanol, and has written many book chapters, working papers, and book reviews. Next year, while on sabbatical, she plans to work on a second book, on the privatization of public utilities in Chile, Mexico, and Argentina.

Her academic awards include two postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard. Recently, she coordinated a research network to study union responses to education reforms across Latin America.

“I love research, and I love teaching,” she said. “It’s a privileged situation to be doing something you really like.”

Celeste Taricone, SIPA News assistant editor, is a first-year student concentrating in International Media and Communications.
Faculty Profile: Jennifer Hill

By Sandra Kinne

There’s a new variable in the statistics department at SIPA. Jennifer Hill, who received her PhD in statistics from Harvard University, joined SIPA’s faculty in January and will teach quantitative methods for the MPA program.

One of her goals is to make statistics more fun and relevant to students’ experiences. “We want people to realize this is useful,” she said.

Hill did not always intend to become a professor. After graduating from Swarthmore College, she worked in the corporate world on employee benefits planning. Working on 401K retirement plans was “dry, dry, dry,” she said. “I decided that was not for me.”

After taking a series of aptitude tests, Hill was told she should work in math or physics. She realized that made sense. “I come from a ‘mathy’ family,” she said. “I’ve always had a quantitative bent.” She received a master’s degree from Rutgers University before heading to Boston. While studying at Rutgers, she realized statistics was a good fit.

During her postdoctorate studies at Columbia’s School of Social Work, all her areas of interest—child and family, welfare policy, and methodologies—came together. “I think that’s when it all meshed for me,” she said.


Hill decided she wanted to become a professor, but thought there was not much precedent for statisticians at policy schools. But, she said, she believes that is changing. “In general, I think public policy is moving toward being more quantitatively oriented.” When SIPA posted a job—a “gift from God,” she said—she thought it would be a great fit because it will allow her to work on statistics and policy. “So this is really the ideal job for me.”

This semester, while preparing for the classroom, Hill worked on research related to child development and maternity leave. She said there are numerous studies about what happens to a child’s development when the child’s mother returns to work, but few have looked at the related connection between family leave policies and the leave that new moms actually take.

Though it builds on a previous project, “it’s of interest to me because I’m in that situation,” said Hill, who had a baby last fall.

Hill said she is interested in child development and family policies because they are the root of other policies. “I guess I thought a lot of the problems people are faced with can best be dealt with from an early start,” she said. “To the extent that we can intervene and help kids off to a better start, that is a good investment.”

Hill looks forward to training a new set of policy students and hopes the SIPA community will use her as a resource to help them think critically and think through empirical policy questions.

“We’re all after the same goal,” she said. “We all want to make the world a better place.”

Sandra Kinne is a first-year MPA student concentrating in Education Policy.

SIPA’s Picker Center Teams up with the New York Fire Department

SIPA has been expanding its wings even further with respect to management training, this time with the New York Fire Department (FDNY). The Picker Center, in conjunction with the Institute for Not-for-Profit Management at the Business School, participated in a four-week management training program for twenty-four New York City fire chiefs. The chiefs learned management techniques related to strategic planning, human resources, and crisis management. After successfully completing the course, which was held at the GE training facility in Crotonville, New York, the fire chiefs received their certificates at a reception held on March 19, 2003.

Bill Eimicke, director of the Picker Center, served as curriculum director and was one of the main instructors. “This program illustrates the establishment of the Picker Center as an arm of SIPA that reaches people working full time who can’t go through the full academic program,” he said. “These individuals can still benefit from the education and resources that full-time students do.”

Building on the success of this initial program, there are plans to broaden the training to middle management of the FDNY and eventually reach all of its managers. This year alone, the Picker Center has mounted projects involving the Department of Homeland Security, police officers from Northern Ireland, the Shanghai Media Group, and the 92nd Street Y in New York City.

“Year-round, the Picker Center is helping to train a wide range of individuals from all over the world,” added Eimicke. “That’s what makes the program unique.”
Columbia 250

Columbia kicks off a year-long celebration of its 250th anniversary during Homecoming Week 2003 (October 16–19). The opening weekend of the “Columbia 250” festivities includes the world premiere of a documentary on Columbia by legendary filmmaker Ric Burns; the long-awaited football rematch between the Columbia Lions and the Penn Quakers; a blockbuster outdoor concert; a birthday celebration marking Alma Mater’s 100th year on campus; two world-class academic symposia, “Constitutions, Democracy, and the Rule of Law” and “The Impact of Genes and Genomes on Medicine and Society”; as well as lectures, book signings, tours, ribbon cuttings, and more. Make plans now to be a part of this historic celebration! www.columbia.edu/c250

Class Notes

compiled by Laura Limonic

1964

Garry Hesser, International Fellow ’64
Garry received the 2002 Distinguished Sociologist of Minnesota Award presented annually by the Sociologists of Minnesota. He also received the 2001 Pioneer Award from the National Society for Experiential Education and the 1998 Thomas Ehrlich Award for national leadership and scholarship in advancing the field of service learning as a teacher, researcher, and community partner.

1973

Adam Lovinger, MIA
Adam works as an attorney at Clifford Chance US LLP, specializing in international project finance with a focus on development finance and representing multilateral development agencies (IFC, IDB) and U.S. governmental development agencies (U.S. Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation). Adam is married to Jessica Lang, and a baby boy is on the way in June.

1975

Beth Bloomfield, MIA
beth@bloomfieldassociates.com
www.bloomfieldassociates.com
Beth retired in 2000 after 25 years in the federal government, most of that with the Central Intelligence Agency. She is now the founder and principal of Bloomfield Associates, LLC, an executive coaching and strategy consulting firm in Annapolis, Maryland, where she lives and sails. The International Coach Federation recently awarded her the designation of professional certified coach, and she is also a certified management consultant, a mark of excellence held by less than one percent of all management consultants. Beth’s clients include senior executives in business, government, and nonprofits. She would be delighted to hear from classmates and other alumni.

1981

Lisa Block, MPA
CHisler2000@aol.com
Lisa has accepted a position as program officer of the Healthcare Foundation of New Jersey, which funds a wide variety of health initiatives in New Jersey and supports the needs of Jewish residents of the New Jersey Metrowest community.

1983

Thomas Lancia, MIA
Thomas recently started his own law practice in New York City, which includes some international commercial and legal work.

1984

Aubrey Carlson, MIA
CarlsonAA@state.gov
Aubrey is currently enrolled in Ukrainian language and area studies at the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, Virginia. Aubrey will be the political counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev, starting in August.

Dr. Edwin G. Beal, ’50GF, a friend of the East Asian Institute, passed away on December 6, 2002, at Collington Life Care Community, which had been his home for many years. A celebration of his life was held at Collington on January 25, 2003. We extend our condolences to Dr. Beal’s family and friends.
1985
Christopher Bobin, MIA
cbobin@adb.org
Christopher has been working at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Manila, the Philippines, going on three years and has recently been promoted to senior risk management officer with the ADB's Treasury Department. He and his colleagues are implementing a straight-through trade processing and risk management solution for ADB's investment and liability portfolio. Previously, he worked for five years in Singapore for several private sector firms, including the Phibro Division of Salomon Inc., all within the trading and risk management areas. Although the economic and political situation in the Philippines still has periodic ups and downs, Christopher, his wife Esther, and their four-year-old son Albert have adapted well.

1989
David Klutz, MPA
dklutz@cityhall.nyc.gov
David has returned to the Mayor's Office for AIDS Policy Coordination, after a year and a half at the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. David worked from 1996 to 2001 as a program coordinator in the AIDS Policy Coordination office. The Bloomberg administration asked him to return in November 2002 as acting citywide coordinator for AIDS Policy, to head the office during a search for a new director. In January 2003, David was appointed deputy director to the new citywide coordinator by Mayor Bloomberg.

1990
Chris Wrona Giallongo, MIA-EPD
cwiallongo@yahoo.com
Chris has recently taken a staff position with the U.S. Peace Corps and will be the programming and training officer on the team that reopens the Albania program, which has been closed since 1997. Chris and her family (husband Rob and two children, Eliza, 6, and Luca, 2) are excited to be heading overseas again. They have been living for the last 12 years in Mont Shasta, California, where Chris has been working in the domestic microenterprise movement as a trainer, evaluator, and program manager.

1997
Jane Leu, MIA
jane@upglo.org
In 2000, Jane founded Upwardly Global (UpGlo), a nonprofit organization in the San Francisco Bay area, focused on increasing economic opportunity for underemployed refugee and immigrant professionals and decreasing discrimination against immigrants in the labor market. Jane is thrilled to report that fellow SIPA alum Camille Ramani, MIA '97, recently joined the UpGlo team. Camille is the third staff member and is responsible for developing the services for immigrant and refugee professionals. Please visit www.upwardlyglobal.org for more information.

1998
Paolo Campanini, PEPM
paolocampanini@hotmail.com
Since graduation, Paolo has been a consul of Italy in Mendoza, Argentina. He is working in Mendoza, which is the Napa Valley of Argentina, has consisted mostly of dealing with Argentines of Italian descent who are reclaiming their Italian citizenship so that they can go back to Italy. He has been overwhelmed with requests due to the terrible economic situation in Argentina.

1987
Edward Gresser, MIA
egresser@dilcppi.org
Edward is the director of the Project on Trade and Global Markets at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, D.C., a think tank associated with the Democratic Leadership Council.

1997
Camille Ramani, MIA
Camille is the third staff member and is responsible for developing the services for immigrant and refugee professionals. Please visit www.upwardlyglobal.org for more information.

1998
Chris Loso, MPA
closo97@yahoo.com
Chris is still living and working in Washington, D.C. He is currently a project manager with the Unisys Global Public Sector practice, a technology and management consulting services firm located in Washington D.C., and McLean, Va. Prior to joining Unisys, he served as a manager with Arthur Andersen’s Office of Government Services in D.C. and as a senior consultant with Deloitte Consulting Public Sector Practice in New York Cty. In March Chris created a day-long benchmarking course for SIPA students, which he led with the assistance of his classmates Rob Boccio and Ben Hunnicutt.

In addition to his volunteer work with SIPA’s Offices of Career Services and Alumni Relations, Chris was elected president of the Columbia University Alumni Club of Washington, D.C., in January and hopes to work closely with SIPA to plan activities. Check out the group’s Web site at CUDC.org or YAHOO Chat Group at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/columbia-dcf. He would welcome your interest and suggestions.
Lloyd Kass, MPA
kassl@nychc.nyc.gov

Lloyd is currently working at NYCHA (New York City Housing Authority).

1999

Chelsea Emery, MIA
Chelsea.Emery@reuters.com

Chelsea was married in August to Canadian Stephen Swalsky, who works in entertainment legal affairs. The couple lives in Brooklyn with their two 15-pound cats. Chelsea was made Reuters’ aerospace and defense reporter a few weeks before the war started, so it’s been a very busy few months.

Elizabeth Gomart, MIA
Ejgomart@aol.com


2000

Chris Allieri, MIA
allieri@yahoo.com

Chris recently joined the New York office of Global Consulting Group (GCG), an international strategic communications consulting firm with offices in New York, London, Tokyo, Tel Aviv, and São Paulo.

Suzana Bacvanovic MIA
Suzana.bacvanovic@kbc.be

Suzana joined the New York Branch of KBC Bank N.V. as an associate in the Global Project Finance Group. In this capacity, she is responsible for the origination, execution, structuring, and portfolio management of Project Finance transactions in the Power, Oil & Gas and Infrastructure sectors in the United States and Latin America. On May 18, 2002, Suzana married Goran Mloshevic in New York City.

Niclas Salomonsson, MPA
niclas_salomonsson@ams.com

Niclas is working at AMS Consulting and has recently wed.

2001

Hong Mei, PEPM
hm240@columbia.edu

Hong Mei has been hired by the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank to work as a human resource training specialist in civil service organizations and reforms in western China for the Office of the Leading Group for Western Region Development of the State Council, People’s Republic of China. Hong Mei is responsible for strategy design and upgrading for the local government officials in 12 provinces in western China.

Katya Nadirova, MIA
enadirova@yahoo.com

Ekaterina (Katya) and Leigh Sprague (Harriman Institute ’99, Columbia Law School ’99) are happy to announce the arrival of their daughter, Ivana Constance, born on January 29, 2003, at M eriter Hospital in Madison, Wisconsin. The couple lives and works in M oscow. Leigh is a lawyer with Leboef, Lamb, Green & MacRae, and Katya is a program officer with IREX.

Joon-sung Park, MIA
jspark01@mofat.go.kr

After graduating from SIPA, Joon-sung returned to South Korea and started working as a researcher at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), a think tank for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea. Joon-sung works mainly in the Division of National Security and Unification Studies, one of five research divisions at IFANS.

2002

Nori Katagiri, MIA
yaponorry@hotmail.com

Nori is working at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., and will spend the summer in Tokyo, before beginning her doctoral studies in political science at the University of Pennsylvania this fall.

Charlie Winkler, MPA
cwinkler@dc.com

Charlie is working at Deloitte Consulting in New York City.

Lila Azam Zanganeh
azalila@hotmail.com

Lila is currently living in New York City, where she works as a freelance journalist and a full-time assistant producer at NBC News. She has been a contributor to the literary pages of Le Monde and recently filed her first story for BBC Radio. Last year, she produced a two-hour French public radio documentary regarding intellectual perspectives on 9/11. Lila also serves as program director for the New York Bureau of the Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, an international NGO promoting cross-cultural exchange.

Laura Limonic is a second-year MIA student concentrating in International Economic Policy.

CORRECTION:

In the previous issue of SIPA News, an article on the work of MIA candidate Violeta Krasnic misrepresented that work and quoted her inaccurately. In unintentionally suggesting questionable ethics and implying that nationalism was the motivation for their work with women war rape survivors, the article discredited her work and that of her colleagues. We regret the error.